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Abstract
In this thesis, I explore issues related to energy and environmental markets. In the first chapter, I
examine the benefits of complementary bidding mechanisms used in electricity auctions. I develop
a model of complex bidding and estimate its structural parameters in the context of the Spanish
electricity market. I then perform a counterfactual analysis in which the original mechanism is
compared to one in which complex bids are not allowed. I find that, while firms do exercise market
power through complex bids, the positive coordination benefits of complex bidding dominate. In the
second chapter, I explore the impacts of cap-and-trade in the Spanish electricity market, quantifying
the rate at which firms internalized the costs of the emissions as well as the rate at which they
passed it through. I find evidence that supports a full internalization rate at the firm-level, which
results in a partial pass-through due to both demand and supply factors. Finally, in chapter 3, in
joint work with Meredith Fowlie and Stephen Ryan, we explore the long run dynamic implications
of subjecting an imperfectly competitive industry to market-based pollution regulation. Using two
decades of panel data on the US Portland cement industry, we estimate a fully dynamic model
of firms' strategic entry, exit, production, and investment decisions. We then use the model to
simulate counterfactual outcomes under three general classes of allocation regimes: auctioning,
grandfathering, and contingent updating. We find that the imposition of a carbon trading program
would lead to large social losses at low to medium carbon prices.
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Chapter 1
The Welfare Effects of
Complementary Bidding Mechanisms*
1.1 Introduction
Auctions are used to allocate goods in many markets. Among the most commonly studied
auction settings, there are first and second price auctions for single goods, and discriminatory
and uniform price auctions for multiple goods. However, there are many situations in which the
auctioning process departs from these simple rules. In the presence of valuation complementarities,
less common rules of bidding are usually introduced. These rules are often tightly related to more
common rules: they are an "augmented" auction in which complementary bidding procedures are
coupled with more traditional designs.
One of the most studied auctions in which complementarities can be expressed are combinatorial
auctions, in which bidders can express their willingness to buy combinations of goods.' A well
known example of combinatorial auctions is the case of package auctions in Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions (see, for instance, Cramton (2002)). The introduction of
combinatorial bidding is motivated by the fact that, in the presence of complementarities across
goods, the joint valuation of two or more goods can substantially differ from their individual values.
The welfare implications of augmented bidding procedures are many times theoretically am-
biguous in a second best environment.2 On the one hand, these mechanisms allow bidders to better
reflect their valuations, which can increase the efficiency of the auction by improving the allocation
I thank Nancy Rose and Stephen Ryan for their invaluable guidance and advice. I thank Paul Joskow for
his comments, support and encouragement. I thank Ignacio Pdrez-Arriaga and Frank Wolak for their comments
and suggestions, which have greatly contributed to this paper. I also thank Hunt Allcott, Sergi Basco, Severin
Borenstein, Jim Bushnell, Lucas Davis, Tatyana Deryugina, Glenn Ellison, Sara Ellison, Natalia Fabra, Meredith
Fowlie, Panle Jia, Erin Mansur, Monica Martinez-Bravo, Marti Mestieri, Eduardo Morales, Michael Peters, Steven
Puller, Nirupama Rao, Joseph Shapiro, Artyom Shneyerov, Ashley Swanson, Matthew White, Catherine Wolfram
and participants at the MIT Industrial Organization lunch and seminar, IIOC Conference, and the UCEI Camp at
UC Berkeley for their comments.
'For a comprehensive treatment, see Cramton et al. (2006).
2 Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2007) document this ambiguity for the case of the procurement auctions for bus rotes
in the United Kingdom, in which bidders are allowed to express a joint preference to serve two or more routes.
of the auctioned goods. On the other hand, it gives bidders another dimension to exert market
power, which can lead to a reduction of total welfare. The goal of this paper is to assess this trade-
off in the context of a specific form of complementary bidding procedure that is used in wholesale
electricity auctions.
Many wholesale electricity markets use complementary bidding procedures in their daily auc-
tions to allow firms to reflect their cost complementarities over time. Some examples are the
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) market, the Californian market, the Irish market and
the Spanish market. The particularities of the mechanism in each of these markets can vary, but
they all have the common denominator of allowing firms to reflect their startup costs in a way that
ensures that these costs are potentially recovered in the market. Due to the richness of the bidding
data, these markets provide a unique environment in which to analyze the bidding behavior of the
firms, measure complementarities and test the effects of these complementary bidding mechanisms
on welfare.
In this paper, I study the benefits and costs of introducing one such mechanism in the Spanish
wholesale electricity market. The complementary mechanism used in the Spanish electricity market
takes the form of an augmented set of uniform price auctions. 3 For every hour of the day, firms
submit offers to produce electricity with step bids as they would do in a uniform price auction,
which are called simple bids. However, each generator can also express a daily revenue requirement
on top of these bids, which constitutes its complex bid. This minimum revenue requirement makes
the simple bids contingent: if the daily gross revenue of a generator is not at least as large as its
minimum requirement, its hourly simple bids are taken out from the auction and the generator is
not assigned any quantity in the auction. Because the revenue requirement applies to the whole
day, this gives firms a mechanism to express their preference regarding joint realizations of demand
over the day.
Figure 1-1 gives an intuition for the effects of complex bids on the supply curve at the market for
a given hour of the day. The figure plots both demand and supply at the market. The solid supply
curve represents the original simple offers made by the firms. However, at the original hourly prices
defined by the crossing of the two solid lines, several units do not recover their revenue requirement.
These units are taken out iteratively from the aggregate supply curve, shifting the supply curve
inwards, until the price is such that the market clears and all minimum revenue requirements are
satisfied. Intuitively, this mechanism allows the players to withdraw their capacity from the market
if demand realizations are too low, which allows them to bid more flexibly, offering their capacity
and letting the mechanism determine whether it is optimal or not to startup a unit. However, if
firms have market power, it can allow them to tailor the startup decisions more strategically, taking
out their units in situations in which (i) it would have been socially optimal to supply them, and
(ii) they would have not been taken out if complex bids were not allowed.
From a theoretical perspective, the welfare effects of the complex bids are ambiguous (Reguant,
3 In a uniform price auction, the auctioneer crosses demand and supply. The market price is determined by the
intersection of the two. All supply units with prices lower or equal to the market price are scheduled to produce.
Figure 1-1: A Uniform Auction in which Offers are Discarded
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2010). In practice, the potential exercise of market power by means of gaming complex bidding rules
has been an important issue of debate. For example, in the initial design of the British electricity
market, firms were allowed to submit complex bids that would let them represent their preferences
more accurately. However, firms learned to use them to significantly raise prices, which led to the
modification of the design towards simpler rules (OFFER, 1999). In New England, during the
discussion of the de-regulated electricity market design, scholars were concerned that complex bids
would give a wedge to the firms to exercise their market power (Cramton and Wilson, 1998).
In order to empirically quantify the welfare implications of minimum revenue requirements in
the Spanish electricity market, I develop a multi-unit auction model in which bidders submit both
simple and complex bids. In the model, I take into account the short-run dynamics that are present
in the production function as well as the non-convex nature of their costs, which are essential to
understanding the role and effects of complex bidding. Then, I estimate the parameters of the model
using the first order conditions implied by firm profit-maximizing behavior. By parameterizing the
cost function and forward position as well as by exploiting the information contained in complex
bids, I am able to estimate both costs and forward contracts jointly. I show that the presence of
complex bids helps to identify the startup costs of the firms. Finally, once the fundamentals of
the model are obtained, I conduct policy counterfactuals to understand the welfare implications of
complex bids in terms of productive efficiency and market power. 4 In particular, I compare the
performance of the market with the complex bidding mechanism to the case in which complex bids
are not allowed.
4The concept of efficiency in an auction setting is usually interpreted as allocative efficiency. In the context of the
electricity auctions studied in this paper, this term can be interpreted as productive efficiency. Given the traditionally
low elasticity of demand, in the short-run the objective is to minimize the costs of producing a certain demand of
electricity.
The results suggest that the complex bidding mechanism performs better than the simple bid-
ding mechanism, even in the presence of market power. Even though firms could potentially with-
hold more capacity with complex bids, the mechanism has beneficial coordination effects, effectively
increasing the overall elasticity of the supply curve. I find evidence that, in the absence of complex
bids, the presence of a more inelastic and uncertain residual demand can increase the incentives of
a strategic firm to raise market prices, with an overall negative welfare effect. The distributional
implications of removing complex bids are particularly large. I find that, in the absence of complex
bids, increased volatility due to less coordination could increase prices by 6.87%, translating into
an increase of over 550ME of annual payments by consumers. Therefore, the results suggest that
augmenting the auction with this complementary bidding procedure has a net positive economic
effect in this market.
The major contributions of the paper are twofold. First, I extend the estimation of multi-
unit auctions by adapting current techniques to a non-standard setting in which players can use
augmented forms of bidding. I show that the presence of these complementary bids can help to
identify the cost complementarities present in the production function of the firms. Second, with
the estimated fundamentals, I construct counterfactuals that contribute to the study of market
power in electricity markets in the presence of non-convex costs and non-standard rules of bidding.
These mechanisms are common in several electricity markets, but there have not been any attempts
to model and estimate their welfare implications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I review the literature. In section
1.3, I explain the institutional features of the Spanish electricity market and the data and present a
descriptive analysis of the usage of complex bids. Section 1.4 develops a multi-unit auction model
with complex bidding and derives optimality conditions. In section 1.5 and 1.6, the estimation
strategy and results are presented. In section 1.7, I detail the counterfactual strategy and perform
a set of simulations using the estimated fundamentals. In section 1.8, I conclude and suggest future
lines of research.
1.2 Related literature
This paper is mostly related to two primary streams of research: the empirical auctions litera-
ture, and the work analyzing the exercise of market power in wholesale electricity markets.
Regarding the empirical auctions literature, the paper follows the methods to estimate valua-
tions from the underlying bidding data using the implied optimality conditions, as in Guerre, Per-
ringue and Vuong (2000). It is particularly related to multi-unit auctions studies, such as McAdams
(2008), Hortagsu (2002) and Gans and Wolak (2008), adapting them to the particularities of the
complex bidding mechanism.
This paper is also related to the empirical literature on auctions with complementarities. The
paper is closely related to the work by Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2007), who also explore the
existing tradeoff between efficiency and market power in the context of procurement auctions of
bus routes in the United Kingdom. They study an augmented set of first-price auctions, in which
players can express joint valuations for the goods in each of the simultaneous auctions. While the
auction setting and complementary mechanism that they study is different from the one explored
in this paper, they also find that the welfare effects of the mechanism are ambiguous and explore
this tradeoff.
A number of previous studies use bidding data to model the strategic behavior of firms in
liberalized wholesale electricity market. The model and first-order conditions that I derive are
closely related to Hortagsu and Puller (2008) and Allcott (2009), but adapted to the presence of
complex bids. This paper is particularly related to the work by Wolak (2003), who develops an
estimator based on best response bidding when bidding data are available, with applications to
the study of hedge contracts (Wolak, 2000) and dynamic costs (Wolak, 2007). The estimator and
the cost structure that I use are similar to the ones used in Wolak (2007), to which I incorporate
startup costs of operation.
Startup costs of operation are an important determinant of electricity costs, but to date they
have not been considered in most empirical studies of electricity markets with strategic agents. A
few papers have incorporated them in the study of competitive markets. Mansur (2008) studies the
effect of dynamic costs of operation. Also in a competitive market, Fowlie (2010) takes into account
startup decisions to assess the effects of pollution permits in operational decisions. Cullen (2010b)
uses a similar approach to estimate the effects of a CO 2 price in the Texas electricity market.
Cullen (2010a) develops a structural model to investigate the effects of such a policy in a com-
petitive infinite horizon dynamic model. Also in an infinite horizon context, Fershtman and Pakes
(2009) develop the concept of Applied Markov Perfect Equilibrium, to account for strategic behav-
ior in the presence of unobserved private information that is correlated over time. They present
an application to the electricity market in which firms make strategic maintenance decisions. In
contrast to these latter approaches, I use a simplified finite horizon model to capture the dynamic
decisions of strategic agents. Even though this is a limitation, it allows me to model very closely
the actual auction mechanism in the market, which is the main focus of the paper.5
This is the first paper that assesses the effects of complex bids empirically. There are several
theoretical papers in the engineering literature that study the optimal design of complex bids
in electricity markets. These papers highlight the fact that in the presence of non-convexities,
a competitive market equilibrium without complex bids might not exist, as simple bids are not
necessarily incentive compatible. These papers address the question of which mechanisms succeed
in implementing the first best with competitive players (O'Neill et al., 2005; Gribik et al., 2007).
Other papers have suggested the use of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism when firms
have non-convex costs, so that bids are truthful even in the presence of market power (Hobbs et al.,
2000). Unlike the previous literature, I take the complex bidding mechanism as given by the auction
rules in the electricity market of study, and I evaluate empirically its welfare implications.
5 Modeling the bidding mechanism in a parsimonious way would not be computationally tractable in an infinite
horizon game with strategic behavior.
Figure 1-2: Market Structure
1.3 Institutions and data
The Spanish electricity market is a national market that produces between 15,000 and 45,000
MWh hourly, with around 85,000 MW of installed capacity, serving more than 40 million people. 6
The Spanish territory is interconnected with France, Morocco, Portugal and Andorra. The liberal-
ized electricity market has an annual value of 6 to 8 BE. The Spanish electricity market has been
liberalized since 1998 and it shares many features with other liberalized electricity markets.
Figure 1-2 presents a schematic representation of the functioning of the electricity market. The
electricity market consists of several important segments: generation, transmission, distribution
and retailing. Generating firms can sell their electricity either at centralized markets or by means
of production contracts. Firms can also establish financial contracts for part of their production.
Independently of how the produced quantity is settled financially, all production decisions need to
be centralized to ensure the functioning of the overall system. The electricity is then delivered to
final consumers by distributors and retailers.
In Spain, most firms are vertically integrated, owning assets in both generation and retailing.
Incumbent firms, prior to the liberalization of the market, also provide distribution services, which
are fully regulated under incentive regulation. During the period of study, most of the energy is
provided to consumers by regulated distributors, and not by retailers. In this paper, I focus on
the generation side, although I account for the retailing share of each firm when performing the
analysis.
The technology mix of the generating companies includes several technologies and has changed
6Compared to liberalized electricity markets in the United States, the Spanish electricity market has a size
comparable to the Californian electricity market.
over the recent years, with the introduction of combined cycle gas plants and renewable energy
sources, specially wind resources. During the sample of study, coal was the predominant source of
energy (25%), followed by nuclear, natural gas and renewable and special energies, each of them
with a share of approximately 20%. Hydraulic energy accounted for approximately 10% of the
production. Due to limited cross-border transmission capacity, international imports represent a
very small fraction of total production, being only 3%. In the paper, I model the decisions of
thermal generators other than nuclear, which account for roughly 45% of the production during
the period of study. These are the type of units that use the complementary bidding procedure
studied in this paper.7
1.3.1 The decisions of the generating firms
The generating companies in the market make two main decisions. First, they decide their
financial position, usually weeks or months in advance. Financial contracts, also known as hedge
contracts or contracts for differences, are firm-specific and imply that a certain amount of produced
electricity is hedged and, therefore, not subject to the market price. These contracts avoid the risk
implied by uncertain prices. This paper does not endogenize the decisions regarding financial
contracts. However, I take into account their presence, incorporating them in the profits of the
firm and estimating them in the empirical section.
Second, firms make decisions on how to operate their plants. The decisions are whether to have
a plant running or not, and, conditional on running, how much to produce. In order to take these
decisions, firms decide whether to use production offers in the centralized market or production
contracts that are arranged ex-ante. Production contracts account for about one third of the
electricity produced in Spain. They are linked to a particular production unit and specify that a
certain amount is planned to be produced by that given unit. On the contrary, the production offers
in the market do not establish a particular amount to be produced. They establish a willingness to
produce at different prices, and the final outcomes are resolved in the daily auctions. The focus of
this paper is on the use of the auction mechanism as a way to decide production, taking production
contracts as given from the data.
1.3.2 The day-ahead market
I study the most important auction of the centralized markets: the day-ahead market.8 Firms
7Wind resources do not have startup costs and therefore do not use complex bids. Nuclear plants are usually op-
erating at full capacity whenever not unavailable for maintenance and thus make startup decisions ex-ante. Hydraulic
plants do not use complex bids either, as they can operate flexibly.
8Focusing on the day-ahead market in order to understand firm strategic behavior is common in the literature,
see for example Knhn and Machado (2004) for the Spanish electricity market and Borenstein et al. (2002) for the
Californian electricity market. There are other centralized markets that are potentially important: the market dealing
with congestion in the network (restrictions market) and the congestion market and the sequential intra-day markets.
Both the congestion market and the sequential rnarkets open after the day-ahead market has cleared. The effects of
these two markets can be substantial, given that firms can potentially adjust their output patterns after making their
day-ahead decisions. Whereas adjustments in the intra-day markets tend to be small, more substantial changes arise
in congested areas. Generators in congested areas can receive congestion rents if they enter through congestion and
in the day-ahead market sell electricity to be supplied during the next day. Therefore, the day-
ahead market clears essentially homogeneous multi-unit goods for each hour (MWh at hour h),
totalling 24 different commodities. Firms submit their bidding strategies for the next day all at
once and the 24 commodities are auctioned simultaneously. Roughly 80% of the electricity allocated
in centralized markets is sold through this day-ahead market. Financial "hedging" contracts are
also often indexed at this price, and therefore, the day-ahead market sets a reference for a large
amount of the electricity traded in the electricity market.
Even though I do not endogeneize other contractual forms in the model, I control for the presence
of contracts that are not decided in the day-ahead market. Production contracts are observed in
the data, given that production contracts need to be communicated to coordinate the operation
of the electric system. Regarding financial contracts, they have been found a crucial factor in
determining the optimal bids of the agents accurately (Wolak, 2000; Bushnell et al., 2008b). Even
though they are not observed, I estimate them from the data in the empirical analysis, as in Wolak
(2003), Hortagsu and Puller (2008) and Allcott (2009).
1.3.3 Bidding in the market
Generating firms in the day ahead market bid simultaneously for the 24 hours of the next day
to sell electricity.9 Firms submit bids that are associated to each production unit. 10 Each unit can
have both simple and complex bids. Simple bids are step functions that offer a quantity electricity
to be produced (MWh) at a certain price for a particular hour of the day. Each hourly step function
of each unit in the market can have up to 25 different steps. The price offers need to be positive
(or zero) and are capped at 180 E/MWh. Furthermore, the price offers need to be monotonically
increasing. Each generating unit has its own bid, which implies that the aggregate supply curve of
a given firm can have potentially many steps. For example, large companies such as Iberdrola or
Endesa can submit aggregate supply functions that have more than 500 steps. However, in practice,
agents do not use all the 25 steps for each unit; generally the bids have no more than 5 to 10 steps.
Only thermal generators can use complex bids. Complex bids complement simple bids and
are unique for the whole day. Any unit submitting a complex bid for the whole day still has a
simple bid associated to each of the 24 hours. Firms can specify a unit-specific minimum revenue
requirement characterized by two bidding parameters: a variable and a fixed component. 1
therefore do not respond to the same incentives. The study of generators with local market power is a topic that I
am currently studying.
91n the auction, there are also demand bids. Given that the model is focused on the supply side, for clarity purposes
I abstract from discussing them in the main text. Note that demand bids do not involve any complementary bidding
mechanism, they are only composed by simple bids.
101n the case of thermal generation, a production unit is a generator, which in turn might belong to a group of
units that constitutes a plant. For renewable sources, units are often an "aggregator," which pools together resources
at different locations.
"Firms can also submit unit-specific ramping constraints, that respond to the technical constraints of operating a
unit, although they do not make use of them very frequently. Only around 6% of the units use ramping constraints.
The firm that I study does not use them for any unit during the sample of study. In the empirical analysis, I account
for the ramping constraints submitted by the few firms that use them. However, I do not consider the strategic effects
of submitting the ramps, given the lack of their usage in revealed strategies.
The minimum revenue requirement for a given unit j of firm i takes the following form,
Ri = Aij + BijQij ,
where Ri3 represents the implicit revenue requirement, Aiy and Bij are the complex bids for unit
j, and Qi3 represents the total daily quantity associated to that unit in equilibrium, which is
endogenously determined. Aij can be interpreted as a bid representing a fixed cost component of
the minimum revenue requirement and Big can be interpreted as a bid representing a marginal cost
component.12
A given unit is guaranteed not to produce if the revenue obtained by the unit during the whole
day is lower than Rj. If the revenue the unit would obtain in the day-ahead market over the
whole day with a particular generator is not at least as large as its minimum requirement, the unit
is not scheduled to produce for the entire day, even if its simple bids are lower than the market
marginal price. Therefore, it is a mechanism by which companies trade off the startup and shut
down decisions of production units.13
When solving for the auction outcome, the market operator uses complex bids as constraints
to the simple bids in an iterative fashion. The market clearing outcome is solved as follows. First,
optimal quantities and prices are found based on simple bids, crossing demand and supply for
each hour of the day independently. Then, the market operator checks that the minimum revenue
requirement is satisfied for all units, by comparing their gross revenue with the specified complex
bid. If the requirements of some units are not satisfied, they are withdrawn sequentially depending
on the magnitude of the violations. The procedure is repeated iteratively until none of the complex
bids bind.14 For a more detailed description of the algorithm, see Appendix 1.9.1.
1.3.4 Bidding Data
I construct a new data set from publicly available data from the market and the system operator
in Spain (OMEL and REE, respectively).' 5 The central piece of the data set are the bidding data
from the day-ahead market, which are fully observed and can be mapped to the generating units
in the market. I map these generating units to additional data sets that contain characteristics
such as type of fuel used, thermal rates, age, location, emissions, etc. These data are coupled with
results of the auction outcomes, such as equilibrium prices and assigned quantities. A more detailed
12 In fact, in a simplified environment it is ex-post optimal for a competitive firm to set Aij equal to its startup
cost and Bij equal to its marginal cost.
13Firms can also choose their startup decisions by other means, such as with production contracts or extreme
simple bids. A more detailed discussion is provided below when discussing the data.
14Note that this iterative procedure needs not to be the optimal way to solve the market clearing problem. It also
does not guarantee a unique possible solution, which raises a winner's determination problem. It was chosen due to
its simplicity and computational tractability when the market was originally conceived. Other liberalized markets
use alternative algorithms that compute the market clearing in one step, which have been enabled by advances in the
available computational algorithms.
15The available data for the Spanish electricity market is more comprehensive than for many other countries,
and its transparency and availability has been acknowledged at the European level. According to "DG Competition
Report on Energy Sector Inquiry (January 2007)," as reported by www.energiaysociedad.com.
explanation of the data sources can be found in Appendix 1.9.2.
In my empirical analysis, I use data from March 2007 until June 2007. The reason to look
at this sample is to ensure that the regulatory benchmark is constant during the period of study.
Even though the design of complex bids has not changed since the start of the electricity market,
other institutional details that might affect bidding strategies have been changing over time. 16 For
this reason, I look at a window of time over which the overall market structure remains constant.
Taking into account regulatory changes, it would be possible to extend the analysis to other periods
in the data.
In the sample, there are 88 traditional thermal units other than nuclear power plants, which
account for most of the thermal units in the Spanish system that are operating during this period.' 7
I divide the units in three main categories: coal plants, combined cycle gas plants and traditional
gas and oil (peaking) plants.18
1.3.5 Bidding behavior
Before turning to the model, in which the bidding behavior of firms is more formally discussed,
I explore the bidding data and analyze some of the patterns that arise. The main goal of the
discussion is to understand how simple and complex bids translate into (i) discrete decisions about
using a thermal plant or not (startup decisions), and (ii) marginal decisions about how much to
produce with a given plant.
1.3.5.1 How do firms use simple bids?
The usual interpretation of simple bids in a multi-unit auction is that they express a marginal
willingness to produce. In this sense, they express how much output a firm is willing to produce
at different price levels in a given hour. However, if firms have startup costs, simple bids need not
to be marginal. In particular, the first step is important to determine whether a unit will run or
not at all in a particular hour. Note that conditional on winning the first step, the other steps of
simple bids are marginal. Given that the steps need to be monotonically increasing, the unit is
already turned on conditional on the first step being accepted.
This fact greatly affects the distribution of bids in the data. Figure 1-3 show the distribution of
simple bids for the first step, separated from the rest of the bids. As it can be seen, the distribution
of first step bids is polarized in very low and very high bids. On the contrary, steps other than the
first one have a more centered distribution around prices that are actually observed in the data.19
16The regulator introduced some sudden changes in the regulatory framework in March 2006, with the approval of
the Royal Decree 03/2006, which affected bidding strategies until February 2007. In July 2007, the Spanish electricity
market joined the Portuguese market to form the MIBEL market.
'
7 Nuclear plants, co-generation plants and new plants that are not online during this period are excluded.
18Peaking plants are units that are very expensive to run. They are known as peaking plants because they are
used very infrequently and usually for very short intervals, only when demand is at its peak.
'
9 Actually, there are some very high prices, that effectively ensure that the unit will not produce at those capacity
ranges. One of the reasons for those high bids is the fact that there are ancillary and regulation markets in which
those plants can provide other services. I abstract from these other motivations in the model.
Figure 1-3: Identification of Operational Parameters
(a) Distribution of Simple Bids for First Step. (b) Distribution of Simple Bids for Other Steps.
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The distribution of first-step bids appears to be very different from the distribution of "marginal steps."
Dashed lines represent minimum and maximum price observed in the whole sample. Firms submit either
very low or very high first step bids. Sample from March to June 2007.
The figure shows that the first step is a crucial element used to choose running patterns over
the day. When using a complex bid, firms submit a zero bid for the first step in most of the
hours of the day, which ensures that, conditional on the unit being accepted, it will operate over
a continuous period of time. Note that thanks to complex bids they can submit a zero price offer
even for very expensive plants, as the complex bid will ensure that those bids are discarded if
market prices are too loW.20 This is also true for units with neither complex bids nor production
contracts, which have an even more polar distribution of the first step of simple bids (see Figure
1-15 in the Appendix). Finally, firms can use production contracts to decide their startup patterns.
When firms have production contracts, they cover usually most of the hours of the day, ensuring a
smooth schedule. For these units, the first step is not relevant anymore for deciding whether to be
on or off and therefore it affects marginal decisions only.
The patterns in the simple bidding data make salient the need to introduce both complex bids
and startup costs when analyzing the bidding behavior of the firms in the market. Otherwise, the
patterns in the first step might look irrational in a paradigm in which firms only have marginal
costs and there are no complex bids.
1.3.5.2 How do firms use complex bids?
Complex bids are concerned with decisions about using a thermal plant or not, as they only
determine whether a unit participates in the market or not. They allow a firm to use its simple bids
more flexibly, as they make simple bids contingent to the overall daily revenue being high enough.
Complex bids allow the firm to make startup decisions contingent on the daily market prices.
Thermal units make frequent use of complex bids. However, as explained above there are
"OFor some non-peak hours of the day, such as the early hours during the night, firms may submit a very high bid,
ensuring that they will be turned off.
alternatives to complex bids in order to decide whether to run a plant or not. In these data,
most firms use either complex bids (66.1%) or production contracts (23.2%), but not both. 21 The
exclusivity between the two is intuitive, as firms with production contracts have committed the
output of those units by some other contractual arrangement and they do not plan to withdraw
them from the market. Units use neither complex bids nor production contracts in 10.7% of the
days in the sample. In such case, in order to determine which hours they are running, they use the
first step of their bid (see subsection 1.3.5.1 above).
In all generating subgroups (coal, combined cycle and peaking), units use complex bids more
than forty percent of the days on average. However, the frequency is not evenly spread across types.
High marginal cost coal plants, natural gas and peaking units use them much more frequently than
do lower cost coal plants, which are producing continuously over the year. When units use complex
bids, they are discarded in the iterative process used by the system operator over 60% of the days.
Remarkably, in these data peaking plants are always rejected due to their high bids.22 The size of
the minimum revenue requirement varies depending on the type of fuel used, as one would expect.
Conditional on submitting a variable component, peaking plants are the most expensive, with a
96 E/MWh average variable bid. Coal and gas average variable components are more similar to
each other, around 30 and 40 E/MWh. The fixed component of peaking plants is also substantially
larger than for other plants, expressing a preference for not running on a given day.
In Table 1.1, I present evidence on how firms appear to make their decisions about using
complex bids. I present results from a linear probability model to assess which components affect
the probability of submitting a complex bid the most, where coal units are the baseline.23 As
explained above, peaking plants and gas plants tend to use complex bids more often than do
coal units, the omitted category. Coal plants, instead, use production contracts more frequently.
Firms seem to rely less on complex bids when the price is higher. The effect on price seem to be
largely explained due to price fluctuations during weekends. Given that complex bids are often
substitutes to production contracts, this implies that units tend to have less production contracts
in the weekend, when demand is lowest. The last specifications shows that, controlling for unit
fixed-effects, firms are less likely to use complex bids if the units are already on. This effect is also
related to production contracts, which usually affect more than a single day in a row.
Table 1.2 presents correlational evidence about how firms choose the level of their complex
bids. The variable and fixed component of the complex bid submitted by the units are regressed
on different explanatory variables. Only those units that submit a complex bid are included, and
therefore the effects are conditional on using complex bids.2 4 The regression confirms the differences
in levels across different technologies, with peaking units submitting much larger fixed and variable
21In the data, only in 1% of the observations a unit has both a production contract and a complex bid.22This is due to the fact that the peaking plants in this market are only economical under extreme market
conditions in which demand is very high or there is local congestion. Except for few days during peak season (winter
and summer), the units are usually not switched on at the day-ahead market, but in the congestion market.
23Results using a Probit model are very similar.
24From the previous evidence, this implies that I mainly exclude those units that have a production contract and
therefore have decided ex-ante that they want to participate in the market.
Table 1.1: Probability of Using Complex Bid by Thermal Units
By fuel types
(1) (2)
Unit Fixed-effects
(3) (4)
Constant
Combined cycle
Peaking
Unit On Previous Day
System hourly price
Weekend Dummy
0.782
(0.082)**
0.413
(0.082)**
0.580
(0.083)**
-0.058
(0.065)
-0.011
(0.003)**
0.352
(0.102)**
0.410
(0.083)**
0.565
(0.085)
-0.074
(0.066)
0.001
(0.003)
0.101
(0.019)**
0.993t
(0.089)
-0.093
(0.021)**
-0.010
(0.003)**
0.58671
(0.072)
-0.115
(0.023)**
0.001
(0.002)
0.095
(0.018)**
Unit Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 6,041 6,041 6041 6041
Notes: Linear regression. Significance levels at 1% (**) and 5% (*). tAverage value of the unit fixed
effect. Dependent variable takes value of one if a given unit submits a positive complex bid. Clustered
standard errors in parenthesis, clustering at the plant level. Sample from March to June 2007. Excludes
units out for maintenance or outage. Marginal price instrumented with average and maximum hourly
demand forecast as given by the System Operator the day before. Input controls include European prices
of coal and natural gas.
Table 1.2: Levels of Complex Bid Components by Thermal Units using Complex Bids
Fix Component (E, in thousands)
(1) (2)
Var. Component (in E/MWh)
(3) (4)
Constant
Combined cycle
Peaking
Unit On Previous Day
Weekend Dummy
System Hourly Price
Plate capacity (MW)
MW x Combined cycle
MW x Peaking
-19.502
(16.352)
1.436
(0.698)
33.802
(56.878)
-8.930
(1.966)**
-0.560
(0.884)
0.207
(0.186)
0.004
(0.002)*
-0.005
(0.002)*
0.330
(0.121)**
7 .12t
(3.34)
-6.400
(0.610)**
0.074
(0.219)
0.030
(0.049)
10.866
(4.731)*
6.715
(0.258)**
59.085
(1.972)**
1.490
(0.396)**
-0.465
(0.359)
0.080
(0.061)
2 8 .1 6t
(2.45)
-1.226
(0.245)**
0.312
(0.172)
0.138
(0.032)**
Input controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unit Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,348 3,348 3,348 3,348
Notes: Significance levels at 1% (**) and 5% (*). t Average value of the unit fixed effect. Clustered standard
errors in parenthesis, clustering at the unit level. Sample from March to June 2007, only contains units
submitting a complex bid. Excludes units out for maintenance or outage. Only includes those units submitting
complex bids. Marginal price instrumented with average and maximum hourly demand forecast as given by
the System Operator the day before. Input controls include European prices of coal and natural gas.
bids. In specification (1), I include the capacity of a given unit, to show that the fixed component
bids are positively correlated with the size of a unit. One can also see that the status of the units
the previous day affects their complex bidding behavior. In particular, if the unit is turned on, firms
tend to submit a much lower fixed component, many times equal to zero, as the status of the unit
the previous day determines whether the unit needs to incur its startup cost or not. The average
marginal price at the market, which I instrument with the demand forecast publicly available to
firms, affects the variable component of the complex bid, which would suggest firms exercising
market power, although this effect is only significant once differences across units are accounted for
with unit fixed-effects.
1.4 The model: a multi-unit auction with complex bids
1.4.1 The basic game
In order to formalize the decision process of the firms, I represent the electricity market as a
multi-unit auction in which bidders submit step functions as well as complex bids. The model
considers the bidding decisions of the firm during a given daily auction. 25 The goods auctioned in
the market are electricity (MWh) to be produced at each of the H periods of the following day.2
There are i = 1, ... , N firms who maximize their profits. Each firm owns a certain number of units
that can produce electricity, indexed by j = 1,... , Ji. Units have a limited capacity Kj and a
minimum level of production K. 27 Producing with each of the units has an associated cost. The
overall cost of producing a certain amount of energy is represented by a function Ci(qi), where qj
is an array that represents the quantity assignments for that day.
Firms submit their bidding strategy to the market on a daily basis, represented by a. The
strategy is composed by simple and complex bids.
Simple bids are a bidding array of prices and quantities, represented by {bi, gj}, which define
step functions for each of the units. They contain pairs of price bids (bi) and generation offers
(gi) for each unit j, each hour h = 1, ... , 24 and each possible step k = 1, .. . , K, where K is the
maximum number of steps and is set by the auctioneer. In practice, firms do not need to use all
the allowed steps.
Complex bids are a set of bids, specific to each unit, that implicitly define a minimum revenue
requirement for the day. The vector of complex bids is given by {Ai, Bi}, which represent the
fixed and the variable component of the minimum revenue requirement, respectively. The revenue
requirement is constructed as the sum of the fixed components and the variable component times
daily unit output, this is, Rig = Aij + Big E24- q.
2 5 In practice, the decision of starting up often involves more than one day. The theoretical model abstracts from
this longer horizon, which I discuss later in the empirical and counterfactual sections.
2 6 In most electricity markets, H is either 24 or 48. In the Spanish electricity market, quantities are auctioned for
hourly intervals, and therefore H = 24.
2 7 Minimum production levels are a feature of thermal units. in order to operate safely, generators need to produce
above a certain level. For this reason, this minimum production level is also referred to as the minimum stable load.
This is a source of non-convexities in the production function of the firm.
Figure 1-4: A Game in Two-Stages
Firm1 ... Firmi F N Demand forecast
maxEII| maxE[Ii| maxE[IINI publicly available
I------------------------------------------------------
Simple bids {bi, gi}
Complex bids {Aj, Bi}
Auction rules
max Net Surplus
s.t. Market Clearing
Complex Conditions
Prices and quantities p*, q*
The firms in the electricity market maximize their profits taking into account the auction rules
and available information.
Firms maximize their expected profits conditional on their information set and their beliefs
about other players' strategies, given by o-_i. The information set contains the common information
shared by the firms, such as publicly available demand forecasts, as well as private information,
such as private cost shocks. Equilibrium prices and the quantities are determined by the auction
rules, taking the bidding strategies of the market participants as given.
In Figure 1-4, I present a diagram with the structure of the game. In a first stage, firms choose
their bidding strategies, which include both simple and complex bids. They choose their bidding
strategies simultaneously taking into account the demand forecast, made publicly available, as well
as potentially other information. Firms anticipate that in a second stage the system operator will
determine equilibrium prices and quantities following the auction rules.
The problem of the firm can be represented as follows
max Ei{[IHi(p*, q*)|o-i, o i,I]
0'i
s.t. p*, q* are determined by the auction rules.
The equilibrium concept used in this context is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Each firm i
chooses a bidding strategy o-, composed by a simple bidding array {bi, gi} and a complex bidding
array {Ai, Bi}. Firms maximize their expected profits taking the distribution of other firms' bids
as given and conditional on a set of information I, such as weather forecast, demand predictions
or cost shocks. In equilibrium, the beliefs over the distribution of other firms' strategies has to be
consistent with the equilibrium play.
1.4.2 Specification of the main elements
1.4.2.1 The auction rules
The auction rules in the game follow the ones in the Spanish electricity market, as described in
Section 1.3. Firms submit simple bids to offer their production, {bi, gi}; and complex bids {Ai, Bi},
which implicitly define a minimum revenue requirement Rj. A supply curve is constructed using
only those units j E J for which the minimum revenue requirement RIg is satisfied. The rest of
offers are not considered. Importantly, this is a daily condition. Therefore, the offers of the unit
are taken out from all hours in the market whenever the minimum revenue requirement over the
day is not satisfied. The system operator crosses demand and supply once the offers that do not
satisfy the complex condition have been discarded, and the price is determined by the last offer
accepted.
I define a complex condition p(Rij) as the function that gives the net difference between the
actual revenue obtained by unit j and its minimum revenue requirement Ri3 implied by the pa-
rameters {Aij, Bij}. A unit is discarded whenever this net revenue is smaller than zero, this is,
whenever
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p( Rgj) = P (p*qih - RiZ < 0.
h=1
where Ry = A + 1 I assume that otherwise the unit is not discarded and its offers
are considered in the auction. 28
For notational purposes, I define with s each possible combination of complex bids of a given
firm being accepted. 29 There is a probability Pr(s) that, once uncertainty is realized, a particular
combination s of complex bids is accepted. The probability of a subset of units J1 being accepted,
and another set J2 being discarded is given by
Pr(sIo-; I) = Pr (p(Rj,) > 0 Vj c Ji n p(Rj3 ) < 0 Vj E J2),
where s defines the event in which only units in the subset Ji are accepted.
As a result of complex bids, the auction rules imply that the own supply curve of a given firm
is uncertain, as the shape of the supply curve depends on which minimum revenue requirements
are satisfied. By choosing each unit's minimum revenue requirement, a firm affects the probability
of different combinations of units being accepted in the market. However, conditional on a given
set of complex bids being satisfied, the resulting supply curve depends on simple bids only and the
game can be treated as a set of simultaneous uniform price auctions.
28Note that in practice, all units are discarded if their minimum revenue requirement is not satisfied, but the
converse is not necessarily true. I abstract from this feature of the iterative procedure used in the Spanish electricity,
as otherwise it would not possible to embed the mechanism in a stylized theoretical model. This assumption can be
interpreted as the firms expecting the unit to be accepted as long as its revenue requirement is satisfied.
29 An example of a combination of complex bids being accepted is a situation in which firm i with three units A, B
and C gets units A and B accepted and the other withdrawn.
1.4.2.2 The profits of the firm
A representation of the expected profits of firm i for a given day is given by
24 J
E-i[Ili(ai, a-i)Ij] = Z Pr(slo; Ih)E_[ pQi(qih(P*), s) - Cj (qig) U; s,Is , (1.4.1)
sES h=1 j=1
where Pr(s) defines the probability of a set of complex bids s being accepted, p* represents the
equilibrium price and qih(p*) represents the quantity offered by firm i at that price, Qih(q, s) is the
net quantity position of firm i at hour h when the equilibrium quantity is q, and Cj(.) represents
the cost function of a generating unit j, which depends on the allocation of unit quantities over the
day, given by q*.
The net quantity Qih (q, s) reflects the net selling position of the firm, which determines its
incentives to drive the price either up or down.30 In particular, one needs to account for the
energy that has been previously contracted, as that quantity is not exposed to the market price
and therefore it is not determined in this stage. The net position is defined as
Qih(q, s) = q - qih(q,s) -q(q) - Tih - Vih,
where q is the quantity offer, q (q, s) represents the infra-marginal quantity withdrawn from the
market due to complex bids at state s and quantity offer q, qf(q) represents the retailing position
of the firm at q, Tih represents physical bilateral contracts and vih represents financial contracts
for that hour. Except for financial contracts vih, all other elements are observable. For nota-
tional convenience, I represent Qih (q, s) as the difference between the observed quantities and the
unobservable financial contracts, this is Qih (q, s) = Qih(q, s) - Vih.
When there is market clearing, the quantity allocated to the firm to produce in the day-ahead
market, given by QSih(p*s) = qih - qih(q, s) - q(q) - Tih, needs to be equal to the residual
demand in the market that is not covered by other firms. Therefore, in equilibrium,
DRh(p*Is) = QSih(p*Is),
where DR(p* Is) defines the residual demand and QSi(p* Is) represents the quantity allocated to
the firm after netting out the offers discarded by the complex mechanism, production already
contracted by means of physical contracts and demand by the firm at that price.
1.4.2.3 Cost structure
I focus my analysis on the cost structure of thermal plants, which are the ones that primarily
submit complex bids. Thermal plants have a dynamic cost structure that makes the valuations of
producing in different hours of the day inter-related, making the use of complex bidding specially
3oThis issue has been explored extensively in the literature. See for example Wolak (2000) and Bushnell et al.
(2008b).
attractive to them. For example, a firm would like to avoid switching on and off a given plant
repeatedly over the day, as this damages equipment and incurs discrete startup costs.
I base my cost structure on engineering models for thermal unit operation (Baillo et al., 2001).
These models take into account short run dynamics involved in electricity production. I assume
the following daily cost structure for a thermal plant j,
C, (qij) = cj (qij) + ta -art
where c3 (qij) represents the costs of production that depend on the level of output. 1 "" represents
a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a unit gets switched on during that day, which
implies incurring a startup cost 3start31
The costs of operation are given by
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cj(qij) = (ajiqijh + +h  ' (qijh - qij,h-1) + ej)
h=1
where aji, aJ2 represent unit-specific marginal costs of production, aj 3 represents ramping costs,
and 4ijh represents the quantity over the minimum production level K, i.e. qij3 = max{qijh -
K, 0}. The dynamic structure comes from the ramping costs and the startup costs. Further non-
convexities are introduced by the fact that, whenever firms are turned on, they need to produce at
least K3 .
1.4.3 Optimality conditions
Even though characterizing the full strategy of a multi-unit auction is not possible, I derive
optimality conditions that can be used to analyze the optimal behavior of the players.32 In the
context of the auction design considered, one needs to characterize the optimal strategies for both
simple and complex bids, which constitute the bidding strategy of the firm.
1.4.3.1 Optimality conditions for complex bids
In order to derive optimality conditions with respect to complex bids, it is important to note
that they only affect the profits function of the firm through the probability of a given revenue
requirement being accepted, given by Pr(slI) in expression (1.4.1). A given complex bid for a
given unit affects that probability at the point at which the minimum revenue requirement of the
unit is just satisfied. The optimality condition with respect to complex bids implies then that
the firm chooses parameters Aiy and Bij such that the expected profit at the point at which the
revenue requirement is just satisfied minus the profit of being out at that point are equalized. This
31Note that I have implicitly assumed that a unit switches on or off at most once every day. This is consistent
with evidence that units do not switch on or off more than once in the day-ahead market.
3 2 The difficulty of solving for the equilibria in a multi-unit auction context is an issue that has not yet been
resolved. Therefore, the analysis of multi-unit auction models usually relies on implied optimality conditions.
expression is represented by the expected difference in profits from being in and out at the point
at which the complex condition equals zero. This is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Assume Pr(s) is differentiable in Aij and Bij. If 4Ps 5 0 or ao = 0, a
necessary first-order condition of optimality for Rig is
E[HP 7 - j{J out} |p(Rij) = 0] = 0, (1.4.2)
where H '" represents the profit of the firm when unit j's complex bid is accepted and I43 out*
represents the profit of the firm when unit j is discarded.
Proof (sketch): Complex bids only affect directly the probability of each complex condition being
binding, given by Pr(s). Marginal changes in complex bids affect outcomes along the range at
which the complex bid is just binding, given by p(Rij) = 0. Noting that the complex bid is just
binding when a given unit is just accepted or just rejected, the first order condition with respect to
Aij is equal to a1 E[H in) - 11H out) |p(Riy) = 0] = 0. An analogous argument applies to Bij.
Proposition 1 states that the firm chooses a complex bid such that the opportunity cost of being
accepted versus being rejected are equalized in expectation at the point at which the minimum
revenue requirement is just satisfied. This implies that the firm sets the complex bids of a given
unit at the point at which the differential value of being accepted, ignoring startup costs, just equals
the opportunity cost of incurring such startup.
In a competitive environment in which a firm has only one plant and has no market power,
Proposition 1 implies that the optimal complex bid is such that the unit breaks even in expectation
when it is just accepted. 33 In fact, equation (1.4.2) takes the form of
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E[I p*qja - Cj (q))|p(Rj) = 0] = 0,
h=1
when the minimum revenue requirement is just satisfied. In a simplified environment in which there
is only a constant marginal cost and a startup cost, the firm can satisfy this condition in a way that
is ex-post optimal by setting Aig equal to its startup cost and Bij equal to its marginal cost, given
that Cy(qj) = 1+J 41 ajlqj .34 More generally, the optimal complex bids for a competitive firm
are equal to the average expected startup and marginal cost at the point at which the unit is just
accepted.
In a strategic environment, Equation (1.4.2) also captures the fact that the profit of the rest of
the units owned by a firm can change depending on whether unit j is accepted or not. If there is
33 In a dynamic context in which different days are interrelated, the complex bid might include an option value of
being either turned on or off for the next day. I account for this in the empirical section, but not in this theoretical
framework.
3 Note that when p(Rij) = 0, p*qja = Aij + E Bij qj .
a strategic value to withhold capacity, due to the increase in equilibrium prices, then a firm will
tend to bid complex bids such that a unit makes positive profits at the point at which it is just
accepted. In this case, when the minimum revenue requirement is just satisfied, equation (1.4.2)
takes the form,
24
E[ p*qj - Cj(q ) - AII"p(Rjy) = 0 = 0,
h=1
where AHt = 11 .out} -I fl. All represents the change in profits of firm i from withholding
the capacity of unit j, without including the profits of unit j itself. Whenever Afl- > 0, the firmi\j
will tend to overbid when placing its complex bids.
1.4.3.2 Optimality conditions for simple bids
In order to derive optimality conditions for simple bids, I look at the deviations of changing a
bid offer at a given step and quantity. For simple bids to be consistent with the optimality of the
strategies, it is a necessary condition that there are no profitable local deviations possible. A firm
must be indifferent between raising or lowering the whole bidding step of its supply curve, given
by a bid bjkh, for unit j at step k and hour h,
SP)DE[fli(o-, o-_)|s] B IPr(s)El u)I]
Pr(s) &bok I+ hE - s] = 0. (1.4.3)
sES sbikh Objkh
These optimality conditions are more complicated than the ones found for complex bids, given
that simple bids affect, first, market outcomes conditional on a particular set of complex bids being
accepted, and second, the probability of a unit being accepted. In order to derive the FOC used in
the empirical application, I assume that the FOC with respect to the bid bjkh can be reduced to
the effects of simple bids on profits, ignoring its potential effects on the probability of complex bids
being binding. The justification for this assumption is both empirical and theoretical, as discussed
below.
Assumption 1 Marginal deviations of simple bids at a single step k and hour h are primarily
captured by their marginal effects on conditional profits, this is,
E abjk-hE[HIi (o-i, oa)|Is] ~~ 0.
sES
Discussion: Note that the bid only affects the probability of states s if a given unit's minimum
revenue requirement is just satisfied and the bid sets the price. Imagine first that there is only
one hour in the auction. In that case, these two events will happen simultaneously, if at all. For
realizations in which the bid does not set the price, the above term is zero. For realizations in
which the bid sets the price, the term will also be zero by the envelope condition implied by the
optimal complex bid condition in 1.4.2. With more hours, this does not necessarily need to be
the case, unless the shocks are perfectly correlated across hours. Whenever the shocks are highly
correlated, the term tends towards zero. If shocks are not highly correlated, the joint probability
of a bid setting the price and the minimum revenue requirement being just satisfied tends to be
empirically small, as not only does the bid need to be marginal, but also price realizations in the
other twenty-three hours need to be consistent with the minimum revenue requirement being just
satisfied. I present evidence in Appendix 1.9.3.1 that shows that this term is empirically negligible
and that the omitted term does not become a source of bias in the estimation.
Assumption 1 is useful to simplify the first order conditions on simple bids, as it allows to treat
the decision of the firm over simple bids in a similar manner as a set of simultaneous uniform price
auctions. This allows me to derive first order conditions with respect to simple bids that closely
resemble the ones usually found in a multi-unit auction with a uniform pricing rule. This result is
summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 A necessary first order condition for optimality of bjkh, for a given unit j at hour
h and bidding step k > 1, is given by
bjkh = (kh + S Pr(sI. in) . Pr(DRh (q) < bjkh < DRh'(q - 1)|s) Qih(q, s) - Vih
sES~j in qEstep k Pr'(bjkh < DR 1(q - 1)|s) qjkh
(1.4.4)
where bJkh is the bid offered, Cjkh represents the average marginal cost at the step, q represents the
inframarginal quantity at the step, qjkh represents the quantity at the step and DRK 1(q) represents
the inverse residual demand at level q and period h.
Proof: See Appendix 1.9.3.2. E
Proposition 2 states that the bid bikh is equal to the average marginal cost (kh plus a shading fac-
tor or markup. The shading factor is composed by a weighted average of the inframarginal quantity
produced by the firm at level q and complex state s, given by Qih(q, s), over the possible states in
which the complex bid of unit j is satisfied, represented by Pr(slj in). Inframarginal quantities are
weighted by the factor Pr(DRW'(q) < bjkh < DRi 1 (q - 1)Is)/Pr'(bikh < DRhl(q - 1)|s), which
can be approximated with the inverse of the expected slope of the residual demand. The slope of
the residual demand is a summary statistic of the residual demand distribution and indicates the
degree of competition faced by firm i.35
The first order condition in Proposition 2 can be approximated as,
.. Qi ("q, S) - Vihbjk jkh + X Pr(slj in) |E[DR'(bjkh)Ip = bjkh, s||
sES|i in
where q represents the average inframarginal supply at the step and E [DR'(bjkh) Ip = bjkh, s] rep-
resents the slope of the residual demand at bjkh when bjkh sets the price. The expression implies
3Note that this term is not well defined if Pr'(bkh < DR' 1(q - 1) s) = 0. Therefore, Proposition 2 is only valid
if the bid submitted has some positive probability of being marginal.
that the marginal cost of the unit is equal to its expected marginal revenue at the step.
As in the usual setting, the net quantity supplied by the firm determines the sign of the cost
markup. For a positive net quantity Qih(T s) - Vih, the firm puts a positive markup to its offer,
submitting a bid that is higher than its marginal cost. However, if the firm is a net buyer in the
market, either because it has forward contracts or because is also a distributor, the bid stays below
the marginal cost of the firm.
This condition is similar to the optimality conditions found in Hortagsu and Puller (2008) and
Allcott (2009). The approximation is exactly satisfied under the assumption that the slope of
residual demand at a given bid bjkh is constant, as in Hortagsu and Puller (2008).36 One difference
in this setup is that the presence of complex bids affects the markup component, which is a weighted
average over the possible set of complex bids being binding. Complex bids change the expectations
over both inframarginal quantity and residual inverse demand. One other difference is that the
first step is not marginal, as it affects startup decisions, and therefore this first order condition is
not applicable to it.
In sum, the simple and complex first order conditions derived in this section highlight the major
trade-offs faced by the firm when choosing its bidding strategy optimally. They are used in the
empirical strategy to infer the fundamentals of the model.
1.5 Estimation strategy
There are several fundamental parameters that need to be estimated in order to perform the
counterfactual simulations. The unknown parameters can be summarized as follows
where q are operational parameters from the production function that can be readily inferred from
the data,37 a and 3 are marginal and startup costs of operation respectively, and y represents
the parameters that affect the forward position of the firm. Therefore, {q, a,#8} are unit-specific
parameters, whereas -y are firm-specific parameters.
The cornerstone of the estimation are the optimality conditions implied by the multi-unit auc-
tion bidding game, represented by Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. The estimation proceeds in a
two stage fashion. First, marginal costs and forward contracts are inferred from simple bids op-
timality conditions. With these estimates, startup costs of operation are estimated from complex
bids optimality conditions.
I outline here the major techniques used to estimate the unknown parameters in the model and
comment on the econometric approach. In the next section, I present the results.
36A weaker assumption that also allows the result to hold is that the residual demand has constant slope conditional
on the bid setting the price, i.e. DR'(bjahlp =bjkh, 8)= k.
37These parameters are the minimum stable load of a production unit and its maximum capacity.
Figure 1-5: Identification of Operational Parameters
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1.5.1 Operational parameters r/
Certain parameters of firm production can be inferred directly from final production data. In
particular, the minimum stable load can be observed from actual production patterns over time.
Figure 1-5(a) represents the histogram of production of a coal plant. One could infer the minimum
production limits of the unit, which in this case are around 65 MWh. In order to estimate it, I
search for a break in the cumulative distribution function around the minimum production range
that minimizes the sum of squared errors. Figure 1-5(b) shows how the break in the cumulative
distribution function identifies the minimum stable load for a particular unit in the data.38
There are other operational parameters that could be potentially inferred from the data. For
example, by looking at production changes across hours, one can have a sense of the ramping limits
of units, both once they are producing and when they are starting up. However, those ramping
constraints are not as binding as the minimum stable load: units can choose to ramp up or down at
different speed, although the costs are potentially increasing in the amount of the ramp. Figure 1-6
shows that the limits on ramping do not appear to be binding, compared to minimum production
constraints. It is apparent that units make changes that are mostly contained in a particular range,
but there is evidence that such limits can be surpassed. For this reason, I estimate these costs from
the bidding behavior, following Wolak (2007).
1.5.2 Marginal cost parameters a and forward contracts -y
I use a generalized method of moments to estimate the unit-specific cost parameters a and the
forward parameters y, using the first order conditions on simple bids implied by Proposition 2,
together with an average marginal cost and forwards parametrization.
38These minimum stable loads are estimated at the unit-level and are identified as long as the unit produces
sometimes at this threshold, which is satisfied in practice. Because minimum stable loads are a fixed parameter of
the production function that does not depend on economic variables, longer periods of data can be used whenever
this condition is not satisfied.
Figure 1-6: Ramping Up Constraints
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Even though firms tend to do relatively small hourly changes of output, ramping constraints
are not as clearly identifiable as minimum and maximum production levels.
The simple bidding first order conditions can be expressed as follows from (1.4.4):
Pr(slj in) 4gJh(b0kh - Zjkh(a)) - jk(h - ih()) = 0,
sESIj in
where
wejkh = ZqEstep k Pr(bjkh < DRh(q - 1ls)/qjkh
4Djkh = ZqEstep k Pr(DRh'(q) < bjkh < DRh1(q - 1)|s)/qikh
Qjkh = ZqEstep k q/qjkh - q' (q, s) - q (q) - Tih,
Other than the unobserved parameters a and -, some of the terms in the above expression are
not readily observed in the data, as they involve expressions that depend on the distribution of the
residual demands that the firm is facing (#5 kh, 'yjh, Pr(slj in)). In order to construct an empirical
analog to these terms, I use a simulation procedure to generate expectations over market outcomes,
using a bootstrapping procedure similar to Hortagsu (2002).31 For a given firm, I randomly draw
other firms' strategies across similar days. Similar days are pooled depending on whether they
are a Monday, another weekday, a Saturday or a Sunday, as well as depending on the maximum
hourly levels of predicted demand. By randomly drawing the strategies of other firms under similar
conditions, I approximate the uncertainty faced by the firm in the market. This approach is similar
to Gans and Wolak (2008), who also pool residual demand across similar days to construct sample
analogs of moment conditions implied by profit maximization.
There are three aspects that are different from a standard uniform auction simulation. First,
the auction rule is not standard and one needs to create an algorithm to determine which units are
39An alternative to this bootstrapping technique is to homogenize the bidding data as a function of covariates and
then randomize the remaining error terms, as in Haile et al. (2003) and Allcott (2009). Due the presence of complex
bids, in this context such approach would require a probabilistic model about the likelihood of using complex bids
and their level conditional on doing so.
Figure 1-7: Generating Random Market Outcomes - April 11th 2007, 5pm
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Randomly drawing strategies of other players generates a distribution of expected residual
demand. Due to complex bids, the ex-post supply curve of a given firm can depend on the
particular realization of other firms' strategies.
accepted and which units are not that closely matches the one used by the ISO. This algorithm is
described in Appendix 1.9.1, in which a Monte Carlo simulation is performed to assess the accuracy
of the procedure that mimics the ISO market rules. The Monte Carlo simulations performed show
a high level of accuracy. Both the mean and the standard deviation of the simulated prices have
on average an error very close to zero.
Second, complex bids change the nature of the uncertainty that firms face when choosing their
bidding strategies. In contrast to previous studies in the auction literature, firms face uncertainty
over their own supply curve as well, as they do not know ex-ante which complex bids are going to
be satisfied. This fact introduces another source of variation when generating random outcomes in
the market. Figure 1-7 represents fifteen random draws of market outcomes. As can be observed,
firms face uncertainty over both demand and supply.
Finally, in contrast to Hortagsu (2002), in the case of electricity markets it is possible to boot-
strap the strategies of other firms maintaining their identities. This is eased even further because
the population across different days does not change, as it is mandatory for all generators of a
certain size to bid in the market. Therefore, the sampling approach does not require assumptions
about the homogeneity of other participants in the market. Because there are several firms in the
market as well as many different days observed, I can approximate the distribution as the numbers
of similar days increase, without requiring the number of firms to grow.
In Table 1.12 and Figure 1-16 included in the Appendix, I show that the randomization proce-
dure across similar days together with the ISO algorithm generates a distribution of marginal prices
that closely matches the one observed during the period of study. In particular, the distribution
captures well the mean prices in the market as well as the different quantiles. It also reflects the
fact that the distribution of prices is bounded, as can bee seen in Figure 1-7.
Once market outcomes are simulated, one can construct an empirical analog to the first order
condition in (1.4.4). One of the challenges in doing so is that the probability of a certain bid setting
the marginal price might be very small, even if the number of simulated draws is large. Note that
for a given realization of residual demand, <Ijkh is either zero or one, taking a value of one only
when ph = bjkh. In practice, due to the low probability nature of these events, 1(Ph = bjkh) is zero
most of the times (if not all), which might make the sample analog very sensitive to the particular
randomization draws, even for many bootstrap samples. Similarly, #jkh equals 1(ph = bjkh)DR'(Ph)
for a given demand realization, which has the additional problem that DR'(ph) is not well defined
due to the discrete nature of step bids.
In order to address this problem, I follow a smoothing approach as in Wolak (2007) and
Gans and Wolak (2008). By means of a smoothing procedure, both the demand and the supply
curve are approximated as follows,
rd bs
DR ,bs(h bs) rd nh Ph
flEsb.9
Qslnv ~ ~ns Pn *P
QS'b"(Ph ISbs) h ~ h
nEsbs
where q/ and pd are pairs of prices and quantities of the residual demand, qnh and P'h are pairs of
prices and quantities of the supply of firm i, sb' is the set of offers that are not discarded by complex
bids in draw bs, C is a cumulative weight, such as the standard normal cumulative distribution
function, and Iw is a bandwidth parameter that determines the degree of smoothing.
Once the residual demand and own supply are approximated, one can compute the residual
demand slope by differentiating DR "''' to get an approximate of DR'(ph). Similarly, noting that
<Djkh = E[p h], one can approximate this term by computing Ph/Objkh using the market clearing
condition DRh(ph) = QSih(ph) and the implicit function theorem on the smoothed versions of
residual demand and supply.40
The empirical analog to the first order condition of unit j at step k in hour h at a given day t
is given by,41
mjkht(Cf, -y, bw) = b(j in)s ((bkht - kt 1 b + DRb ( t - Vht(&))), (1.5.1)
Bbs=l Objkht kh
where B represents the number of simulations per day in the bootstrapping algorithm.
The moment conditions are constructed by adding up the empirical analogs to the first order
conditions across simulations. Potentially the moments could be constructed at the daily and
hourly level, which would provide thousands of moments. To perform the estimation, I pool the
4 The formula is given by p9h/ebjkh = &QSih(ph)/&bjkh/(ODRh(ph)/&ph - aQSih(Ph)/&Ph), which can be con-
structed using the smoothed versions of the firm's supply and residual demand.
41Note that these conditions are analogous to the one found in Wolak (2007), noting that when bjkh = Ph,
ODR "bbs /bjah = &QSih(ph)/&ph - DPh/ 9 bjkh + &QSih(ph)/8 bjkh.
moments across subset of hours and time, which provides valid moment conditions as T -+ 0c and
B -+ oo. With these moments, the parameters of the marginal cost function, which appear in the
marginal cost (kht , and the forward positions of the firm vht. Several specifications of Ckht(ae) and
vht(-y) as well as ranging parametrizations of the bandwidth parameter bw are considered in the
next section, in which results are presented.
Identification As shown in McAdams (2008), the multi-unit auction model is only partially
identified. However, by parametrizing the cost function and the forward position, one can point
identify the parameters using the optimality conditions at each bidding step.
The parametrization strategy also allows me to identify the marginal costs and the forward
position of the firms jointly. Previous work has shown that the forward position cannot be non-
parametrically identified in the absence of marginal cost engineering data (Wolak, 2000, 2003;
Hortagsu and Puller, 2008). This has traditionally been a challenge in order to carry out empirical
analysis in the context of electricity markets, as engineering cost estimates are needed to perform
the analysis, which are often not publicly available. I show that by parametrizing the cost function,
one can estimate both costs and forward contracts. The identification makes use of the fact that the
forward position is common across units from the same firm, which gives a source of cross-sectional
variation. For this reason, forward contracts could be potentially estimated flexibly.
To gain intuition on the identification of the parameters, it is useful to re-write the above GMM
estimator as a weighted regression with specification
bjkht = Xkhtag + 9DRht llht('y) + Ejkht,
'
9Pht
where bykht is the offer made by unit j in step k and hour h after substracting the markup component
8DRM - 1 -bsthat is observed by the econometrician, given by ht,- Qht(bgkht); Xgkht are covariates of the
marginal cost specification, such as a unit fixed effect, offered unit quantity or expected differences
ODRb -1
of output across hours; and ht is the expected slope of the inverse residual demand. The
weights are given by the probability of a given observation being marginal, given by %( .
The marginal cost parameters cv are all unit-specific and therefore their identification comes
from observing the same unit make different decisions across steps, hours and days for different
output levels and market conditions. Because the first step of a given unit is not marginal, one
cannot identify the marginal cost of those units that submit a single step. In order to identify
both a linear and a quadratic cost component, one requires at least two moments per unit. The
identification of forward contracts comes from the cross-section of different units, through variation
in the markup components, as well as temporal variation.
The implicit assumption in the identification strategy of both marginal costs and forwards is
that its structure is relatively constant over the period of study. Because I look at a reduced period
of time with similar weather patterns and forecasted prices, this assumption is not as strong as it
could be otherwise. In the results sections, I also consider a specification in which I parameterize
marginal costs as a function of input prices to allow for temporal variation. I also consider separating
the sample in two, which allows for greater flexibility in both marginal and forward parameters.
The unobserved error might be correlated with the explanatory variables. In particular, when
a unit has a large cost shock, it submits higher bids, which implies that it can be possibly located
ODR" -1
at a higher region of the supply curve. Therefore, - ht can be potentially correlated with
the error term. Similarly, the cost components might include quantity decisions, which might be
affected by its cost shocks. In the GMM framework, there are many instruments that can be
used. In particular, any variable that belongs to the information set 1,, and is correlated with the
aforementioned variables, can be a candidate instrument. I use lags from several periods before
the day of the auction, to circumvent possible correlation across cost shocks over time as well as
publicly available data on demand forecasts.
Inference In order to construct standard errors for the marginal cost and forward estimates, I
use a bootstrapping technique. Due to the temporal nature of the data, I use an empirical block
bootstrap estimator at the week level. In order to compute the optimal weighting matrix, I use a
Newey-West variance-covariance specification with weekly lags clustered at the unit-step level.
1.5.3 Startup cost parameters #
The empirical strategy used for simple bids suggests using a similar approach to infer the startup
costs of production units. As shown in the previous section, first order conditions with respect to
complex bids have a mapping to the startup costs of operation. From the reduced form evidence
presented, it was also seen that the fixed component of complex bids is primarily used in those
days in which a given unit needs to incur the startup cost. The idea is to exploit the information
contained in complex bids to infer this parameter.
Recall that, when firms are strategic, the first order condition with respect to complex bids is
given by
24
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Given an estimate of the marginal costs and forward contracts, {&, -J}, one can construct the
sample analog of the above expression. All the elements of the above expression are known except
for the startup costs of operation, which enter the cost function C (q; &, 3). Therefore, one can
infer the startup costs of operation as the residual of the above expression when the minimum
revenue requirement is just satisfied.
Excluding unit j from the market has the effect of potentially increasing market prices. The
unit is trading off starting up and producing versus withholding that capacity. When the minimum
revenue requirement is just satisfied, rearranging terms one finds the following expression for the
startup cost
24 24
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All the terms on the right hand side are known at this stage and can be used to calculate the above
expression.
Similar to the simple bidding estimation, empirical observations in which the minimum rev-
enue requirement is just satisfied might not be observed, even after augmenting the data with a
simulation procedure. One can use a kernel estimator to approximate this term around those de-
mand realizations for which the minimum revenue requirement is close to being just satisfied. The
empirical analog to the first order condition for a unit j and day t is given by,
1 Bl kInbs(/2 *,bs *,bs 24 bs A1Tofb-5
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where r. is a density weight such as the standard normal density function. AHIoff,'b' can be calculated
by looking at the counterfactual profits difference between excluding unit j and including it. The
above equation gives an empirical analog to the first order condition when the minimum revenue
requirement is just satisfied. The expression is averaged across different days in the sample to
construct the empirical moments.
Identification As shown above, the pointwise estimates identify the startup costs of operation
of those units that trade off starting up a unit on a given day. However, there are some units that
do not use complex bids at all, and therefore in such case complex bids cannot be used to identify
the startup costs. Furthermore, when units are already on, their complex bids might capture the
option value of keeping the unit on. Therefore, the pointwise estimates can usually only identify
jointly the startup cost and the possible option value associated with being turned on.
In order to separately identify the startup cost, I focus my attention on units that are switched
off and decide whether to startup or not a given day.42 Consider the case in which the unit is
turned off and has to decide whether to turn on in a given day. At the point at which the complex
bid is just binding, the firm is indifferent between
Hl i"(, ) - # = Oj t*(&,)
where UP *n ignores the startup cost, which is separately represented by 3. Given first stage
estimates, HV in(a, -y) and Hli 0"' (a, 7) can be computed around those obervations in which the
minimum revenue requirement is close to being binding. However, if there is a continuation value
due to the dynamic nature of the problem, then the estimate also captures the difference in the
continuation value of being on or off. Therefore,
11 i"(, ) - u t(6, ) = # - AV in-out.
4 2This approach is similar in spirit to Fowlie (2010).
Given that AV in-*t ;> 0, this implies that, in the presence of a continuation value, the startup
cost estimate will be a lower bound to the actual cost. The intuition behind the above equation
is that a unit does not need to recover its startup costs during a single day. Consider for example
a competitive unit. The unit might decide to startup if it makes a positive profit during the day,
even ignoring the startup cost, if it expects to recover such startup cost in the following days of
contiguous operation. A similar argument can be built for the case in which the unit is switched
on. Shutting down has the opportunity cost of imposing a startup cost in the future and also has
different continuation payoffs.
In order to control for the potential continuation value, I use a reduced form approach using
weekday dummies. The idea behind this strategy is to note that the continuation value of starting
up a unit depends on the day of the week. For example, a unit starting up on Friday will generally
only startup for that given day, as in the weekend there is lower demand for electricity, which
implies that the continuation value of that startup can be considered to be approximately zero.
Therefore, the Friday fixed effect can be used as a baseline to identify the startup costs of the units.
Other specifications are discussed in the results section.
In the context of a more generalized dynamic game, an alternative identifying strategy would
be to use moment inequalities implied by Bayesian Nash equilibrium, generating deviations around
complex bids. Moment inequalities taken across several days would provide a way to control more
explicitly for the continuation value of the startup. For example, observing a unit stay producing
at a loss during the weekend to avoid incurring the startup cost again on Monday can provide a
lower bound on the magnitude of this startup cost. The reason why I have not followed this route
is an empirical one. Even though such bounds can be constructed, I find them to be not very
informative in my application. The low power of the bounds is due to the fact that firms do not
switch on and off very often, even during a four month sample. Therefore, it is difficult to infer
tight bounds. On the contrary, complex bids are submitted more frequently and can provide direct
information on those costs through the pointwise optimality conditions.
Inference In order to create confidence intervals for the pointwise estimates of startup costs, I
construct bootstrap standard errors that account for the uncertainty arising from the first step
estimates. Due to the selected nature of the sample in the estimation of startup costs, I bootstrap
the relevant sample of observations.
1.6 Estimation results
In this section, I describe the results of the estimation for the marginal and forward parameters
as well as for the startup costs. I report the parameter estimates for one of the largest firms in the
market, which owns several coal, combined cycle gas and peaking units. This firm has a thermal
generating capacity of around 9,000 MW, most of it composed of combined cycle gas plants (~5,600
4 3 See Morales et al. (2009).
MW) followed by peaking units and coal (~2,050 MW and ~1,000 MW respectively). Given that
peaking plants never produce during the sample of study and are always discarded by their complex
bids, I do not include them in the estimation as their costs cannot be properly identified. The firm
owns five peaking plants, which submit complex bids that are never accepted during the period of
study.44
The firm also owns nuclear plants which usually run whenever they are available. The firm has
also a large capacity in renewable energy, mainly wind, which usually also runs whenever there is
wind available. Finally, the firm has hydro power plants, which can have an important strategic
role. In this paper, I do not include these other generating groups in the analysis, holding their
decisions as observed in the data. The focus of the paper is on coal and combined cycle gas plants,
which are the ones that use complex bids.
1.6.1 Marginal cost and forward estimates
I estimate the costs of thermal plants as well as the forward position of the firm using of the first
order conditions from marginal bids. The cost specification is given by the cost structure presented
in Section 1.4,
ykht(a') = aji + aj2qjht + aj3(2qj,h,t - qj,h-1,t - qj,h+1,t) + ejkht.
The specification for forward contracts assumes that firms hedge in expectation a percentage
of their expected output of the next day. I allow forward contracts to differ between peak hour
to base hours. This is motivated by the fact that there exist forward contract products that are
targeted at peak hours, which range 8am to 8pm. Finally, I also allow weekends to have different
forward positions, given that demand is substantially different in those days. Therefore, the forward
position for firm i is specified as
Vht(7) = (1 + 721peak + 731weekend)qht + Cht,
where ght represents the quantity actually sold at the day-ahead market, which is observed in the
data.
The empirical moments are constructed averaging both across simulations and time, as
T B Pu bwks (DRbwbs
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I take 100 randomly drawn simulations to simulate market outcomes, i.e. B = 100. In the sample
of study, T = 120. The bandwidth parameter is equal to 3E. Because the number of moments
available is very large due to the highly-dimensional strategy space of the firm, which provides over
"In fact, most of these peaking plants data are unavailable during the period of study or undergoing retirement
operations, which gives another reason to exclude them from the sample.
a thousand moment conditions, I experiment with different pooling strategies across first-order
conditions. In the baseline specification, the day is divided in six different 4-hour periods and first-
order conditions are considered at aggregating at that level, this is, 7 jky - Eheh rnjkh (0) 'Y, -w).
The results for each of the units are presented in Table 1.3. I include the estimated linear and
quadratic component of the cost function.45 One can see that there is substantial heterogeneity in
marginal cost estimates of combined-cycle gas plants, even though these plants are new and similar.
One explanation is that these units sometimes have unit-specific contracts to obtain their inputs.
Another plausible explanation is the presence of congestion in some areas. Therefore, the marginal
cost estimates do not only capture the cost of the inputs, but also some opportunity cost of giving
up congestion rents. In fact, combined cycle units with higher estimated marginal costs in the
sample are the ones in systematically congested areas. In this paper, I interpret this opportunity
cost as the "marginal cost" of the unit, as I am mainly interested in analyzing the day-ahead
market holding other opportunity costs due to other markets fixed, which are not accounted for in
the model.46 Note that, under the assumption of homogeneous marginal costs across similar, newly-
built, combined cycle units, the true marginal cost could be easily identified using the estimates of
units in uncongested areas.
Table 1.4 provides the estimates summarized at a more aggregate level, by fuel type. The results
indicate that average coal costs are around 27.42E/MWh, whereas combined cycle gas costs are
around 39.76E/MWh. Combined cycle marginal costs appear to fluctuate more than coal costs
over time, which is consistent with the fact that gas prices tend to fluctuate more than coal prices.
The table also includes the forward position at the firm level, which is estimated to be around 91%
of the quantity that is sold in the day-ahead market.47 The forward position appears to be lower
during peak hours and slightly higher on weekends, although the estimated differences are very
small and not significant.
It is important to note that the specification without quadratic costs differs in the implied
forward position of the firms. This is due to the fact that an increasing bid can be rationalized
in two ways. First, it can imply that the inframarginal quantity is larger and thus the markup
component increases. Second, it can imply an increase in the marginal cost. Because the linear
specification does not allow for increasing marginal costs, increasing bids need to be rationalized as
higher incentives of firms to markup, given by a lower level of forward contracting. The preferred
specification is the one with quadratic costs, given that they are usually considered when modeling
45In this baseline specification, ramping costs axe set to zero in the main specification (Uj3 = 0). Ramping costs
are estimated in alternative specifications included in Table 1.13 in the Appendix. I find some evidence of ramping
costs for coal units, whereas I do not find evidence of ramping costs for combined cycle gas units at the hourly level,
specially units with 400MW of capacity. This result is intuitive, as these combined cycle gas plants are new plants
that can ramp to full capacity in less than one hour.
46Incorporating the actual opportunity cost from the congestion market is a topic that I am currently investigating
taking advantage of an institutional change in the congestion market in July 2005.
47Even though 91% might appear to be a large share of forwarded quantity, previous studies in markets in which
forward data were available document also large shares of forward contracts. Wolak (2007) documents an average
forward position of 88% in the Australian electricity market. It is also consistend with informal discussions with
industry participants, who mentioned that they tend to forward a large share of their expected output.
Table 1.3: Marginal Cost Estimates at the Unit Level
Plant Type Size ag j2
MW 6/MWh 6/MWh2
ACE3
ARCOSI
ARCOS2
ARCOS3
CTJON2
CTN3
ESC6
STC4
GUA1
GUA2
LAD3
LAD4
PAS1
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
386.0
389.2
373.2
822.8
378.9
782.0
803.5
396.4
148.0
350.0
155.0
350.0
214.0
41.32
(2.43)
44.90
(2.82)
41.07
(2.50)
37.99
(2.02)
36.94
(3.46)
45.19
(2.09)
33.89
(2.49)
36.78
(2.62)
31.37
(1.63)
26.60
(1.09)
30.62
(1.42)
24.54
(0.96)
23.95
(0.87)
2.05E-2
(6.58E-3)
2.52E-2
(1.41E-2)
2.87E-2
(8.45E-3)
7.56E-3
(2.38E-3)
2.60E-2
(6.53E-3)
7.32E-3
(4.79E-3)
2.20E-2
(2.54E-3)
3.11E-2
(6.83E-3)
5.25E-2
(1.14E-2)
2.48E-2
(4.48E-3)
4.78E-2
(7.39E-3)
4.02E-2
(6.20F-3)
5.99E-2
(7.43E-3)
Notes: Sample from March to July 2007. Standard errors computed using block-bootstrap at
the week level.
Table 1.4: Marginal Cost and Forward Estimates for Firm 1
Linear Quadratic Ramping Ramping Thermal
Costs Costs Costs IV Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coal (E/MWh) [aji) 27.23 27.42 27.13 27.50 1.27
(2.59) (1.19) (1.42) (1.33) (0.06)
CCGT (6/MWh) [a51] 36.74 39.76 39.57 40.24 1.75
(4.23) (2.55) (2.74) (2.65) (0.14)
Coal X q (6/MWh2 ) [aj 2] 4.51E-2 4.24E-2 4.34E-2 2.04E-3
(7.39E-3) (1.11E-2) (8.93E-3) (3.76E-4)
CCGT X q (6/MWh2 ) [aj2] 2.11E-2 2.05E-2 2.06Fr2 8.40E-4
(6.53E-3) (6.63E-3) (6.60E-3) (3.14E-4)
Coal ramp (6/MWh2 ) [aj3] 4.06E-3 3.82E-3 1.63E-4
(3.64E-3) (3.63E-3) (1.77E-4)
CCGT ramp (6/MWh2) [a33] 1.75E-3 7.27E-4 2.57E-5
(1.15E-2) (1.71E-3) (7.30E-5)
Forward Position (%) [v1] 82.34 91.41 91.17 92.10 91.19
(5.56) (2.54) (2.71) (2.88) (3.00)
Forward Peak (%) [72] 82.51 90.87 90.59 91.36 90.58
(6.44) (3.06) (3.26) (3.43) (3.60)
Forward Weekend (%) [-y3] 84.36 92.21 91.79 92.65 91.81
(10.70) (4.30) (4.47) (4.63) (4.82)
Notes: Sample from March to July 2007. Coal and combined cycle (CCGT) estimates present average of
unit-specific parameters. Input costs variable in specification (5) constructed with European fuel prices of
coal, natural gas and oil. Heat rates as provided in reports by the Spanish Ministry of Industry. Standard
errors computed using block-bootstrap at the week level.
the function of these units in engineering terms. The model also gives a better fit from a statistical
point of view, according to an F-test of the overall fit of the model.
Specification (4) includes the same specification as in (3), but instrumented with lagged data.
One can see that the results do not change significantly. In specifications (5), I use information
on thermal rates as well as fuel prices at European markets to control for variation in fuel costs
over time. I find that fuel costs computed using thermal rates and European coal prices have an
estimated coefficient of 1.27 for coal plants, which is consistent with the fact that coal costs in
Spain are higher than in most of European markets. 48 This can be a result of variable operation
and maintenance costs as well as transportation costs, not included in fuel prices. One can see that
forward contract estimates do not change substantially when variation of fuel prices over time is
accounted for in a more parametric fashion. For the rest of the analysis, I use the specification in
column (2) as the baseline specification.
Concerns and alternative specifications One of the critiques of the above approach is that
the econometrician needs to make a choice on how much to smooth the residual demand in order
to construct the moments. The estimates of the inverse residual demand slope could be sensitive
to the smoothing parameter. In order to assess this concern, I check several different smoothing
parameters, which are relegated to the appendix. A table is included in which the estimates in
Table 1.4, column (2), are presented under alternative assumptions of the bandwidth parameter.
Results for marginal cost estimates are not too sensitive to the smoothing parameter as long as the
smoothing parameter is relatively small.
With a bandwidth parameter between 1 to 56, the implied forward position ranges between
87 to 97% approximately. Coal estimates range roughly between 26 to 296, whereas combined
cycle gas estimates are more sensitive to the bandwidth parameter, and range between 35 to
436.In the baseline specification, the bandwidth parameter is set to 36. In Figure 1-17, I show
that a bandwidth parameter in that range captures well both the residual demand and its slope.
Bandwidth choices that are either too small or too large will tend to exacerbate or attenuate its
slope, respectively.
1.6.2 Startup cost estimates
I perform the estimation of startup costs using the information contained in complex bids. The
firm examined makes use of complex bids actively, which allows me to identify the startup cost for
all units.
I estimate the startup cost using Equation (1.5.2). In order to construct a sample of the expected
II" (a, 7), I" (a, -y) at the point at which the minimum revenue requirement is just satisfied, I
randomly draw market outcomes and estimate the profits for each unit of either being in or out. I
take 100 random samples for every day in order to make sure that observations next to the minimum
481 do not have data of thermal rates for combined cycle gas plants, for which I use an engineering benchmark
rate. The results suggest that the thermal rates for gas plants are higher than the ones used.
Figure 1-8: Pointwise Estimation of Fixed Costs
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Observations around the point at which the minimum revenue is just satis-
fled are used to identify fixed startup costs for a given unit (GUAl). The
expected intercept at zero provides the estimate of startup costs.
revenue requirement are sampled. Sampling different random draws provides observations around
the point at which the minimum revenue requirement is just satisfied. The simulation procedure
results in J moments given by,
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Figure 1-8 gives a graphical representation of the estimation around the minimum revenue
requirement. The difference in profits is represented in the Y-axis against the net revenue of the
unit. As one can see, due to uncertainty in the market, different profits can be achieved at the same
level of net revenue. The startup cost is estimated as the expected difference in profits around the
point at which the net revenue is zero using kernel weights. Given the observed linearity of the
difference in profits, I control for the slope induced by the minimum revenue requirement using a
locally linear regression.
This sampling process provides an estimate of the difference in profits of having a unit accepted
or not. This implies that the startup cost is estimated as,
Aff~nout(&, j') = 13j + Ejt
when the midnimum revenue requirement is just satisfied. However, as highlighted in the previous
section, these estimates will provide in general a lower bound to startup costs due to the presence
of the continuation value of the startup.
In order to control for the continuation value, I use a reduced form approach in which I project
the estimated profit difference A f-"t to a specification with weekday fixed-effects, motivated by
the fluctuation of the continuation value due to the weekly cycle. Because there are not enough
observations at the unit level to estimate a specification with weekday fixed effects, 49 I pool units
within thermal groups. The coefficients on the covariates are not unit specific, but specific to
the type of fuel (combined cycle gas or coal, indexed by f). I include controls for the day of the
week, that should capture partially the option value associated to each day. Given that combined
cycle units have standard sizes of either 400MW or 800MW approximately, I compute the startup
cost estimation separately for the two groups and do not include a size control. For coal plants, I
include a coefficient on the size of the plant, which is highly correlated with its startup costs. The
specification for coal plants is given by,
affr *(6,-y)='50+#ppMWj +ryfeekday _
Results from the startup costs estimation are presented in Table 1.5. In the baseline specification
(1), weekday fixed effects are included and Friday is taken as a baseline. Units reportedly unavailable
due to maintenance or outages are also not included in the baseline specification, given that their
complex bids might reflect this unavailability to produce. Due to the possible bias in the submission
of complex bids, units in systematically congested areas during the period of study. Due to the
systematic congestion, these units are not included in the specifications in which congested units
are excluded.o
Specification (1) shows that coal plants have startup costs that are increasing in the plate
capacity of the plant. They range approximately between 6,0006 and 26,0006. Coal estimates
are not very sensitive to a regression without weekday controls or to the inclusion of congested
and unavailable, as can be seen in specifications (2)-(4). The icnlusion of unavailable units has
the expected effect of increasing startup cost estimates. On the contrary, if the strategic value of
not starting up is ignored, then the implied startup costs are significantly larger, as implied by
the confidence intervals in column (5). This highlights the strategic value of capacity withholding
through the use of complex bids.
Gas plants have startup costs ranging from 12,0006 (400MW) to 20,0004E (800MW), as shown
in column (1). The estimates for gas plants are more sensitive to the removal of weekday fixed
effects and to the inclusion of congested units, as can be seen in columns (2) and (4). The effects of
congestion on the startup estimates are particularly large. The bias of the estimate is downward,
being even negative for the congested units if unit fixed effects are included. 51 Similar to the coal
49Note that even if I observe complex bids frequently at the unit level, market prices are not always in a range
in which the minimum revenue requirement is just satisfied. Furthermore, some units have production contracts and
do not use complex bids so frequently. Finally, some units are usually turned on and therefore only deciding their
startup infrequently.
50 Congested units are often required to produce after the day-ahead market has been closed, being compensated
with congestion rents. Therefore, a given unit that is discarded due to its complex bid, can be actually starting up
later on. In such case, the complex bidding decisions do not fully reflect the decision of starting up the unit, but also
incorporate incentives from the interaction between the day-ahead and the congestion market.
5 1Even though this seems counterintuitive, part of the bias is driven by the fact that marginal costs are overesti-
Table 1.5: Startup Cost Estimates by Type of Fuel
Friday FE No FE Unavailable Congested Non-strategic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coal (E)
cons -11877.5 -11353.4 -10769.3 -10769.3 -13470.3
(2424.0) (2453.6) (2456.1) (2456.1) (1999.7)
mw 125.3 123.7 122.9 122.9 176.8
(11.1) (11.2) (11.0) (11.0) (10.4)
- Implied costs:
150MW 6,915.1 7,199.9 7,662.7 7,662.7 13,056.5
(1,347.1) (1,274.6) (1,340.2) (1,340.2) (2,535.6)
350MW 25,707.7 25,753.2 26,094.8 26,094.8 39,583.2
(1,826.2) (1,708.2) (1,724.7) (1,724.7) (3,700.3)
CCGT (E)
400MW 11,999.4 8,923.3 12,667.3 7,459.4 22,397.2
(11,537.9) (11,585.0) (11,282.6) (8,492.1) (14,184.6)
800MW 20,116.0 16,163.0 20,523.4 9,895.6 40,924.3
(14,179.7) (14,641.5) (14,346.4) (10,191.0) (17,061.7)
Weekday Controls Y N Y Y Y
Unavailable Excluded Y Y N N Y
Congested Excluded Y Y Y N Y
Strategic Firm Y Y Y Y N
Notes: Sample from March to July 2007. Dependent variable is the difference in profits of getting one plant
in or out from the market. Estimates computed using a locally linear regression around observations for
which the minimum revenue requirement is just satisfied. Regression performed by fuel groups controlling
different plant sizes. Standard errors include first stage variance. Specification (5) is computed assuming
that the firm is not strategic, ignoring the effects of withholding capacity on price.
units, ignoring the strategic effects of complex bids lead to larger startup costs, as shown in column
(5). In this case, I find that not accounting for strategic behavior doubles the estimated startup
costs of combined cycle plants.
The standard errors in the startup costs are tight for coal plants, but are much larger in the
estimation of combined cycle plants. The larger standard errors are due to the larger variance in
the marginal cost estimates from the first step, which directly affects the startup cost estimates. An
estimation ignoring the first step variance produces much tighter standard errors for these plants.
1.6.3 Replication exercise
In order to assess the validity of the model, I compute the firm's optimal strategy given the
forward contract, marginal and startup cost estimates. The model computes the optimal quantity
strategy of the firm assuming that there is no uncertainty and firms have perfect foresight.52 Given
the dimensionality of the game and the presence of dynamics, the unit commitment problem of the
firm is solved iteratively with a finite horizon model looking at a week ahead. 53 The model should
capture, at least in average, the price, quantity and startup distribution that is observed ex-post
in the data.
In order to construct confidence intervals around these average simulations, I also simulate
optimal outcomes when I take the lower and upper confidence intervals of marginal costs. For
startup costs, I take the interquartile range, given the lower power for the combined cycle estimates.
I also compute the case in which startup costs are zero. Figure 1-9 shows the daily pattern of four
main variables replicated by the model. The first figure shows the evolution of prices over the day. In
gray, the original data is plotted. One can see that the model predicts very accurately the evolution
of average daily prices. The daily quantity patterns are also captured by the data. In figures 1-9(c)
and 1-9(d) I also compute the optimal strategy if I ignore startup costs. The simulations show that
it is important to account for startup costs in order to rationalize the startup decisions taken by
the firm at the unit level.
Figure 1-10 shows the evolution of the same variables over time. The results show that the
model reflects accurately the evolution of prices and quantities over time. In most of the range,
average prices and quantities are within the confidence intervals. For certain periods of the sample,
particulary the third quarter of the sample, the model does not fit firm decisions as well, understat-
ing the number of startups, as can be seen in figure 1-10(c). This might be due to cost shocks at a
temporal level that the estimation does not capture. However, the overall fit reflects the evolution
of production patterns over time.
mated for these units. Using the gas marginal costs of uncongested units in the subset of congested units predicts
larger startup costs for congested units, which goes in line with the intuition that these units have some opportunity
cost whenever they are accepted, as they give up congestion rents.
52 In the absence of uncertainty, the bidding problem of the firm can be reduced to the firm choosing quantities for
every unit and every hour of the day. In the Section 7, I consider a bidding model in which the firm faces uncertainty.
53 A week ahead horizon is reasonable given that it captures the weekly cycle and is often used in the industry to
choose startup decisions.
Figure 1-9: Hourly Patterns from Replication Model
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1.7 Counterfactual simulations
In this section, I present counterfactual simulations to assess the welfare effects of complex bids.
The goal of this counterfactual analysis is to separately quantify the efficiency benefits of the
complex mechanism versus its market power effects. The exercise consists in comparing market
outcomes under the original market design to one in which complex bids are not allowed.
One of the challenges of performing a counterfactual analysis is that, to date, there are no known
approaches to characterizing equilibrium strategies in a comprehensive fashion in the context of
multi-unit auctions with step bids such as the ones studied here. These difficulties are aggravated
in the presence of complex bids and startup costs, which make the cost structure of the firm non-
convex. For this reason, the counterfactuals are computed for a strategic firm facing a given residual
demand, taking the behavior of the other firms as given. This approach ensures that a global
optimum for the firm's strategy is found, as the problem of the firm can be solved exhaustively.
To capture more general equilibrium effects of the bidding mechanism change, I adjust the
residual demand faced by the strategic firm in a way that seems plausible given the characteris-
tics of the mechanism change, based on the optimal bidder behavior implied by the single firm
computational model as well as observed bidding patterns in the market. The main idea behind
the endogenization of residual demand changes is based on the fact that, without complex bids,
the model predicts that firms will make their on/off decisions ex-ante. This provides me with a
simplified way to account for changes in the uncertainty faced by the strategic firm and can be
informative about the coordination effects of the mechanism change.
1.7.1 Counterfactual strategy
Figure 1-11 represents the counterfactual model analyzed. The counterfactual model solves for
the optimal strategies of Firm 1, both with and without complex bids. Strategies for other firms
are endogenized in a more indirect fashion, based on the actual data from the market as well as a
simple prediction of firm behavior under simple bids.
1.7.1.1 Optimal bids for the strategic firm
Solving the problem for a single firm is in itself a computationally intensive task, due to the
dimensionality of the game being played and the presence of non-convexities. In order to implement
the counterfactual computation, I use a modified version of the model in Cerisola et al. (2009),
which I adapt to introduce complex bidding. The idea underlying the model is to convert the
problem of the firm into a linear mixed-integer program (MIP) that can be solved exhaustively in a
reasonable amount of time. In order to linearize the problem of the firm, both the residual demand
of the firm as well as its gross revenue are approximated with piece-wise linear functions. For a
large number of pieces, the approximation gives a modified problem that converges to the original
one.
The model solves the day-ahead bidding problem of the firm, in which optimal bidding strategies
Figure 1-11: Computation of Counterfactuals
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The counterfactual model computes the optimal best response of a given firm, given the
distribution of other firms' actions. A counterfactual residual demand is computed based on
likely changes in rivals' strategies in the absence of complex bids.
are computed given the expected residual demand. Expected residual demand is simulated by
drawing a set of residual demands from its estimated distribution. The firm solves then for the
optimal bidding strategy taking into account the uncertainty in the market. In order to account
for the continuation value of the startup, I allow the firm to look five days ahead.
More details regarding the computational implementation can be found in Appendix 1.9.4.
1.7.1.2 Counterfactual residual demand
One of the crucial aspects of the simulations is to endogenize the response of residual demand
to a change in the bidding mechanism. To adjust the residual demand, I make use of the fact that
firms appear to commit their units ex-ante whenever they do not have a complex bid, as explained
in section 1.3.5.
This behavior is consistent with the computational model used for a single firm. Intuitively,
if startup costs are large enough and there is enough uncertainty, it can be optimal to decide the
status of the unit ex-ante, as it might not be possible to submit bids that are consistent with a
smooth pattern of operation across hours. This form of bidding is also consistent in industry short-
term scheduling tools for electricity generation, in which firms tend to decide their commitment
decisions in the medium run (week) and then take them as given when deciding their daily bids.
Based on these facts, I construct counterfactual strategies for the other firms by bootstrapping
strategies across similar days, as originally made in the estimation section. 54 However, instead of
randomly sampling all the bids of the firms and solving for the complex bidding auction rule, I
54Similar days were defined are pooled depending on whether they are a Monday, another weekday, a Saturday or
a Sunday, as well as depending on the maximum hourly levels of predicted demand.
only randomly sample the accepted simple bids across days and solve for a uniform auction with
no complex bids. This implies that I take the startup decisions that happened ex-post due to the
complex bids, as if they had been taken ex-ante.
Because the equilibrium prices will change once I allow the behavior of the strategic firm to
change, I iterate the startup decisions of non-strategic firms. Given that I observe their complex
bids, which define a contingency plan, I can check which units obtain their minimum revenue
requirement at the new prices. 55
Even though this is a limited experiment, it illuminates the effects of complex bids on coor-
dinating entry, capturing the fact that in the absence of complex bids the distribution of residual
demand is more volatile. Further details on the construction of the counterfactual residual demand
curve as well as a comparison of implied uncertainty of the original and adjusted distributions of
residual demand are included in Appendix 1.9.5.
1.7.2 Counterfactual results
I present in this section the main results regarding the counterfactual simulations. I compare the
market performance with and without complex bids, when a strategic firm faces the original residual
demand and when the firm faces an adjusted demand that approximates the responses of other
firms to the counterfactual change. I consider four strategic cases: complex bidding with original
residual demand, complex bidding with adjusted residual demand, simple bidding with original
residual demand, and simple bidding with adjusted residual demand. 56 I also compute the first
best equilibrium under both the original and the adjusted residual demand curve. 57 The simulations
are computed over the whole sample period, totaling 116 days.58 I run several simulations with
different random draws that correspond to different evolutions of demand realizations over the
period. In the discussion, I focus on the comparison between the complex bidding mechanism with
the original residual demand and the simple bidding mechanism with the adjusted demand, as this
is the comparison that reflects the overall effects of the policy counterfactual. I also comment on
the insights coming from the rest of cases.
1.7.2.1 The effects of complex bids
I examine the equilibrium prices and quantities to assess the performance of the market under
complex and simple bids. Table 1.6 presents average measures of prices and quantities. From the
55Note that this iteration still takes the bidding strategies of other firms as given and, therefore, it has good
contraction properties. Even though the iteration needs not to converge to a single point, due to the discrete nature
of startup decisions, it has well-defined bounds that in practice are very small. In the results subsection, I report the
last iteration obtained.
561 define the simple bidding mechanism as the auction with no complex bids, which is a set of simultaneous
uniform auctions with no complementary bidding.
5 7 The first best equilibrium minimizes the costs of producing the residual demand left in the market, assuming
that the residual demand represents the marginal costs of producing with units other than the thermal generators of
the strategic firm.
58 Note that the last days cannot be simulated as the simulations look five days ahead to account for the continuation
value of the week.
Table 1.6: Counterfactual Market Results
Price Weighted Price Quantity
(6/MWh) (E/MWh) (MWh)
Complex Bids
with Original Demand 34.24 39.01 1,202
Simple Bids
with Adjusted Demand 36.95 44.23 1,353
Difference (%) 6.87 9.93 9.84
Notes: Weighted price represents market price weighted by the quantity produced
by the firm. Main effect compares the original counterfactual with complex bids
to the one in which firms can only use simple bids and the residual demand has
been adjusted.
table, one can see that the complex mechanism with the original residual demand captures well
the average price actually observed in the market. In the simulation with complex bids, the price
equals 35.346/MWh. This is very similar to the average price in the data (34.14 E/MWh) and
the average price in the bootstrapped data with complex bids (34.24 E/MWh), as can be seen in
Table 1.12.
Once complex bids are removed, one can see that the average market price increases, moving
from 35.346/MWh to 37.78E/MWh (6.87%). The increase in prices occurs even though the thermal
quantity produced by the firm increases as a response to higher prices due to the more volatile
residual demand. In order to assess whether the firm is more or less aggressive in bidding, in
Appendix 1.9.5 I perform a naive counterfactual in which I take the decisions of all firms as given,
and compare market outcomes with the original and the adjusted residual demand. The simulation
predicts higher volatility in the market as well, but the increase in market prices is not as large,
around 3.79%. This fact highlights the importance of accounting for strategic responses to a more
volatile and inelastic residual demand curve.
Table 1.7 presents results regarding overall firm revenues. Note that the average net revenue is
negative. This is because the net revenue does not include the revenue coming from forward and
production contracts, which are sunk at the time of the day-ahead market. One can see that the
firm obtains higher revenues under the simple bidding mechanism, due to the increase in prices. 59
To get another sense of firm profits, I compute a measure of thermal profits. These profits
include the gross revenue obtained with thermal plants minus thermal production costs. One can
see that firms make net positive profits with their thermal generators. One can see that the firm
experiences an increase in thermal profit in the absence of complex bids, which increase by 44.08%.
This is mainly due to the fact that prices are larger in the market, but also due to the increased
thermal production.
59Note that, if the residual demand were held constant, the firm would be expected to obtain weakly higher net
revenues under the complex bidding mechanism, as in this setting with a single firm facing a residual demand complex
bids expand the bidding possibilities of the firm.
Table 1.7: Counterfactual Aggregate Measures
Net Thermal Unit Dispatch Overall
Revenue Profits Costs Costs Payments
Complex Bids
with Original Demand -18,640 11,420 35,463 106,791 783,574
Simple Bids
with Adjusted Demand -16,441 19,027 40,832 107,314 847,663
Difference (%) 5.11 44.08 12.12 1.62 7.05
Notes: Average hourly values in E.
I also compute aggregate measures that give a sense of the overall efficiency of the allocation
and the distributional implications of the implied market prices. Column 4 in Table 1.7 presents the
overall cost of serving the residual demand in the market, where the residual demand not covered
by the strategic firm is evaluated assuming that the residual demand represents the marginal cost
of the alternative generating units. This is a partial measure of cost, as the supply curve of other
firms does not necessarily reflect their costs even if they are competitive. For example, as noted
above, units might submit zero bids to ensure operating. Taking into account these caveats, the
comparison suggests that complex bids induce slightly lower overall costs, although the effects are
minor.
Finally, I include in column 5 the total payments made by consumers in the day-ahead market,
taking into account the distribution of market prices implied by the two mechanisms. This measure
reflects the consequences of higher prices to consumers due to strategic behavior. One can see that
differences in payments are of 7.05%, which can imply approximately 550ME annually." This
implies that payments at the electricity markets could increase substantially.
1.7.2.2 Market power versus startup coordination
In the beginning of the paper, I explained that complex bids could have potentially negative
market power effects. Yet, the main result that emerges is that it actually enhances competition by
allowing more flexible startup decisions. In this section, I show that, holding the residual demand
fixed, a single firm could actually exercise market power and increase prices modestly.
As can be seen in table 1.8, holding the residual demand fixed I find that the simple bidding
mechanism induces slightly lower prices on average. With the original residual demand, prices
move from 35.346/MWh to 35.33E/MWh. This reduction in price is due to the fact that the firm
tends to withhold less quantity using the simple bidding mechanism. I find similar results when
I compare the two mechanisms with the adjusted residual demand. The firm produces 9.47% less
when complex bids are allowed, confirming that the complex mechanism allows the firm to withhold
its capacity. This translates in a price increase of 0.37%.
ONote that the policy counterfactual is evaluated only during four months of the year. Due to seasonality, overall
changes might be different if seasonal fluctuations significantly affect price differences across the two counterfactuals.
Table 1.8: Counterfactual Market Results
Price Weighted Price Quantity
(6E/MWh) (6/MWh) (MWh)
Original Demand
- Complex Bids 34.24 39.01 1,202
- Simple Bids 34.00 38.40 1,253
Adjusted Demand
- Complex Bids 37.19 45.19 1,297
- Simple Bids 36.95 44.23 1,353
Notes: Weighted price represents market price weighted by the quantity produced
by the firm. Main effect compares the original counterfactual with complex bids
to the one in which firms can only use simple bids and the residual demand has
been adjusted.
Table 1.9: First Best Market Results
Price Weighted Price Quantity
(6E/MWh) (4E/MWh) (MWh)
First Best
- Original demand 32.42 36.18 1,436
Implied markups/changes (%)
- Complex with original demand
vs First Best Original 5.6 7.8 -16.3
- Simple with adjusted demand
vs First Best Adjusted 11.6 16.3 -17.1
Notes: Weighted price represents market price weighted by the quantity produced by the firm.
This intermediate effect highlights the tradeoff between market power and efficiency in this
market. In the presence of a single firm, holding the uncertainty in the market constant and
given the relatively low uncertainty in the market, efficiency savings through complex bids are
not sufficient to justify their introduction. However, to the extent that removing complex bids
introduces larger volatility in the market, the positive effects of coordination overcome the market
power concerns.
1.7.2.3 Comparison to first best
The methods presented in this paper can be used to compute a measure of market power that
accounts for startup costs in both the strategic and the first best scenario. I compare the main
results in table 1.6 to the ones in which expected costs are minimized, which are presented in table
1.9. With respect to the first best counterfactual, average prices in the market are 5.6% and 11.6%
larger under complex and simple bidding, respectively. Note that these price differences can be
interpreted as markups. 61 The increase in these markups when the residual demand becomes more
61 Markups with respect to marginal costs only can be misleading in this setting in which firms have non-convex
costs of operation.
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volatile reinforces the thesis of increased incentives to exercise market power in the presence of a
more volatile demand.
Figure 1-12 represents the equilibrium supply curve of the firm under the six different scenarios
considered. One can see that the supply curve in the first best scenario is very similar under both
residual demand realizations. Even though removing the complex bidding mechanism increases the
volatility of the residual demand, the equilibrium supply curve remains more or less constant. This
contrasts with the response of the strategic firm, which increases its markups in the presence of a
more volatile and inelastic residual demand.
1.7.2.4 Discussion of the validity of results
The results of the counterfactuals are subject to different assumptions and modeling decisions
that I have taken in the analysis. In this section I discuss some of the main issues and the possible
implications with regards to the counterfactual findings.
As discussed above, the analysis does not take into account congestion and sequential markets,
which could change the overall production patterns of the units. In the data, I find important
adjustment in the congestion markets and relatively minor adjustments in sequential markets (ex-
cept for those directly related to congestion). However, without complex bids, these patterns could
change and sequential markets could gain importance. Such changes would potentially not affect
substantially the finding that the day-ahead market prices increase due to volatility, as these ad-
justments occur once the day-ahead market has cleared. However, changes in production patterns
could be important, which could affect the final costs of production.
Another aspect that I do not endogenize is the changes in production and financial contracts,
which I hold fix in the simulations. Given that firms seem to use production contracts as a way to
schedule their production, one could expect firms increasing this type of arrangements, which could
reduce the volatility in the market given that they usually exhibit certain persistence. Regarding
financial contracts, an increased volatility could potentially increase the incentives to hedge firms
production. Given that the structural model has a reduced form equation for choosing forward
contracts, one could potentially endogenize this decision partially and do sensitivity analysis with
the estimated forward parameter.6 2
The model does not incorporate the decisions of technologies that do not use complex bids,
such as renewable energy, nuclear plants and hydro power plants. Whereas holding production
fixed for wind and nuclear resources is a reasonable assumption, the bids of hydro resources could
change substantially in the presence of more uncertainty. A treatment of the optimal strategies in
the presence of hydro power plants is beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, the response of other firms is modeled in a limited fashion, exploiting the fact that
complex bids provide a contingency plan even with changing market conditions. While this ap-
proach is reasonable for competitive firms, in which complex bids are on average equal to their cost
parameters (which should presumably not be affected by the counterfactual change), this is more
limited in the presence of other strategic firms. Given the findings for a single strategic firm, in
which the firm withholds more capacity when complex bids are not available, one would expect
that an iteration of each firm's decisions in this market would actually strengthen the results of
increased prices in the absence of complex bids.
1.8 Conclusions
I study the benefits and costs of introducing augmented forms of bidding in the wholesale elec-
tricity auction, often referred as "complex bids." Complex bids allow generating companies to link
their valuations across different hours of the day, giving an horizontal dimension to the auction.
The introduction of complex bids can potentially improve the efficiency of the market by allowing
firms to better express their cost structure. However, in the presence of market power, complex
bids also give firms another dimension with which to exert market power. Which of these effects
dominates is theoretically ambiguous, so I assess this trade-off empirically in the Spanish electricity
market.
Simulated counterfactual analysis of this market suggests that the complex bidding mechanism
performs better than the simple bidding mechanism, even in the presence of market power. Holding
the residual demand constant, the effect on consumers is an increase in prices and a slight increase
in overall dispatch costs. However, once I account for the increased volatility in the market in the
absence of complex bids, prices and overall costs increase. I find that, without complex bids, prices
increase by 6.87% (2.446) on average. Overall dispatch costs increase only modestly, suggesting
that the distributional concerns of changing the market mechanism are larger than its associated
6 2 Preliminary analysis in this direction suggests that updating the forward position in an iterative fashion does
not have good convergence properties. In future research, it would be interesting to develop a computational method
in which production decisions that are consistent with the reduced form equation for forward contracts can be solved
simultaneously.
production efficiency losses.
The analysis highlights the importance of complex bids as a mechanism to coordinate entry
(startup decisions). If firms commit their units ex-ante, the residual demand becomes more volatile
and inelastic, which enhances the incentives to exercise market power. Whereas the results on
production costs are more limited, due to the focus of the counterfactuals on a single firm production
function, the analysis reveals important distributional implications of removing complex bids, with
payment increases of over 550ME. The results suggest that, to the extent that complex bids
successfully reduce the volatility in the market, they have positive effects in this market.
There are several extensions that remain open for future work. First, I find that the mechanism
studied does not give firms increased incentives to exercise market power and that overall it increases
the elasticity of supply in the market, due to its positive coordination benefit. The nature of the
problem could change substantially if the complex bidding mechanism were to be used to collude,
for example by making it easier to coordinate. It would be interesting to explore whether complex
bids could enhance collusion in this setting. Second, there are other complex mechanisms that could
be used. In Reguant and Perez-Arriaga (2010), we explore alternative bidding mechanisms that
are used in existing electricity markets, analyzing its efficiency implications in competitive markets.
We also consider its long run implications, accounting for fixed investment costs. Understanding
the functioning of these alternative complex mechanisms in a strategic setting is a topic of future
research.
Finally, I would like to explore how complex bids interact with other markets. In particular, I
would like to study how firms use simple and complex bids in the presence of local congestion, given
the evidence that I have found of persistent local congestions in this market. I plan to exploit an
institutional break in the design of the congestion market. The day-ahead is an augmented uniform
price auction, as presented in this paper, whereas the congestion market is a discriminatory auction.
Before July 2005, firms had to submit the same bids for both markets. However, after July 2005,
firms could separate the decision and bid in the two markets separately. This provides a quasi-
natural experiment to understand optimal behavior under these two settings and opens the door
to testing the assumption of optimal behavior, which is usually needed for identification. In this
context, I would like to understand the antitrust and market monitoring implications of firms
in congested areas withholding capacity, paying special attention to the role of complex bids in
withholding capacity.
1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 The ISO algorithm
I explain here the details of the algorithm that I use to simulate the ISO algorithm, as well as
set of simulations to assess the accuracy of this pseudo-algorithm by comparing it to actual prices.
First I discuss the actual algorithm used by the ISO and explain how the algorithm is approximated
in my application. Finally, I compare predicted and actual market outcomes for a set of 90 days,
and assess the magnitude of the bias in the predictions with respect to equilibrium prices as well
as number and identity of complex bids that are binding.
1.9.1.1 Details of the actual algorithm
The details of the algorithm used by the ISO to compute the market outcome of the day-ahead
market are explained in the "Appendix on the Fanctioning of the Wholesale Electricity Day-Ahead
and Intra-day Markets."63 Here I outline the major steps that are taken to solve for the optimal
dispatch.
After receiving and verifying the supply and demand offers made by the market participants,
the ISO solves for the optimal dispatch using the following order:
1. Construct aggregate supply and demand curves from simple bids taking into account merit
order rules and interconnection constraints.
2. Solve for the optimal dispatch using these aggregate curves (uniform auction rule). Use
established rules to deal with indivisible steps and ties.
3. Check ramping constraints at the unit level and change quantities to satisfy them (only check
once for ramping up and once for ramping down).
4. Order the units with complex bids whose minimum revenue constraints are not satisfied
according to the difference between their average required price and the average price they
receive.
5. Discard the unit whose deviation is largest.
6. Repeat 1 to 5 until no complex bid binds. This is the provisional solution.
7. Order units with complex bids that have been discarded according to the difference between
their average required price and the average price they would receive at current prices. Note
that some units that have been discarded might be willing to produce at current prices.
8. Use the resulting merit order from step 7 in step 4 when repeating 1 to 5, again until no
complex bid binds, to obtain a new provisional solution.
9. Repeat 7 to 8 until no discarded units would be willing to produce at current prices or stop
if time exceeds 30 minutes or number of iteration is larger than 3,000, taking the provisional
solution that minimizes the foregone rents of discarded units that would be willing to produce
at current prices. This is the final solution.
Mimicking the ISO algorithm poses some challenges. In particular, the ISO algorithm can take
up to 30 minutes to complete, which is computationally not feasible in my application, in which
I need to simulate hundreds of market outcomes for each firm and each day. Furthermore, the
63Boletin Oficial del Estado num. 128, 05/30/2006, pp. 20157-20192 (in Spanish).
treatment of the interconnections requires some information that I do not have available. For this
reasons, it is important to approximate the ISO in an heuristic manner.
1.9.1.2 Details of the pseudo-algorithm
Implementing the ISO algorithm exactly is not possible for two main reasons. On the one hand,
I do not have the information necessary to account for congestion at the interconnections. On the
other hand, the procedure is computationally very costly. The ISO allows the algorithm to do up
to 3,000 iterations during up to 30 minutes. However, for estimation purposes, I need to simulate
market outcomes thousands of times. Therefore, there is a need to trade-off the trustworthiness of
the pseudo-algorithm with its computational efficiency, but trying to preserve the actual outcomes
of the algorithm as much as possible.
I follow Garcia et al. (1999) to implement an heuristic ISO algorithm as a mixed integer linear
programming problem. This problems takes into account the ramping constraints submitted by
the units, as well as the indivisibility conditions of the steps as a single maximization problem.
The minimum revenue requirements are dealt in a similar fashion than the actual ISO algorithm,
although I only allow for one iteration. I plan to extend the iteration to better resemble the method
used by the ISO.
The pseudo-algorithm is programmed as follows:
1. Solve a mixed-integer linear program that includes indivisibility and ramping constraints.
2. Order the units with complex bids whose minimum revenue requirements are not satisfied
according to the difference between their average required price and the average price they
receive.
3. Discard the unit whose deviation is largest.
4. Repeat 1 to 3 until no complex bid binds.
The pseudo-algorithm is implemented in Java and the mixed-integer linear program is solved
using the commercial solver CPLEX 11.0, which is very efficient for this type of problems.
1.9.1.3 Simulations to assess the performance of the pseudo-algorithm
I present a comparison of actual and predicted prices by the pseudo-algorithm in Table 1.10.
The algorithm predicts the prices accurately and the difference between the two is not significant
for any hour of the day. The overall error is small, with a mean close to zero. The predicted prices
also present the same standard deviation as actual prices.
I also implement different version of the algorithm, some of which relax the integrality con-
straints. Some other algorithms allow for a certain degree of iteration, following the minimization
criteria used by the ISO. Overall, I find the pseudo-algorithms to replicate very accurately the
patterns across the different hours of the day. Results are presented in Table 1.10.
Table 1.10: Price predicted and simulation error at the hourly level
Hour MgPrice AIg 1 AIg 2 AIg 3 AIg 4 Al A2 A3 A4
1 33.20 33.11 33.23 33.16 33.21 -0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.01
(6.98) (6.91) (6.96) (7.04) (7.06) (0.83) (1.19) (0.95) (0.97)
2 29.77 29.98 30.07 29.97 29.98 0.20 0.30 0.19 0.21
(5.40) (5.39) (5.36) (5.46) (5.45) (1.03) (0.96) (0.88) (0.86)
3 26.57 26.90 26.90 26.81 26.88 0.33 0.33 0.24 0.30
(4.24) (4.39) (4.33) (4.44) (4.33) (0.75) (0.64) (0.71) (0.70)
4 25.45 25.63 25.67 25.64 25.71 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.26
(3.86) (3.99) (4.02) (3.97) (3.81) (0.70) (0.76) (0.68) (0.67)
5 24.47 24.66 24.66 24.66 24.75 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.28
(3.98) (3.98) (3.99) (3.98) (3.91) (0.59) (0.61) (0.59) (0.52)
6 24.47 24.72 24.71 24.61 24.71 0.25 0.24 0.14 0.24
(3.53) (3.49) (3.49) (3.50) (3.35) (0.56) (0.58) (0.47) (0.50)
7 26.82 27.03 27.00 26.95 27.03 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.21
(3.76) (3.57) (3.56) (3.62) (3.41) (0.89) (0.88) (0.72) (0.70)
8 30.39 30.73 30.70 30.74 30.81 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.42
(6.28) (6.25) (6.29) (6.28) (6.23) (1.09) (1.34) (1.07) (1.12)
9 33.87 34.00 33.83 34.02 34.08 0.13 -0.04 0.15 0.21
(7.71) (7.50) (7.47) (7.52) (7.47) (1.09) (1.23) (1.11) (1.14)
10 36.51 36.69 36.43 36.68 36.73 0.18 -0.07 0.18 0.22
(7.84) (7.87) (7.80) (7.89) (7.93) (1.17) (1.33) (1.16) (1.20)
11 39.93 39.84 39.49 39.86 39.93 -0.10 -0.44 -0.07 -0.00
(8.08) (8.23) (8.17) (8.23) (8.25) (1.26) (1.27) (1.25) (1.24)
12 41.44 41.44 40.99 41.46 41.51 -0.00 -0.44 0.02 0.07
(8.81) (8.97) (8.90) (8.95) (8.90) (1.30) (1.60) (1.18) (1.17)
13 41.97 42.04 41.56 42.05 42.06 0.07 -0.41 0.08 0.09
(9.40) (9.50) (9.42) (9.49) (9.47) (1.28) (1.64) (1.20) (1.19)
14 40.23 40.29 39.91 40.30 40.34 0.06 -0.32 0.07 0.11
(8.73) (8.74) (8.76) (8.73) (8.78) (1.19) (1.48) (1.11) (1.14)
15 37.34 37.41 37.10 37.45 37.47 0.08 -0.23 0.11 0.13
(8.12) (8.03) (8.09) (8.03) (8.07) (1.12) (1.26) (1.06) (1.04)
16 36.12 36.06 35.72 36.07 36.09 -0.06 -0.40 -0.05 -0.03
(8.59) (8.60) (8.57) (8.61) (8.62) (1.14) (1.22) (1.11) (1.07)
17 35.96 35.84 35.44 35.82 35.85 -0.12 -0.52 -0.15 -0.11
(9.30) (9.18) (9.21) (9.16) (9.14) (1.01) (1.37) (0.93) (0.89)
18 36.21 36.02 35.65 36.00 36.01 -0.19 -0.56 -0.21 -0.21
(9.78) (9.56) (9.52) (9.57) (9.61) (1.00) (1.13) (0.98) (0.87)
19 35.00 35.07 34.69 35.08 35.14 0.07 -0.31 0.08 0.14
(8.87) (8.63) (8.65) (8.63) (8.61) (0.96) (1.21) (0.93) (0.92)
20 34.30 34.33 33.97 34.30 34.32 0.03 -0.33 0.00 0.02
(6.63) (6.46) (6.39) (6.50) (6.47) (1.22) (1.49) (1.21) (1.20)
21 35.93 35.33 34.79 35.40 35.51 -0.60 -1.14 -0.53 -0.42
(6.31) (6.29) (6.04) (6.32) (6.30) (1.92) (2.24) (1.64) (1.61)
22 42.35 41.73 41.10 41.78 41.72 -0.62 -1.24 -0.57 -0.63
(9.12) (9.40) (8.91) (9.31) (9.19) (1.90) (2.25) (1.70) (1.90)
23 38.82 38.53 38.11 38.54 38.57 -0.30 -0.72 -0.29 -0.26
(7.37) (7.50) (7.25) (7.51) (7.47) (1.35) (1.61) (1.37) (1.20)
24 32.72 32.82 32.37 32.80 32.81 0.10 -0.34 0.09 0.10
(5.32) (5.61) (5.34) (5.65) (5.58) (1.20) (1.30) (1.19) (1.17)
Total 34.16 34.17 33.92 34.17 34.22 0.01 -0.24 0.01 0.06
(9.07) (8.99) (8.83) (9.01) (8.98) (1.17) (1.40) (1.11) (1.11)
Notes: Monte Carlo simulation covers the period of March-June of 2007. Prices are in E/MWh.
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1.9.2 Data sources
The major part of the data is obtained from the Market Operator website, http://www.omel.es. I
obtain the bidding data from bidding files DET and CAB. Physical bilateral contracts are obtained
from PDBF files. Congestion restrictions are obtained from PDVD files as well as from the System
Operator 190 form, http://www.esios.ree.es. Similarly, unavailability of units as well as the reason
of the unavailability are obtained from INDIP files and the 190 form. Outcomes of sequential
markets as well as final dispatch data are obtained from PHF files.
Plant characteristics of the plants can be obtained from the annual statistic reports of the
System Operator as well as from the structural data in their website. These include maximum
capacity, vintage and main type of fuel. I complement the data set with fuel mix obtained from
the Ministry of Industry registrar as well as emission rates obtained from the EPER registrar. I
also obtain engineering thermal rates for previously regulated plants from several sources from the
National Energy Commission and the Ministry of Industry.
I complement the data set with other information available at the System Operator's website. I
acquire demand and wind production forecasts, which are made available before the auction is run
to reduce balancing needs in real-time. The files are DEMANDAUX and PREVEOL. I also get
commodity price data to include it in the cost estimation. I use NBP day ahead prices for natural
gas (UK), API coal indexes, and European ARA prices for low sulfur fuel-oil and gas oil.
1.9.3 Model first-order conditions
1.9.3.1 Assumption regarding effects of simple bidding
This section provides an empirical verification that the term assumed to be negligible in Assump-
tion 1 is indeed small. In other words, I show that the effect of marginal changes of bids on expected
profits due to the changes on the probability of a bid being binding is negligible. In addition, I
show that ignoring this effect does not seem to be a potential source of bias in the estimation.
First, I calculate the probability of a bid being binding and the revenue requirement being
just satisfied. Then, I show that for plausible (estimated) parameter values, the contribution
to the total derivative coming from changes in the probability of a bid being binding (holding
profits constant) is small compared to the contribution coming from changes in profits (holding
probabilities constant). Finally, I show that the omitted term coming is not particularly correlated
with the elements included in the main empirical specification, which could be a potential source
of bias.
The probability Pr(Rig = 0|bijk = Ph). I first compute the empirical probability Pr(Rig =
0|bigk = Ph). One of the challenges of the simulated outcomes is that usually the above probability
will almost always be empirically zero. I use a kernel regression to estimate which bids correspond
to revenue requirements just being satisfied. I use as a benchmark bandwidth parameter of 15,0006.
Note that this bandwidth parameter is very conservative, as the fixed costs of the units are estimated
to have values in similar magnitude. The weights are renormalized so that a probability of one is
attributed whenever the revenue requirement is just binding. Using this method, I estimate that
at least 30% of the observations have zero probability to both set the price and have minimum
revenue requirements just being satisfied.
Assessing relative magnitudes. I now show that the relative contribution of marginal effects
due to probability changes are very small when compared to the marginal effects of bids on profits.
se Pr(s) E[II(o-i, oi)Is]
EsgPr(s)EffI )|s] '
which is the ratio of the contributions to the FOC due to the changes in the probabilities relative
to changes on profits. Note that the numerator can be computed using that it can be expressed as
Pr(bjkh = Ph) Pr(p(Rig) = O|bjkh = Ph)E[II* - nfuIp(Ri ) = 0, bjkh = Ph].
This ratio is no greater than 10.55% on average, with an interquartile range with value of zero and
median value 0. Trimming the outliers from the simulated outcomes (top and bottom 0.5%), this
average ratio is reduced to 1.98%.
Assumption 1 and potential omitted variable bias. Finally, I show that the term
zBPr(s)[H(.1: ObjkhE [IIi(o-i, o-i)|Is]
sESOjk
does not systematically correlate with either simple bids, the markup variable in the simple bids
and the main term in the FOC. The raw correlations between these terms and the omitted term is
small (0.02-0.05) and not significant, both on average across units and conditional on a given unit.
1.9.3.2 First order conditions for simple bids
We need to show that aag = 0 implies
b~kh = .jkh + Pr(slj in) Pr(DR 1 (q) < bjkh < DRh1(q - 1)Is) Qih(q, s)
sESlj in q~step k Pr' (bjkh < DR- 1 (q - 1)|s) qjkh
The expected profit is the sum of revenues minus costs over possible states s and equilibrium
quantities q. In order to derive the condition, I first express profit as a sum of discrete incremental
profits. This approach follows (McAdams, 2008), but it needs to be adapted to the presence of cost
complementarities. Discretizing the quantity increments offered by the firm, I express the profit
function as,
24 Q
EII = Pr(s)E Pr(qfh = q)E[p* q* = q, s]Qih(q, s) - C(qf (s)) s,JI].
sES h=1 q=O
where s is the state of complex bids accepted and q represents the total quantity of firm i that is
offered at a price of p* or less. In a usual setting, q can be interpreted as the total quantity assigned
to firm i, but here one needs to take into account that part of it might be discarded by complex
bids. Qih(q, s) represents the actual net quantity that firm i is selling in the market at quantity q.
The revenue expression is separated across hours and quantity outcomes, given the independence
of the uniform rule across hours once the complex bids that are accepted have been determined,
given by the state s. The cost function cannot be so readily decomposed, due to cost comple-
mentarities. However, it can also be expressed as a sum of incremental costs at each period h,
conditional on the expectations regarding contiguous periods.
Dropping the i subscript, I define the incremental cost of producing an extra MWh in a partic-
ular period h, when the output level is q, as,
aji + aj2(qjh(q) - q.) - aj3(2qj,h(q) - E[qj,h-_1q* = q] - E[qj,h+1|llq = q]), if unit in at s0 s) { , ± 
otherwise,
where qj,h(q) represents the quantity produced by the individual output of the marginal unit j and
aj is a vector of unit specific cost parameters. Therefore, the average incremental cost at a given
step is given by,
Pr(slj in) (jkh(q, s), if unit in at s
(jkh = scSjj in q~step k
0, otherwise,
where qjkh is the offered quantity at the step, q represents the total quantity for the firm and, qjh(q)
represents the unit output.
I consider the incremental profits for a particular hour h, and drop the firm index i and time
index h for ease of notation. Define rq as the inverse residual demand at q and bq as the bid offer
at q. Then, the expected probability of a given quantity q being accepted and the expected price
at that q become,64
Pr(q* = qis)
E[pq* = q,s]
= Pr(by <rqIs) - Pr(bq+1 <rqIs),
= Pr(rg <bq <rq1s)bq+
Pr(q* = qis)
Pr(bq < rq < b+1|s) I
+ Pr(q* = qs) < rq < bq+1, s
= Pr(rq < bq < rq1s) (bq - E[rqlrq < bq < rq-l, s]) +
Pr(q* = qls)
Pr(bg < r1|s) E Pr(bq+1 < rqls)
Pr(q* = qs) E r~b <rg_,s| Pr(q* = qs)
Substituting these equalities and pooling terms together, the gross profit function can be expressed
as,
Q
E[H] = Pr(s) Hlq,,,
sES q=0
where
Pr(bg < rq_1|Is) (E[rglbg < rg_1, s] - (q - 1)E [rq_1 - rqlbq < rq_1, s| - (s)
= -Pr(rq < bq < rq1 Is) (E[rq rq < bq < rq _, s - bq)Q(q, s)
0,
if unit in at s
otherwise.
Each incremental profit depends only on the bid at the step k, and thus the total effect at the
step is given by,
Pr (s) 
''.
S k- ab
It is sufficient to show that at each possible q in k, whenever a unit is in,
_ Pr'(b, < r_1s)((q(s) - bq) - Pr(rq < bq < rqls)Q(q, s),
0,
4Hbgq1s
cObq
if unit in at s
otherwise.
First note that Pr(rq < bq < rq_1 Is) = Pr(bq < rq1 Is) - Pr(bq < rqIs), given that rq_1 < bq => rq <
bq and thus Pr(rq < bnbq < rq-1\Is) = Pr(bq < rq-1) +1 - Pr(bq < rq) -Pr(rq < bqU bq < rq_1Is). The
profit function can be re-written as follows,
H,s = Pr(bq < r_1s)(bq - Cq(s)) + Pr(bq < rqls)(E[rqlbq < rq,s - bq)
- Pr(bq < rq_1s)E[rg_1 - rqlbq < rqi_, s|(Q(q, s) - 1)
+ Pr(rq <bq < rqi _s)(bq - E[rglr, < bq < r_,s])(Q(q, s) -1).
6Note that I make use of the fact that Pr(bq < rq < bq+1|s) = Pr(bq < rg) - Pr(bq+1 < rq) = Pr(bq <
rq-1) - Pr(rq < bq < rq-) - Pr(bq+1 < rq)).
1
4,47
sEq_ q~zstep
Note that the derivative of the first line of profits equals
Pr'(bq < rqls)(bq - (q(s)) + Pr(bq < rq1s) - Pr(bq < rqIs),
given that r <rgs)Etrgb<r,s = Pr'(bq <rqls)bq." One can show that the partial derivative of
the second line and third line of the expression equals to
(Pr(bq < rqgils) - Pr(bq < rls))(Q(q, s) - 1),
which gives the final result given that Pr(bq < rq_1|s) - Pr(bq < rels) = Pr(rq < bq < rq-1|s).
First note that,
&Pr(rq < bq < r_1|Is)b(Q(q, s) - 1) Pr(bq <rqiIS) - Pr(bq <rqIS))(Q(qs) -1)
Obq
+ (Pr'(bq < rq Is)bq - Pr'(bq < rqls)bq) (Q(q, s) - 1).
Also note that,
Pr(bq < rqls)E[rqbq < rq_1, s] - Pr(rq < bq < rqIs)E[rqlrq < bq < rq_1, s]
= Pr(bq < rq)E[rqlbq < rq.
The derivative of this term together with -Pr(bq < rq_)E[rq-1|bq < rqg_](Q(q, s) - 1), as already
seen by Leibniz rule, equals - (Pr'(bq < rls)bq - Pr'(bq < rls)bq) (Q(q, s) - 1), which cancels
with the above terms. i
1.9.4 Counterfactual model
In this appendix I describe in detail how the two main pieces of the counterfactual analysis
are implemented. First, I discuss how the optimal strategy of a single firm is computed, with
and without complex bids. In the next section, I discuss how the residual demand is modified
endogenously to capture some of the general equilibrium effects of the mechanism change.
1.9.4.1 Baseline problem
The baseline problem of the firm is to maximize profits for each possible realization of residual
demand. There are no bidding rules and therefore one can solve the optimal strategy choosing the
quantity produced by each unit at each hour of the day for each possible demand realization, taking
into account the cost structure of the units.
The goal of the firm is to maximize its expected profit, given by its gross revenue minus the
costs of production. The gross revenue depends on the total quantity produced by the firm, which
in equilibrium equals the residual demand. The costs depend on the hourly production at the
65Note that Pr(bq < r. ls)E[rqlbq < rq, s] = f6 rdF(r). By Leibniz rule, its derivative is equal to -bqf(bq).
unit level. Units have both a minimum and a maximum capacity. Units incur a startup cost #y
whenever they turn on.
In order to represent the quadratic and ramping costs at the unit level, and in order to preserve
the linearity of the problem, the quantity levels at the unit level are discretized into different steps.
As the number of steps increases, the solution approximates one in which no linear approximation
is being made.
St 24 J
max Edt (qt) = Pr(s) ( GR(DRt) - Cj (gesj)
s=1 h=1 j=1
[Cost function]
[Balance Constraint]
[Capacity Constraint]
[Startup Constraint]
[Integer Constraint]
C(qtsj) = E iq1 (ol tsh + a2(qjtsh K )
DRtsh = jj qjtsh, Vt, s,
UjtshK, 5 qjtsh ULtsh,, Vj, t, s, h,
Yjtsh = 1(L3 ts,h > Ujts,h-1), Vj, t, s, h,
Ujtsh E {0, 1}, Yjtsh E {0, 11, Vj, t, s, h.
#yjts ), IVj, t, s,
where
Day index,
Demand realization scenarios, s = 1, ..., St,
Hours of the day, h =1,..., 24,
Unit index, j = 1, ... , J,
Probability of demand realization s occurring,
Quantity produced by unit j at day t, scenario s and hour h,
Run indicator, takes value of one if unit is on in day t, scenario s and hour h,
Startup indicator, takes value of one if unit starts up in day t, scenario s and hour h,
Equilibrium residual demand at day t, scenario s and hour h,
Gross revenue function (piecewise linear approximation) which depends on residual demand function,
Daily costs of production.
t
s
h
j
pr(s)
qjtsh
Ujtsh
Yjtsh
DRtsh
GR(.)
Cits
1.9.4.2 Adding simple bids
The above representation does not take into account that firms have constraints when bidding in
the market. Firms cannot provide a quantity schedule for every possible demand contingency, but
need to represent its preferences by means of bidding functions. In the simple bidding problem, I
examine what happens when unit quantity output needs to be increasing with the realized market
prices.
One way to introduce bidding in the model is to make the firm choose over bids, instead of
quantities directly. A way to introduce a sense of bidding in the above problem is to impose that
the quantity produced at the unit level needs to be increasing in the market price.66 This is,
[Simple condition] Ptsh Ptsh = qtsth qjts'h, Vj, t, 8, s 1, h.
One of the problems of the first formulation is that it can become computationally very intense,
due to the large number of binary variables involved in defining the monotonicity constraints. One
solution to this problem, is to reduce the number of scenarios faced by the firm. However, this has
important effects in the nature of bidding. If there are not many possible demand realizations, the
simple bidding rule will tend to look more flexible than it actually is.
For sufficiently many draws of demand realizations, given the nature of uncertainty in the
market and substantial startup costs, choosing the startup decision of the unit ex-ante might can
be a profit-maximizing strategy. This is also consistent with observed bidding patterns in the data.
Therefore, in order to reduce the dimensionality of the game, I consider the case in which the firm
commits its units ex-ante. In such case, the simple bidding restriction is given by
[Simple ex-ante commitment] Uftsh - Ufts'h, Vj, t, s, s', h.
The restriction [Simple ex-ante commitment] can be jointly imposed with the [Simple condition]
constraints, with the advantage that not as many scenarios are required to capture the actual
constraints implied by bidding.
1.9.4.3 Adding complex bids
The introduction of complex bids allows the firm to state its preferences more flexibly over the day.
In terms of the above problem of the firm, the complex bidding mechanism relaxes the restrictions
imposed by simple bidding. For this purpose, the bidding variables Aj, B are introduced. The firm
can exclude its units by means of these bidding variables. As a simplification, general equilibrium
effects to the residual demand function are ignored. 67 Given that the complex bidding mechanism
"Note that for a given quantity strategy it is trivial to derive bidding strategies that are consistent with the
quantity decisions and satisfy the simple bidding rules. Given the discrete number of demand scenarios, there might
exist more than one bidding strategy that is consistent with optimal quantity choices.
67 A model in which the residual demand is endogenous to the complex bids decisions would require computing a
residual demand function for every possible combination of complex bids being binding, which would be prohibitively
represents the game actually played in the data, the original residual demand should be a good
approximation to the residual demand around the equilibrium.
Consider the case in which monotonicity constraints are imposed. The simple bidding rule
requires that the quantity produced by a given unit is increasing in the market price. With complex
bids, that restriction only applies as long as the unit is accepted in the market. Therefore, the
constraint becomes,
[Complex condition 1] Ptsh < Ptsh = qjtsh qjtss, Vj, t, h,{s, s'} e S,
where S represents those states of residual demand in which the unit has been accepted. The
state S is determined endogenously by means of the complex bids submitted by the firm. Complex
bidding conditions are given by,
[Complex condition 2] Y24 I ptshgjtsh <Ajt + By Zh qjtsh - {qjtshk 0,E 2 5} Vj, t, s, h.
One of the problems of [Complex condition 2] is that it is a nonlinear function that depends on
prices, bids and quantities, which are all endogenous variables. In order to compute the actual
equilibrium, I proceed in two-stage fashion. In a first-step I compute the equilibrium of the un-
restricted problem. This gives me a baseline hourly production for each unit, qjtsh. If the unit is
not producing in the baseline, I attribute it a total daily quantity equal to the minimum observed
daily quantity. Once these quantities are defined, the model can be solved as a linear mixed integer
problem, similar to the simple bidding case.
Similar to the simple bidding model, due to the computational limitations of simulating a rich
enough spectrum of possible residual demands, the model might overestimate the flexibility intro-
duced by complex bids. As explained in the Section 1.7, conditional on getting their units accepted,
firms appear to make their commitment decisions ex-ante regarding which hours to produce. For
this reason, I consider the following constraint, which is analogous to the simple bidding ex-ante
commitment constraint bu only applies to states in which the unit has been accepted,
[Complex ex-ante commitment] jtsh = Uses,, Vj, t, h, {s, s'} E S.
1.9.4.4 Adding a dynamic dimension to the game
As explained in Section 1.5, the startup decision of the firm can take a temporal dimension that
spans longer than the daily auction. For this reason, it is necessary to account for the continuation
value of the startup decisions. In order to account for this intertemporal dimension, I consider
a finite horizon game in which the firm is maximizing its profit for the current day, taking into
account the expected demand in the future.
costly from a computational point of view. The firm own thirteen units, which would imply 213 possible residual
demands for every possible demand scenario considered and every day in the sample.
Figure 1-13: Introduction of Dynamic Interactions
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The dynamic game assumes a Markovian process in the evolution of residual demand real-
izations. Today's demand realizations affect the expectations regarding tomorrow's market
outcomes.
The objective function is given by,
t+T
max EIlt(qt),
where T represents the number of periods looking forward. I consider the case in which the firm
looks five days ahead, which in principle should be long enough to capture the weekend cycle.
Similar than before, each day there axe different possible residual demand scenarios, represented
by St. A transition matrix is specified in order to account for possible correlation of demand patterns
across days. I consider a Markovian structure in which the level of demand today is correlated with
the expected demand level tomorrow. In order to reduce the dimensionality of the problem, only
uncertainty over today and tomorrow's shocks are considered. This structure is represented in
Figure 1-13.
In order to reduce the computational dimensionality of the problem, in the computations in-
cluded in the paper I consider six different possible demand realizations, corresponding to the
intervals ranging the 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90 percentiles. 68 The transitions between the different
percentiles across days is estimated based on the actual demand realizations observed in the data.
These process should roughly capture the major features of the underlying distribution of market
68The criterion to classify the residual demand in percentiles is based on the residual demand levels of the different
hours of the day in the relevant ranges of production for the firm. The relevant ranges of thermal production are
those that range from zero to the total thermal capacity of the firm.
outcomes.
1.9.5 Counterfactual residual demand
One of the major benefits of complex bids is to coordinate the startup decisions of the firms.
In this paper, I capture in a reduced form way these effects on the residual demand faced by a
strategic firm. In this section I describe the bootstrapping procedure used.
1.9.5.1 Bootstrapping strategy
A distribution of residual demands is constructed for both simple and complex bids. The distri-
bution is computed for 100 different draws, in which bidding strategies are pooled across similar
days. The complex and simple bidding bootstrapping strategies differ in that the complex mech-
anism solves for the actual ISO algorithm in the market to obtain the residual demands, whereas
the simple mechanism is based on a simpler uniform auction.
Complex mechanism
To generate residual demand draws for the complex mechanism, I take the original residual
demands obtained in the following manner:
1. Randomly select bidding strategies for each firm across similar days.
2. Solve for the market equilibrium under the complex algorithm described in Appendix 1.9.1.
3. Take only offers that are not discarded by the algorithm.
Simple mechanism
In order to generate the residual demand under simple bidding, I assume that observed accepted
bids would have been offered if units were committing their units ex-ante. The process is then:
1. Randomly select bidding strategies that have been accepted for each firm across similar days.
2. Solve for the market equilibrium under a uniform auction.
3. Obtain new prices from strategic firm optimal behavior and repeat 1 and 2 until convergence.
1.9.5.2 Comparison of implied volatility levels
Holding the strategies of all firms as given, including the strategic firm, the above procedure
generates a first rough assessment of the effects of complex bids in coordinating the startup of
units. As it can be seen in Figure 1-14, the presence of complex bids helps reduce the volatility
in the market. This is due to the fact that firms can contingently decide their startup, whereas
with simple bids they take this decision ex-ante. As presented in Table 1.11, while the original
bootstrapped data reflects accurately the underlying distribution of prices in this market, the
bootstrapped data using the simple mechanism only exaggerates the variance in the market.
Figure 1-14: Complex bids reduce the volatility in the market
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Distribution of hourly prices in a given day. The price distribution when the mechanism does
not use complex bids presents higher variance than the original bootstrapped distribution.
Table 1.11: Distribution of Complex and Simple Bootstrapped Prices
Stats Price Price Complex Price Simple
(,E/MWh) (46/MWh) (E/MWh)
mean 34.14 34.24 35.54
sd 8.99 8.90 14.19
skewness 0.66 0.69 1.53
kurtosis 3.17 3.07 6.82
p5 22.91 23.00 20.07
p 2 5  27.48 27.50 25.83
p50 32.18 32.19 30.98
p75 40.01 40.01 42.00
p95 50.61 50.61 64.10
min 8.03 13.00 5.00
max 69.70 65.00 109.11
Notes: Excludes lower and upper 0.5% of the data. Trimming the data in the
extremes avoids including observations in the bootstrapped sample that are not
representative from the actual distribution of prices and that could potentially bias
the estimates of expected market outcomes. Trimming 1% of the data ensures that
no prices at the price cap are observed, which never happens in the data, capturing
the actual process very closely.
1.9.5.3 Estimation of residual demand and gross revenue
Once the distribution of residual demands is obtained, I estimate the 10, 25, 50, 75, and 90 per-
centile, which are used in the simulations. 69 They are approximated as piece-wise linear functions,
so that they can be used in the computational model.
The gross revenue is also estimated as a piece-wise linear function. In some of the simulations, I
also impose that the gross revenue is convex in the relevant ranges of production. This allows me to
reduce the number of integer variables in the problem, while still capturing the major characteristics
of the revenue function. Note that imposing a convex gross revenue function does not impose such
restriction to the residual demand shape.
1.10 Additional tables and figures
Table 1.12: Distribution of Bootstrapped Strategies
Non-trimmed
Stats Price Price Bootstrap Price Bootstrap
(46/MWh) (6E/MWh) (6E/MWh)
mean 34.14 34.24 34.59
sd 8.99 8.90 10.37
skewness 0.66 0.69 2.16
kurtosis 3.17 3.07 24.86
p5 22.91 23.00 22.22
p25  27.48 27.50 27.50
p50  32.18 32.19 32.83
p 7 5  40.01 40.01 40.06
p 9 5  50.61 50.61 52.02
min 8.03 13.00 0.00
max 69.70 65.00 180.30
Notes: "Price Bootstrap" excludes lower and upper 0.5% of the data. Trimming
the data in the extremes avoids including observations in the bootstrapped sample
that are not representative from the actual distribution of prices and that could
potentially bias the estimates of expected market outcomes. Trimming 1% of the
data ensures that no prices at the price cap are observed, which never happens in
the data, capturing the actual process very closely.
69The reason to estimate those percentiles is to ensure that, even if a small number of draws is used, they roughly
represent the underlying distribution in the data. Absent computational limitations, more draws could be taken to
reflect the underlying distribution more accurately.
Table 1.13: Marginal Cost Estimates at the Unit Level
Plant Type Size aog an2  an3
MW 6/MWh 6/MWh2 6/MWh2
ACE3
ARCOS1
ARCOS2
ARCOS3
CTJON2
CTN3
ESC6
STC4
GUA1
GUA2
LAD3
LAD4
PAS1
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CCGT
CO
CO
CO
CO
CO
386.0
389.2
373.2
822.8
378.9
782.0
803.5
396.4
148.0
350.0
155.0
350.0
214.0
41.17
(2.44)
44.68
(2.91)
40.90
(3.78)
37.84
(2.09)
36.72
(3.49)
44.92
(2.20)
33.75
(2.45)
36.61
(2.59)
31.27
(1.69)
25.84
(1.95)
30.40
(1.45)
24.37
(1.01)
23.79
(0.99)
2.OOE-2
(6.88E-3)
2.50E-2
(1.43E-2)
2.81E-2
(8.04E-3)
7.16E-3
(2.46E-3)
2.59E-2
(6.51E-3)
5.76E-3
(4.85E-3)
2.13E-2
(2.73E-3)
3.10E-2
(7.32E-3)
4.54E-2
(1.52E-2)
2.33E-2
(1.70E-2)
4.60E-2
(8.42E-3)
3.89E-2
(6.79E-3)
5.83E-2
(7.81E-3)
4.94E-4
(1.94E-3)
5.68E-4
(2.01E-3)
8.70E-3
(7.96E-2)
6.58E-4
(2.12E-3)
2.59E-5
(1.80E-4)
2.60E-3
(4.55E-3)
9.23E-4
(1.87E-3)
7.88E-6
(7.80E-5)
8.15E-3
(6.87E-3)
4.73E-3
(2.81E-3)
4.94E-3
(4.29E-3)
9.48E-4
(2.41E-3)
1.54E-3
(1.83E-3)
Notes: Sample from March to July 2007. Standard errors computed using block-bootstrap at
the week level.
Table 1.14: Smoothing Average Marginal Cost and Forward Estimates for Firm 1
bw =16 bw = 2E bw = 3E bw =46 bw = 56
Coal (6/MWh) [aji] 29.37 28.68 27.42 26.98 26.43
(0.87) (0.96) (1.19) (1.32) (1.56)
CCGT (6/MWh) [a3 1] 43.57 42.31 39.76 38.74 37.35
(2.14) (2.18) (2.55) (2.89) (3.34)
Coal X q (6/MWh2 ) [aj2] 5.58E-2 5.16E-2 4.51E-2 4.27E-2 4.08E-2
(7.45Fr3) (6.15E-3) (7.39E-3) (8.09E-3) (8.92E-3)
CCGT X q (6/MWh2 ) [ayi 3.18E-2 2.73E-2 2.11E-2 1.61E-2 1.32E-2
(8.11E-3) (7.07E-3) (6.53E-3) (5.51E-3) (5.44E-3)
Forward Position (%) [71] 97.70 95.79 91.41 89.71 87.55
(1.57) (1.55) (2.54) (3.33) (4.45)
Forward Peak (%) [72] 97.64 95.42 90.87 88.80 86.57
(2.01) (2.00) (3.06) (3.98) (5.41)
Forward Weekend (%) [y3] 99.23 96.80 92.21 89.95 87.97
(2.70) (2.86) (4.30) (5.59) (7.11)
Notes: Sample from March to July 2007. Peak defined according to forward contract products, from 8
a.m. to 8 p.m. Standard errors computed using block-bootstrap at the week level.
Figure 1-15: Bidders in the market appear to choose commitment ex-ante
First step offers
if no bilateral contract and no complex bid
I -
D 50 100 150 200
euro/MWh
The distribution of first-step bids for units with no bilateral contract and no complex bid
shows that firms ensure ex-ante whether a unit will be turned on or not during that day.
Dashed lines represent minimum and maximum price observed in the whole sample. Firms
submit either very low or very high first step bids. Sample from March to June 2007.
Figure 1-16: Distribution of Bootstrapped Strategies
C\I
I -- ---- -r
Actual Price Distribution - --- Bootstrapped Price Distribto
Notes: Excludes 1% lower and upper outliers so that the distribution can be
compared at the relevant range. A plot using the no-n-trimimed price distribution
is very similar to the one reported here, except for few observation around the
price cap.
84
Figure 1-17: Example of Residual Demand for Different Smoothing Parameters
(a) Residual demand fit for different values in the relevant range of ob-
served bids and prices.
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(b) The smoothing technique should also approximate the residual de-
mand slope, which is a key statistic in the construction of the first order
conditions. One can see that a low smoothing parameter might produce
jagged slope estimates. A large smoothing parameter might flatten out
the slope. Note that the original slope is approximated as the slope
between the 10 closest bids at each point.
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Chapter 2
Cost Internalization and
Pass-Through in Emissions Markets*
2.1 Introduction
Understanding how firms respond to the introduction of a cap-and-trade market and how this
effects the product market is of great importance to assess the benefits of these programs. One
of the main benefit of cap-and-trade markets for pollution as compared to command-and-control
methods is that the cap-and-trade mechanisms ensure that, in the absence of any other distortions,
the lowest abatement cost allocation will be achieved.
Among other assumptions, in order to achieve the least cost allocation it is required that firms
internalize the costs of the emissions accordingly. Therefore, estimating the degree to which firms
internalize pollution costs is an important issue, especially in emissions markets in which firms
face a new form of production costs with often relatively illiquid markets. To understand the
consequences of the program, it is also important to assess how, conditional on firms internalizing
pollution costs, this translates into higher consumers prices, which is known as the pass-through.
One of the issues that has confounded the debate on the effects of pollution permits on firms'
decisions has been the belief that a full internalization rate is necessarily associated with a full
pass-through.' Therefore, evidence on partial pass-through has at times been interpreted as either
evidence of firms not internalizing the full cost of the emissions or evidence of firms exercising
market power. Even though this statement is true in some theoretical models, it does not hold
generally.
The goal of the paper is to separately quantify these two important economic concepts (inter-
nalization and pass-through) in the context of emissions markets. Whereas the cost internalization
rate relates to the degree to which firms incorporate the costs of the emissions into their rational be-
*I thank Nancy Rose and Stephen Ryan for their advice and support. I thank Denny Ellerman, Meredith Fowlie,
Tatyana Deryugina, Michael Greenstone, Marti Mestieri, Joseph Shapiro and participants at the MIT 10 lunch for
their useful comments and suggestions.
'See Ellerman et al. (2010) for a discussion.
havior, the pass-through rate is concerned about how this internalization translates into equilibrium
prices.
In order to answer this question, I examine the response of generation firms in the Spanish
electricity market to the introduction of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS),
a cap-and-trade program regulating CO 2 emissions from energy intensive sectors. I examine the
degree of cost internalization with two different test. First, I present a simplified reduced-form
model that is based on observed production outcomes. I derive a test of internalization following
Reguant and Ellerman (2008), which relies on predictions related to the incentives of power plants
to operate on a given day. Second, I construct structural form estimates using predictions of optimal
bidding from the multi-unit auction literature.
I then examine the pass-through rate in the market using two alternative approaches. First,
I present reduced-form estimates that assess the changes in price due to changes in carbon costs.
This analysis is based on equilibrium electricity prices observed at the electricity market. Second, I
construct structural form equations to quantify through which channels the estimated pass-through
differs from one.
Studying the internalization rate and pass-through in the context of the EU ETS and electricity
markets presents several advantages. From a policy point of view, the electricity sector is the largest
CO 2 contributor in the European Union. Furthermore, the effects of CO 2 prices on marginal costs
are significant and vary by technology, which creates important interactions that affect the degree
of abatement in this market and makes the potential impacts of the policy important.
From an econometric perspective, analyzing the effect of pollution costs in this setting has the
advantage that European CO 2 prices can be considered exogenous cost shifters, as they are traded
across all Member States. Furthermore, there is substantial variation in permit prices during the
sample. Electricity markets are also particularly suited for this analysis. First, there is rich micro-
level data, including demand and supply curves that allow me to be flexible in the estimation.2
Furthermore, the institutions and industrial processes that affect firm behavior in these markets
are well understood.
I find evidence that firms fully internalized the costs of the emissions in this market. Using both
a reduced-form and a structural model, I find that one cannot reject that internalization rates are
equal to one. The point estimates are also close to one. Even if firms internalize the costs of the
emissions, I find that this translates into incomplete pass-through, which I estimate between 50%
and 75%. I find some suggestive evidence that this incomplete pass-through can be due to both
supply and demand factors, and not only due to supply response.
The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, this is one of the first papers to present
strong empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis of full cost internalization in the presence of
pollution permits (Reguant and Ellerman, 2008; Fowlie, 2010). Second, this is the first paper to
quantify pass-through rates in the EU ETS market using micro-level data. More broadly, the paper
2This is particularly important for the estimation of pass-through rates, which can be greatly affected by functional
form assumptions (Besanko et al., 2005; Weyl and Fabinger, 2009).
contributes to the understanding of cost internalization and pass-through by taking advantage of
the presence of cost shocks due to the introduction of pollution permits.
The paper proceeds as follows. After reviewing the related literature, I present in section 2.2 a
conceptual framework to define the terms of cost internalization and pass-through in the context
of emissions trading. I then introduce the context and the data of analysis in section 2.3. In
section 2.4, I present the empirical strategy to identify the degree of cost internalization in and the
empirical results. In section 2.5, I identify and quantify of the pass-through. Section 2.6 concludes.
Related literature. This paper is related to the literature on the effects of environmental policies
on firms' decisions. It is closely related to the work by Reguant and Ellerman (2008), which also
presents evidence on firms internalizing the costs of the emissions in the Spanish electricity market.
McGuinness and Ellerman (2008) present evidence that electric utilities in the UK changed their
operational decisions in response to carbon prices in the EU ETS, although they do not directly
assess whether the response is consistent with full internalization.
In the context of other pollution markets, Kolstad et al. (2008) present evidence on how firms
used, NO. prices to strategically exercise market power in the Californian electricity market. In
their study, they test for cost internalization using structural equations from the multi-unit auction
literature, as this paper. They find evidence supporting the hypothesis that firms do not respond to
environmental cost shocks as if they were marginal shocks. Fowlie (2010) examines firm responses in
the context of the NOx Budget Program, exploiting the differences in allocation regimes. She finds
evidence that firms internalized the costs of the emissions, and that the degree of internalization
depended on the subsidization rate, as theory would predict.
Regarding the pass-through analysis, this paper is related to previous papers that have exam-
ined pass-through rates in the context of the EU ETS. For example, Sijm et al. (2006) estimate
pass-through rates using equilibrium prices and fuel cost data in the German electricity market. 3
They find pass-through rates that range between 0.60 and 1.17, depending on market conditions.
Zachmann and Hirschhausen (2008) use a structural break in the EU ETS prices to document
whether the pass-through rate depends asymmetrically on whether cost shocks are positive or neg-
ative. Whereas previous studies on pass-through rates are based on market outcomes, this paper
has the advantage of using finer micro-level data to assess the response by firms more directly.
This paper is also related to a more general literature that examines the degree of pass-through
in the presence of cost shocks. From a theoretical perspective, the effects of cost changes on
prices cannot be determined, as discussed in Weyl and Fabinger (2009) and Besanko et al. (2005).
Empirically, several setting have been examined to answer this question. A big part of the liter-
ature has exploited changes in currency exchange rates to examine the relevance of pass-through,
as they can provide exogenous variation in costs (Goldberg and Hellerstein, 2008). Other papers
have focused on the incidence of taxes, also as a way to measure observable changes in costs.
Marion and Muehlegger (2011) provide evidence of pass-through patterns in the gasoline retail
3 See the Annex by Keppler in Ellerman et al. (2010) for a review of this and other studies.
market using variation in gasoline taxes. They find evidence of full pass-though. They also docu-
ment heterogeneous pass-through rates depending on supply and demand conditions.
2.2 Cost internalization and pass-through
In this paper, I separately identify the internalization rate and the pass-through rate in the
context of CO 2 emissions trading in the Spanish electricity market. Before diving into the empirical
context, I discuss briefly how the two concepts are defined and why identifying the two of them
can be a challenge in practice.
2.2.1 Concepts
Definition 1 The cost internalization rate is the rate at which firms internalize changes in costs
when making their decisions.
Definition 2 The pass-through rate is the rate at which changes in costs are translated into changes
in equilibrium prices.
Imagine a very simple model in which a single firm is facing a residual demand, D(p; e), where
p is the market price and e is a demand shock. The firm has costs C(q; u), where q is quantity and
is u a cost shock. The firm also faces environmental costs er, where e is the emissions rate and -
is the emissions permit price.
Consider a situation in which the perceived costs by the firm are given by
TC(q; y) = C(q; u) + yer.
In this context, -y represents how the firm perceives the cost of the emissions, and therefore it
represents the internalization rate of the emissions costs. Usually, we consider the case in which
y = 1. However, in the case of emissions programs, there exists some policy debate on how firms
actually treat those costs in practice.
Several reasons have been suggested to explain why firms would not fully internalize the emis-
sions costs, such as the lack of internalization in the presence of free permits, the presence of
transaction costs even when firms recognize that permits can be traded, which could bias the in-
ternalization upward or downward depending on whether firms are net sellers or net buyers of
permits, and the threat of regulatory intervention if electricity prices increase too much due to the
internalized emissions cost.
Whereas the internalization rate is a fundamental parameter of the model, the pass-through
rate is an equilibrium outcome. Consider the equilibrium supply curve of the firm as S(p, -r; u, -y).
The pass-through with respect to the emissions costs is given by dp/dr, where p represents the
equilibrium price. As noted in the literature, by the implicit function theorem, this results in
dp 
_ S-r(p, r; u, y) (2.2.1)
d-r D, (p; c) - Sp,(p, -r; u, -)'
It is important to note that this pass-through does not generally equal to one, even in the
presence of competitive firms. However, under certain circumstances, p = 1.
One setting that is particularly relevant for electricity markets and that leads to full pass-
through, is the case of competitive markets and inelastic demand. In this case, a firm changes
its supply curve one to one with the increase in costs (given that p = C'(q) + er, Sr (p, ;uy) =
-Sp(p, r; u, y)), and demand remains the same (D,(p) = 0).
The common assumption in electricity markets analysis that demand is inelastic has often lead
to the conclusion that, if one does not observe a full pass-through, this is a sign of either market
power or a lack of cost internalization. Yet, this could also be consistent with demand not being
completely inelastic (inducing pass-through less than one). These different effects are represented
in figure 2-1 in the form of three different examples.
Example 2-1 (a) represents the case in which both demand and supply are elastic. In the
example, firms are competitive and they have linearly increasing marginal cost, TC(q) = aiq +
a2qq + rq. As long as demand is elastic, the pass-through is less than one.
Example 2-1 (b) represents the case in which firms exercise market power. In the example,
firms have constant marginal cost but increase their markup as they produce more q, consistent
with a multi-unit auction setting. Because the effective supply curve is elastic, this is equivalent to
example 2-1 (a).
Example 2-1 (c) represents the case in which firms do not internalize the full cost of the emissions.
In the example, firms have constant marginal costs and thus, in equilibrium, one should observe
a full pass-through. However, with less than full internalization, consumers only face part of the
cost increase. An internalization rate less (more) than one will then to attenuate (exacerbate) the
degree of pass-through.
In general, the actual observed pass-through is potentially a combination of these different
factors.
2.2.2 Identification
As the previous discussion shows, in order to separately identify the different hypothesis for
explaining the resulting pass-through in these markets, it is important to first design a test for cost
internalization. In a competitive setting, this reduces to testing -y = 1 in,
S-r(p, 7r; U, 1) = 7Cer,
holding other cost shocks u constant. In the presence of market power, the test also needs to be
explicit about the potential exercise of market power. It is important to note that this is a test on
Figure 2-1: A pass-through less than one can be explain with several hypothesis
(a) An incomplete pass-through is consistent with elastic demand and sup-
ply.
Ap < T
S(p, r; u, 1)
S(p; U)
(b) An incomplete or excessive pass-through is consistent with market
power.
Ap <'r
D(p;,E)
S(p, r; u, 1)
S(p; u)
mc + r
mc
(c) An incomplete pass-through is consistent with partial internalization of
emissions costs, with y < 1.
AP < r
D(p;e)
S(p, r; u, 1)
S(pT;uvY)
S(p; U)
the supply curve only.
The identification of the pass-through can be done in a reduced-form, by observing how equi-
librium prices change as a response to changes in emissions prices, holding other cost shocks and
demand shocks constant. From the data, one observes
dP*
One can also quantify the different components of the pass-through separately, which are given
by equation 2.2.1. It is important to note that, differently than with the internalization rate, the
identification of the channels through which the pass-through is determined involves both demand
and supply.
2.3 Context and data
2.3.1 The EU ETS trial period
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme or EU ETS is the largest cap-and-trade pro-
gram in the world. It is also the first compulsory international trading system for CO 2 emissions.4
It covers approximately 10,000 energy-intensive installations across the EU. Its initial focus has
been on regulating stationary sources of CO 2-
The system works as follows. The EU sets a global cap on emissions and assigns a share of
free permits to each EU Member State. These states develop a National Allocation Plan (NAP),
which has to be approved by the European Commission. The NAP sets an overall cap on the total
emissions from all installations in the member country covered by the scheme. Each installation is
then allocated a share of free European Union Allowances (EUAs) equal to that cap. 5 At the end
of each year each company must surrender enough allowances to cover all its emissions; otherwise
heavy fines are imposed. In order to comply, they can either submit their own allowances or freely
trade them across all Member States.
The first phase of the EU ETS, also known as the trial period, started in January 2005 and ended
in December 2007. Phase 1 covered only carbon dioxide emissions from energy related industries
(combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20MW, mineral oil refineries, coke
ovens), production and processing of ferrous metals, the mineral industry (cement clinker, glass
and ceramic bricks) and the pulp, paper and board industry. These activities represent around
40% of CO 2 emissions in the European Union, the electricity sector being the largest contributor
in the group.6
Figure 2-2 shows the evolution of EUA prices during the trial period. One of the striking
4 A non-mandatory precursor of the EU ETS is the Chicago Cimate Exchange, which was a voluntary greenhouse
gas (GHG) reduction and trading system.
5 For details regarding the allocation of allowances in each Member State see Ellerman et al. (2007).
6EU Energy in Figures 2010: CO2 Emissions by Sector, European Commission, DG TREN. Shares exclude
emissions from Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry.
Figure 2-2: Evolution of EUA prices during the EU ETS trial period
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features is the substantial drop in prices around May 2006. This drop in price was induced by
the release of emissions reporting data from 2005, the first year of the policy. In light of the
revealed information, which indicated a markedly lower level of emissions than had originally been
anticipated and therefore a lower marginal cost of meeting the cap, the price halved in a very short
period of time and subsequently declined to zero (Parsons et al., 2009). Even though I do not
explicitly exploit this drop in prices, it will contribute to the variation in CO 2 prices that will help
identify the internalization and pass-through of emissions costs.7
2.3.2 The Spanish electricity market
The Spanish electricity market is a national market that produces between 15,000 and 45,000
MWh hourly, has around 85,000 MW of installed capacity, and serves more than 40 million people.8
The Spanish territory is interconnected with France, Morocco, Portugal and Andorra. The electric-
ity market has an annual value of 6 to 8 BE. The Spanish electricity market has been liberalized
since 1998 and shares many features with other liberalized electricity markets.
I study the decisions of generators in the Spanish electricity market following the introduction
of carbon permits. The electricity sector is one of the sectors most affected by the EU ETS and
therefore it is well-suited for this analysis. Furthermore, it is a sector in which production decisions
7 Bushnell et al. (2009) and Zachmann and Hirschhausen (2008) explicitly exploit this change to analyze the
response of firms to changing market conditions.
8 Compared to liberalized electricity markets in the United States, the Spanish electricity market has a size
comparable to the Californian electricity market.
are made very frequently. Therefore, one can exploit the variation of marginal costs due to changing
carbon prices at a fine level.
In order to perform the empirical analysis, I construct a data set that contains daily electricity
generation at the unit level for Spanish thermal technology from 2002 to 2007.9 This data set
contains both MWh produced at a given day, as well as unit available capacity net of forced
outages and planned shut downs. I combine these data with other market outcomes, such as the
day-ahead and final average electricity prices, CO 2 prices (EUA prices) and aggregate output by
types of technology. I also collect characteristics at the unit level: maximum available capacity,
type of fuel used, vintage, generating company, geographic location, etc. 10 Using data from the
market operator, I also construct an hourly data set that contains day-ahead bidding data from
the companies in the market. 1 '
I also collect annual information on CO2 emissions at the plant level from the National Register,
for the years 2001-2004.12 These data are merged with the emissions data during the EU-ETS trial
period 2005-2007. I estimate emissions rates at the plant level for each year, by dividing total
emissions by total output at the annual level. Emissions rates do not fluctuate much at the unit
level and are consistent with typical fuel benchmark emissions for the generation plants involved.
Therefore, they are strongly correlated across units that use the same fuel. Among coal units,
imported coal plants have the lowest emissions rate around 0.90 tons/MWh, whereas lignite units
are the dirtiest with an emissions rate ranging 1.00 to 1.10 tons/MWh. Natural gas generators
tend to have an emissions rate around 0.35 tons/MWh.
Table 2.1 summarizes the characteristics of power plants in the Spanish electricity market.
There are around 90 thermal units that are subject to emissions control. The units can be broadly
categorized in three different categories, depending on the fuel they use. Coal units are thermal
plants that use coal as their main fuel. In Spain, these plants usually use a combination of national
coal and imported coal. Depending on their inputs, they will have different emissions rates, which
average 0.95 tCO2/MWh. Combined cycle natural gas units are of new construction and have much
lower emissions rates, averaging 0.35 tCO2/MWh. They are used less frequently than coal plants
due to their higher marginal cost of operation. Finally, peaking plants are older oil-fired or gas-fired
plants that are more inefficient than newer gas plants and tend to operate very infrequently. One
can see that these plants are very old, with an average vintage of 1971, and rarely operate, the
capacity factor being only around 7% over the sample from 2002 to 2007.13
9Data are publicly available at the system and market operator websites, www.esios.ree.es and www.omel.es.
10 The input types are combined cycle, oil, imported coal, anthracite coal, black lignite and brown lignite, following
the categorization in the Annual Statistics by Red Electrica Espanola.
"For a detailed explanation on the market rules, see Reguant (2011). These bidding data are processed as in
Reguant (2011) to ensure that they are reflective of marginal decisions.
12 A plant is composed by one or more units. In the data set, the largest plant contains four units.
1 3The capacity factor expresses how much a unit is utilized with regards to its full potential, and therefore can be
expressed as the average output of a unit (MWh) divided by its maximum capacity (MW).
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of power generators
Coal Gas Peaking Total
Total number of units 36 38 15 89
Relative number of units (%) 41.1 41.6 17.3 100
Average vintage (year built) 1977 2005 1971 1989
Average capacity of units (MW) 314 472 346 383
Average capacity factor (MWh/MW) 0.65 0.37 0.07 0.43
Average emissions rate (tons/MWh) 0.95 0.35 0.72 0.65
Notes: Sample from 2002 to 2007, including all
are active at some point during the period.
thermal units in the Spanish electricity market that
2.4 Evidence on cost internalization
In this section, I discuss the empirical strategy and results regarding the internalization of
emissions costs. Section 2.4.1 presents a test of cost internalization based on participation decisions
at the daily level. Section 2.4.2 presents a test of cost internalization based on predictions from
optimal bidding.
2.4.1 Test based on operational patterns
2.4.1.1 Empirical Strategy
In order to assess the response of generators to carbon costs, I model the choice of a production
unit deciding whether to produce or not on a given day as in Reguant and Ellerman (2008). Given
that generating units produce on those days in which their overall opportunity costs are below the
market price, the decision to produce or not on a given day is a function of the expected average
price that the unit is going to get for that day as well as the average opportunity costs that the
unit incurs in producing.
The decision can be represented with the following inequality:
onit =
Pit
Cit
ei
EUAt
uit
if pit cit + eiEUAt + uit;
otherwise,
(2.4.1)
= daily weighted electricity price,
= marginal cost for a given unit,
= emissions rate at the plant level,
= daily cost of the CO 2 allowances weighted by unit emissions rate,
= other opportunity costs for a given unit.
where
The above equation suggests using the following strategy to identify whether firms are internal-
izing the emissions cost or not:
onit = #1pit + 7eiEUAt + 32 Xit + ai + wt + t + eit, (2.4.2)
where
Pt = daily weighted electricity price,
ej = emissions rate at the plant level,
EUAt = daily cost of the CO 2 allowances weighted by unit emissions rate,
Xit = variables affecting opportunity cost of units,
ai = unit fixed-effects,
Wt = time fixed-effects.
In the above framework, a test for cost internalization becomes a test of #1 = -y. The test,
therefore, relies on the relationship of the coefficient on the carbon cost to the coefficient on price.
This approach has the advantage of allowing for a normalization of coefficients that does not rely
on cost data and imposes few restriction on the exact form of marginal fuel costs.
It is important to control for elements that affect the opportunity cost of a given unit. One
of the controls that is particularly relevant is whether the unit was on or not the previous day, as
this affects the startup costs of the unit, which can be large. Similarly, it is important to control
for the continuation value of starting up, given that the startup decision commonly involves more
than one day.
Given that this is a market in which there is potential for exercise of market power, I also
control for variables that are known to affect bidders' incentives to withhold capacity. Similar to
Wolfram (1998), I control for the inframarginal quantity of a given unit in some specifications,
which is expected to reduce the probability of a given unit to turn on whenever the firm is a net
seller of electricity in the market.
2.4.1.2 Results
Table 2.2 presents the reduced-form test of cost internalization based on on/off decisions. The
table reports the coefficients on price and emissions costs under different specifications. The de-
pendent variable is whether a unit is on or off at a given day, which is regressed on the average
market price, the unit emissions cost and a rich set of time controls. Other specifications include
cost of the input used by the power plant at European markets as well as the inframarginal quantity
being sold by the firm. Given the potential endogeneity of the market price, it is instrumented with
weather data for most specifications. The value of the ratio -y/#1 is also included in the table
with an F-test of the equality #1 = -y, which is the proposed internalization test.
The time controls included on the regressions are aimed at capturing the opportunity cost of
the units not included in the basic specification. In particular, the costs for a thermal plant when
Table 2.2: Test based on operational patterns
onit = 3 1pt + 7eiEUAt + 32 Xit + ai + Wt + t + cit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pt [10,] 9.494 9.617 4.825 4.985 4.900
(0.620) (0.907) (0.852) (0.865) (0.840)
ejEUAt(y) -8.044 -8.151 -4.873 -5.077 -5.010
(1.770) (1.716) (1.222) (1.194) (1.193)
0.847 0.847 1.010 1.018 1.022
(0.161) (0.157) (0.190) (0.188) (0.191)
F-test 0.335 0.331 0.958 0.922 0.906
IV price
Only OFF
Input control
Infraq control
Obs
N
N
N
N
125,723
Y
N
N
N
125,723
Y
Y
N
N
50,208
Y
Y
Y
N
50,208
Y
Y
Y
Y
50,208
Notes: Sample from 2002 to 2007, includes all thermal units in the Spanish electricity market.
All regressions include unit, weekday, month and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the unit level. Prices and emissions costs are normalized in 610--3. All coefficients are
significant at the 1% level.
deciding to run or not for a given day depend crucially on whether the unit is already turned on,
which becomes a state variable at the decision stage (Reguant, 2011). For this reason, I also run
the regressions when the plants are turned off at the beginning of the day.14
The advantage of including only units that are turned off is that the estimated fixed effects
and the day of the week controls are conditional on the unit not being operative. Therefore, the
controls will capture, at least in part, the presence of startup costs.15
The results in Table 2.2 show that the estimated internalization rate is very close to one. In
particular, in all specifications -y/#1 is above 84%. In the specifications in which I control for
the status of the unit, the estimated internalization rates are very close to 100%. The estimated
internalization rates are stable across the different specifications. These estimates support the
hypothesis that firms fully internalize the costs of the emissions.
I include in the appendix several alternative specifications and results. Table 2.6 presents several
robustness checks to the main specifications. It presents a set of regressions in which the dependent
variable is the weighted price, instead of the average price; a set of regressions in which only the
units that are on are used; and a set of regressions in which the coefficients on input and the
1 4Fowlie (2010) uses a similar approach in the context of the NOx Budget Program.
15The estimated time effects go in the expected direction. For example, the day of the week has a declining value
as the week progresses, which is consistent with the continuation value of starting up being lower in the middle of
the week or during the weekend.
inframarginal quantity are allowed to be different by type of fuel and firm, respectively. The point
estimates are all within 0.85 and 1.15.
Table 2.7 presents estimates of the internalization rate when the regressions are performed
separately for each of the four main firms. I find that firm 1 and firm 3 have an internalization that
is very close to one. The internalization rate for firm 2, on the contrary, is estimated imprecisely,
with a point estimate of 0.68. Firm 4 has an estimated internalization rate of 1.23.
Finally, Figure 2-4 presents the distribution of internalization rate coefficients when the regres-
sion is run separately for all units in the sample. The average coefficient is 0.94, but the estimates
are in generally very noisy and sensitive to the specifications, given that there are fewer observation
per unit. One of the reasons for this sensitivity is that there are some units that are not present
in the full sample and, therefore, might have few observation before or after the EU ETS. Another
issue is that some units tend to be either operating most of the time or hardly ever, which makes
the identification of the coefficients more challenging.
2.4.2 Test based on structural bidding equations
2.4.2.1 Empirical strategy
The above test abstracts away from explicitly modeling the strategic interactions between the
carbon price and the opportunity cost of the unit. To the extent that the opportunity cost changes
endogenously with the carbon price through channels that are not controlled for in the above
approach, the estimates could be biased. For this reason, I perform an alternative test that is more
explicit about the strategic behavior in this market, at the expense of putting more structure on
the behavioral assumptions regarding equilibrium strategies.
The idea behind the test is to use predictions from the multi-unit auctions literature to estimate
the extent to which the bids submitted by the firms in the day-ahead market reflect full cost
internalization. Under the assumptions that firms play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this market,
one can derive optimal bidding equations. Then, with finer level data on firms' bidding strategies,
one can estimate the degree of cost internalization.
Following the previous literature on multi-unit auctions, the structural bidding equation for
optimal best response bidding is:
9RDkh -1
bikht = c'i + Xi3X -+7e EUAt + (Qikht - Oht) + Eikht, (2-43)
OPht
where
bikht = bid by unit i at step k, hour h and day t,
ai = unit fixed-effect,
Xit = variables from marginal cost function (fuel cost, offered quantity, etc.),
ej = emissions rate at the plant level,
EUAt = daily cost of the CO 2 allowances weighted by unit emissions rate,
RDikht = residual demand curve,
Pht = hourly market price,
Qikht = inframarginal quantity,
6ht = financial position of the firm.
The parameters that are estimated in the above framework are E = {13, -y, 0}. A test for cost
internalization becomes a test of -y = 1. Note that in this case there is no need for re-normalization,
as the structural equations have predictions on the levels of expected observed bids.
It is important to point out that, even if the internalization rate is one, this does not necessarily
determine the overall change of the bid due to the carbon price, as other components of the
bidding function can change endogenously with respect to emissions cost. In particular, the markup
component and the inframarginal quantity could also be affected by the carbon prices.
2.4.2.2 Results
Table 2.3 presents the structural estimates of the internalization rate. The structural estimations
are performed at the firm level. I present four different specifications for each firm. First, I present
a specification in which the marginal costs of the units is modeled as a constant fixed effect. Second,
I present the same specification but instrumenting the markup using weather variables as well as
temporal variables, such as hour, peak and weekend fixed effects. The idea of these instruments is
that markups are correlated with demand, and thus with weather and temporal fixed effects. Third,
I include a specification that allows for quadratic costs. Fourth, I include a specification in which
I allow marginal costs to differ as a function of input costs. Contrary to the other specifications,
the latter allows for a more flexible evolution of marginal costs across the period. The coefficients
for the input cost variable are estimated also at the unit level.
The estimated internalization rates from the above specifications are close to one for firm 1 and
2. The estimates vary depending on how the marginal costs are modeled, particularly for firm 1.
In the specification that allows for time-varying marginal costs, the internalization rates for firm 1
and 2 are 0.92 and 1.02, respectively.
The internalization rate estimated for the two other firms is smaller than one and is more
sensitive to the different specifications. One possible explanation for this result is that small firms
do not behave as closely to optimal bidding as bigger players, as shown in Hortagsu and Puller
(2008).
Finally, Table 2.8 in the appendix presents a robustness check of the specification including input
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Table 2.3: Test based on structural equations
bikht - IDhl Qikht = 0i e-#Xi + -YeiEUAt - *i Oht -+ eikht-
- ph 19h I  ~~i ~ h ~
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
[w : bidjkt - Pt]
Firm 4
Unit FE
Unit FE - IV
Unit FE * q - IV
Unit FE * input * q - IV
1.067
[0.947, 1.186]
1.233
[1.084, 1.382]
1.230
[1.082,1.378]
0.916
[0.822, 1.010]
1.157
[0.947, 1.186]
1.130
[1.075, 1.185]
1.136
[1.082, 1.190]
1.018
[0.972, 1.064]
0.855
[0.737, 0.972]
0.936
[0.790, 1.083]
0.997
[0.665, 1.025]
0.702
[0.466, 0.696]
0.802
[0.592, 1.006]
0.575
[0.434, 0.717]
0.539
[(0.413, 0.666]
0.523
[0.398, 0.608]
Obs 1,207,778 1,098,959 425,254 1,171,018
Notes: Sample from 2002 to 2007, includes all thermal units in the Spanish electricity market. Confidence
intervals at 95% level obtained with standard errors clustered at the unit level.
controls for different values of the bandwidth parameter. One can see that
rate estimates do not change substantially as a function of the bandwidth
the bandwidth affects the relevant size of estimation, as it determines which
marginally setting the price, which are the ones used for the estimation.
the internalization
parameter, even if
bids are "close" to
2.5 Evidence on pass-through
In this section, I discuss the empirical strategy and results regarding the equilibrium pass-
through in this market due to cost shocks from carbon emissions. Section 2.5.1 presents a reduced-
form quantification of pass-through based on observed equilibrium prices. Section 2.5.2 performs a
structural computation of marginal pass-through rates.
One important clarification is that the quantification is focused on isolating the partial effect
of carbon prices on electricity prices, holding the rest of input costs fixed. The measured pass-
through does not account for other input cost changes that could have been induced by the policy.
For example, the computed pass-through will not include the potential effect of a EU-wide cap-
and-trade market on the relative prices of coal and gas.
2.5.1 Quantification based on equilibrium outcomes
2.5.1.1 Empirical strategy
The pass-through is defined as the change in price due to a change in costs and therefore
reflects an equilibrium outcome. Therefore, in order to analyze how the equilibrium price responds
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to changes in marginal costs, I regress the electricity marginal price on the EUA prices. One
advantage of this approach is that the cost of the emissions is observed and exogenous.
The key of the regression is to consider equilibrium prices and match them to the unit that is
setting the marginal price at that moment. Given that most units do not exactly set the price at
a given hour, I use a weighted regression in which observations are weighted with a normal kernel
depending on how close the bidding of a given unit is to the marginal price.
The baseline regression to identify the degree of pass-through is:
Pt = peiEUAt + Xjkt/3i + ai + wt + eit [w : bidgkt Pt], (2.5.1)
where
Pt = daily weighted electricity price,
ej = emissions rate at the plant level,
EUAt = daily cost of the CO 2 allowances weighted by unit emissions rate,
Xit = variables affecting price other than carbon cost,
ai = unit fixed-effects,
Wt = time fixed-effects.
where p identifies the equilibrium pass-through.
The regressions includes time year and month fixed effects to control for potential trends and
seasonality within the year. Given that the marginal cost of electricity is not only defined by the
EUA price, I also control for the evolution of fuel prices during the period with monthly input prices
at European markets and match them to the different technologies setting the price. In order to
be able to control for unit-specific cost differences, I introduce unit fixed effects in the regression
as well as unit-level coefficients on input prices.
2.5.1.2 Results
Table 2.4 presents estimates of reduced-form pass-through rates in this market. I find that the
average pass-through rate in the market is significantly below one, around 75%. The estimated
pass-through is stable across several specifications with different demand and cost shock controls.
In the appendix, I also include a robustness check that assesses the sensitivity of the estimates to
the weights used to determine which units are setting the marginal price.
In order to explore whether the pass-through rate depends on the level of demand, table 2.5
presents heterogeneous pass-through estimates for peak hours (high demand) and weekends (low
demand). The estimated pass-through is significantly larger for the central hours of the day and
somewhat smaller during the weekend. In particular, in the most parsimonious specification the
estimated pass-through for peak hours on a weekday is 82.8% versus 68.9% off-peak. The rate is
lowest on off-peak hours during the weekend, with an estimated rate of 64.2%. The differences in
pass-through observed in this market are similar to the ones documented in Germany, which are
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Table 2.4: Reduced-form pass-through measures
Pt = pe EUAt + X,'-3 i + ai + wt + eit [w : bidjkt ~ Pt]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ejEUAt(p) 0.624 0.737 0.736 0.740
(0.049) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050)
Input control N Y Y Y
Input X Unit FE N N Y Y
Add. controls N N N Y
Obs 3,448,787 3,448,787 3,448,787 3,448,787
Notes: Sample from 2002 to 2007, includes all thermal units in the Spanish electricity market.
All regressions include unit, hour, weekday, month and year fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the unit level. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
60 and 117% in non-peak and peak hours, respectively (Sijm et al., 2006).
One of the reasons that could explain the smaller pass-through at off-peak periods is that
thermal units do not bid marginally at night, as they tend to operate at minimum production
levels, and therefore the marginal price does not reflect the full price increase. Another competing
explanation is that on those hours there is more competition and firms can exercise less market
power. On the contrary, firms might be able to exercise more market power in periods in which
demand is high and capacity is tighter.
2.5.2 Quantification based on structural bidding equations
2.5.2.1 Empirical strategy
Even though the estimates above provide reduced-form evidence on the degree of pass-through,
it is difficult to fully control for changes in demand and supply. In particular, the estimated pass-
through rates are conditioning on a particular unit setting the price. However, in equilibrium the
order of the units and the marginal unit can change due to the differential impact of the emissions
costs and the response by demand.
For this reason, it is useful to compare the measured pass-through to the one that is obtained
with the structural bidding model. This approach can be more accurate at quantifying the short-run
pass-through of the emissions price, holding demand and cost shocks in the market constant.
As presented in section 2.4.2, the equilibrium bidding equations in this market are given by,
e9RD*h -1
bikht = ai + 3Xit + -ei EUAt + ih (Qikht - Oht) + Eikht. (2.5.2)Opht
The introduction of the EU ETS can affect optimal bids in two ways. First, it affects the
marginal cost bid by the firm, with -yeiEUAt component. It can also potentially affect the markup
component, by changing the shape of the residual demand as well as the net inframarginal quantity
Qikht - Oht-
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Table 2.5: Reduced-form pass-through measures - Demand effects
p, = peEUAt + X -tIBi + o'i + Wt + Eit [w : bidjkt Pt]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
egEUAt(J) 0.572 0.684 0.677 0.689
(.0386) (.0380) (.0373) (.0439)
ejEUAt(6) * peak 0.177 0.159 0.135 0.139
(.0386) (.0346) (.0325) (.0331)
ejEUAt(5) * weekend -0.098 -0.079 -0.057 -0.047
(.0348) (.0298) (.0278) (.0295)
Input control N Y Y Y
Input X Unit FE N N Y Y
Add. controls N N N Y
Obs 3,448,787 3,448,787 3,448,787 3,448,787
Notes: Sample from 2002 to 2007, includes all thermal units in the Spanish electricity market.
All regressions include unit, weekday, month and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the unit level.
Other than the optimal bids, the EU ETS can also affect participation decisions. Thermal
plants need to decide whether to startup or not on a given day, given the presence of fixed costs.
In this paper, I characterize the changes in optimal bids given small changes to the emissions
cost, so that participation decisions can be taken as given. 16 Given that there is ample variation of
CO 2 prices during the sample, this allows me to compute marginal pass-through rates at different
price levels. As noted before, the marginal pass-through rate is equal to
S-r (p, r; U, -)
D, (p; e) - S, (p, -r; u, -)'
I benefit from the fact that both short-run demand and supply are observed in this market, which
implies that both the derivative of demand and supply with respect to the market price are observed.
In order to compute the marginal change of supply from a cost shock, ST(p, r; u, -Y), I perturb
the optimal bids for small changes of the emissions cost and calculate the derivative as the difference
in supply at a given price,
Sr(p, r; u,) = S(p, r + h; u, -y) - S(p, r; u, 7)
In order to capture the heterogeneity in cost shocks due to the differential in emissions rates, which
affects the supply curve differently depending on the affected units, I set hi = ei, which is equivalent
16 Characterizing the optimal startup decision is beyond the scope of this paper. See Reguant (2011) for a compu-
tational of optimal strategies in the presence of fixed costs. Given that I am evaluating changes in bids for marginal
increases in emissions costs, participation decisions are likely to have a minor effect in the results.
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Figure 2-3: Distribution of marginal pass-through rates
LO
C)
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passthrough
to a carbon price increase of one euro per ton of CO 2 -
2.5.2.2 Results
Figure 2-3 presents the distribution of estimated pass-through rates in the market when firms
internalize the full costs of the emissions. These estimates provide an upper bound to the pass-
through rate, as any internalization rate lower than one will attenuate the pass-through. 17 I find
average marginal pass-through rates of 55.2% around equilibrium prices.
Differently than in the reduced-form estimation, I do not find a systematic relationship between
high prices and pass-through rates. When examining the decomposition of pass-through rates, I find
that both demand and supply become less elastic to the price, which implies that the denominator
in the pass-through rate becomes smaller. However, I also estimate that the response of quantity
to increases of costs becomes smaller in absolute value, which compensates the potential increase
in pass-through rates.
In order to compute the contribution of demand elasticity to the pass-through rate, I compute
alternative pass-through rates in which I ignore the response of demand (e.g. D,(p; e) = 0. The
alternative pass-through rates are 72.2% on average when ignoring the effects of demand.
1 7Given that I examine the marginal cost changes of C0 2, an approximation of pass-through rates with an
internalization of y is simply given by P(-y) ~ yp, given that it is equivalent to the computations above in which the
price increase h is equal to et/y but the cost increase perceived is only ej.
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2.6 Conclusions
I have presented an assessment of internalization rates and pass-through rates due to the in-
troduction of carbon permits in the Spanish electricity market. In order to quantify both the
internalization and the pass-through rate, I have analyzed results from both reduced-form and
structural models. The analysis has benefited from two important features of the market studied.
First, I have exploited the fact that the evolution of European-wide CO 2 prices can be considered
exogenous at the Spanish electricity market. Second, I have been able to construct structural pass-
through rates making few assumptions on the shape of demand and supply due to the richness of
the data in electricity markets.
The empirical results support the hypothesis that firms internalize the full cost of emissions in
this market, specially the bigger firms. However, this does not generally translate to pass-through
rates equal one, which are between 50-75%, depending on the methodology used. The pass-through
rate estimates also suggest that firms were able to pass more the cost increases in those hours of
high demand, which is consistent with previous findings in the literature.
2.7 Additional Tables and Figures
Table 2.6: Test based on operational patterns - Robustness checks
onit = I1pt + ye EUAt + 32Xit + ci +wt + t + cit
Weighted Price Only On Flexible coeff.
Pt [/31] 4.561 4.623 5.594 5.465 5.628 4.827
(0.824) (0.810) (0.685) (0.675) (0.683) (0.819)
ejEUAt(-y) -5.184 -5.308 -4.845 -4.920 -4.900 -4.915
(1.268) (1.248) (0.803) (0.915) (0.902) (1.100)
1.136 1.148 0.866 0.900 0.871 1.018
(0.201) (0.205) (0.077) (0.096) (0.091) (0.178)
F-test 0.497 0.468 0.077 0.281 0.139 0.918
Only OFF Y Y N N Y Y
Only ON N N Y Y N N
Input control N Y N Y Y Y
Infraq control N Y N Y Y Y
Input *fuel N N N N Y N
Infraq *firm N N N N N Y
Obs 50,208 50,208 75,513 75,513 50,208 50,208
Notes: Sample from 2002 to 2007, includes all thermal units in the Spanish electricity market. All
regressions include unit, weekday, month and year fixed effects. In all specifications, the price is instru-
mented with weather variables. Standard errors clustered at the unit level. Prices and emissions costs
are normalized in 610-3 . All coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
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Table 2.7: Test based on operational patterns - By firms
onit = 31pt + -yeiEUAt + 32 Xit + ai + wt + ( + eit
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
Pt [13 ] 6.170 2.735 8.331 6.870
(1.592) (1.488) (4.818) (2.348)
ejEUAt(y) -6.272 -1.850 -8.439 -8.460
(1.285) (1.927) (4.438) (1.903)
1.016 0.745 1.013 1.231
(0.213) (0.555) (0.107) (0.232)
F-test 0.942 0.564 0.899 0.188
Obs 18,115 10,749 1,818 7,086
Notes: Sample from 2002 to 2007, includes all thermal units in the Spanish electricity market.
All regressions include unit, weekday, month and year fixed effects, and input and infra-
marginal quantity controls. Standard errors clustered at the unit level. Prices and emissions
costs are normalized in 610- 3. Only coefficients for firm 1 and firm 3 are significant at the
1% level.
Table 2.8: Test based on structural equations - Bandwidth sensitivity
bw -1 -
- w - +
bikht -Dkt Qikht = ai ± /3Xj + -ye2 EUAt - OR1 iht 0 ht + Eikht
bw = 1 bw=2 bw=3 bw=4 bw=5
0.950
[0.848, 1.051]
551435
1.017
[0.975, 1.059]
675,559
0.623
[0.500, 0.746]
237,376
0.495
[0.395, 0.594]
680,620
0.943
[0.845, 1.041]
942,810
1.015
[0.970, 1.059]
922,318
0.597
[0.473, 0.7211
357,923
0.495
[0.388, 0.603]
1,013,199
0.929
[0.835, 1.024]
1,207,778
1,098,959
425,254
0.506
[0.396, 0.615]
1,171,018
0.917
[0.824, 1.010]
1,394,111
1.020
[0.976, 1.064]
1,265,781
0.556
[0.437, 0.675]
452,477
0.512
[0.405, 0.620
1,241,110
0.906
[0.815, 0.997]
1,516,757
1.021
[0.978, 1.065]
1,419,413
0.541
[0.423, 0.660]
463,052
0.516
[0.411, 0.621]
1,278,004
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Firm 1
ci
Obs.
Firm 2
ci
Obs.
Firm 3
ci
Obs.
Firm 4
ci
Obs.
Notes: Sample from 2002 to 2007, includes all thermal units in the Spanish electricity market. Confidence intervals
at 95% level obtained with standard errors clustered at the unit level.
[W : bidjkt ~ pAl
Table 2.9: Reduced-form pass-through measures - Demand effects
pt = pejEUAt + Xkt + Oi + Wt + eit [w : bidjkt ~ Pt]
bw = 1 bw=2 bw=3 bw=4 bw=5
ejEUAt(5) 0.714 0.699 0.689 0.682 0.680
(0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053)
ejEUAt(6) * peak 0.139 0.135 0.139 0.144 0.150
(0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028)
egEUAt(6) * weekend -0.058 -0.049 -0.047 -0.047 -0.047
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
Obs 1,552,365 2,610,705 3,448,787 4,126,895 4,692,338
Notes: Sample from 2002 to 2007, includes all thermal units in the Spanish electricity market. All
regressions include unit, weekday, month and year fixed effects; unit specific input controls and demand
controls which include temperature, wind speed and available hydro resources. Standard errors clustered
at the unit level.
Figure 2-4: Distribution of coefficients unit-by-unit
Notes: Sample of internalization rate coefficients when reduced-form regressions are performed
unit-by-unit. Sample size is 85. All regressions include unit, weekday, month and year fixed
effects. Five outliers with absolute internalization rates larger than thirty have been removed.
Average internalization rate is 0.949 (5.36).
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Chapter 3
Pollution Permits and the Evolution
of Market Structure
with Meredith Fowlie and Stephen Ryan
The California cement industry's potential cost disadvantage under AB32 is stag-
gering... In the absence of measures that either relieve the initial cost pressure or impose
equivalent costs of imports, such a substantial price increase will render the California
cement industry economically unviable, will result in a massive shift in market share
towards imports in the short run, and will precipitate sustained disinvestment in the
California cement industry in the long run.
Letter from the Coalition for Sustainable Cement Manufacturing and Environment to Larry Goulder,
Chair of the Economic and Allocation Advisory Committee. Dec. 19, 2009.
3.1 Introduction
With the passage of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress gave the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) a mandate to implement market-based strategies for the
control of regulated emissions. Specifically, Title IV of the Amendments encourages the EPA to
transition from prescriptive, "command and control" emissions regulations to more decentralized,
market-based mechanisms, such as emissions trading programs.' So called "cap-and-trade" pro-
grams have since become the favored approach to regulating industrial emissions.
To implement a cap-and-trade program, the regulator must first set a limit on the total quantity
of permitted emissions and then distribute a corresponding number of tradable emissions permits.
'The CAAA legislation authorized the use of "economic incentive regulation" for the control of acid rain, the
development of cleaner burning gasoline, the reduction of toxic air emissions, and for states to use in controlling
carbon monoxide and urban ozone.
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To remain in compliance, regulated sources must hold sufficient allowances to offset their uncon-
trolled emissions. The resulting equilibrium permit price reflects the marginal cost of abatement
among firms in the program and, in an ideal world, equals the social marginal cost of emissions.
With a sufficiently large permit market, a cap-and-trade program functions analogously to a Pigou-
vian tax on emissions. The appeal of cap-and-trade programs is that they achieve emissions reduc-
tions to the socially-optimal level in the least-cost fashion, without requiring the regulator to have
any knowledge of the production processes of regulated firms. However, since Buchanan (1969),
economists have recognized that there may be mitigating factors which may complicate this rosy
story.
Buchanan emphasized the role of market structure in assessing the welfare consequences of a
Pigouvian tax. His general point was that the exercise of market power may result in an equilibrium
level of quantity that is already below the socially-optimal level even when firms do not price in
the pollution externality. In such a setting, the imposition of a Pigouvian tax on emissions further
distances the market outcome from the social optimum. 2 This a first-order concern, as a majority
of emissions regulated under existing and planned cap-and-trade program come from industries
that can likely be classified as imperfectly competitive. Emissions from restructured electricity
markets represent the majority of emissions currently targeted by existing cap-and-trade programs
in the United States and Europe. Numerous studies provide empirical evidence of the exercise
of market power in these industries, such as Borenstein et al. (2002); Joskow and Kahn (2002);
Wolfram (1999); Puller (2007); Sweeting (2007); Bushnell et al. (2008a). Other emissions intensive
industries being targeted by regional emissions trading programs, such as cement and refining, are
also highly concentrated. The policy implication is that if market power concerns are sufficiently
strong, the regulator's optimal response is to completely exempt a given industry from the cap-
and-trade program.
A second concern that complicates the welfare calculation is the possibility of emissions "leakage"-
the substitution of production from domestic sources to imports from unregulated jurisdictions.
There are several interrelated channels through which emissions leakage can occur. It can manifest
immediately as firms adjust variable input and output decisions such that less (more) stringently
regulated production assets are used more (less) intensively. It can occur gradually as firms ac-
celerate the retirement of older production technologies in more stringently regulated jurisdictions
and invest in new facilities and equipment in less stringently regulated jurisdictions. "Indirect"
leakage can also occur. As demand for carbon intensive fuels decreases in more stringently regu-
lated regions, carbon intensive fuel prices may fall, and producers in unregulated jurisdictions may
substitute towards these inputs. In a worst-case scenario, the domestic industry exits the market
as producers shift production overseas, prices rise, and leakage leads to higher aggregate emissions
in equilibrium. The potential for emissions leakage continues to be a major obstacle to regional
climate change policies. 3
2Borenstein and Davis (2010) have a similar finding in the US natural gas market resulting from a non-optimal
pricing structure.
3The potential solution of imposing border adjustments for carbon content are complicated by both issues of
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Finally, the political concerns arising from the imposition of potentially crippling costs on
domestic producers has lead to a wide variety of partial rebate schemes for permits. Partial rebate
schemes allocate some proportion of permits to regulated firms in order to offset the costs associated
with the emissions regulation. While some of these schemes, such as a lump-sum allocation of
permits in each period in proportion to a firm's historical share of output, do not factor into static
production decisions, some of them do. Of special interest are dynamic allocation schemes, which tie
the amount of permits rebated to firms to their share of output or emissions in the previous period.
As such, firms face an additional incentive to increase production. Such a scheme may at first
seem bizarre from the perspective of a static, first-best setting: why should the regulator encourage
production, particularly of relatively dirty plants under emissions-based rebating, when the ultimate
goal is to reduce emissions? The discussion above hints at the answer: dynamic allocation schemes
may simultaneously mitigate leakage and minimize disruption of the product market. Since the
costs of these rebates are largely hidden through abatement costs that are borne elsewhere in the
economy, these types of rebating schemes are also politically palatable. More broadly, how permits
are initially allocated can have significant implications for who ultimately bears the cost of achieving
the mandated emissions reductions and how cost-effectively the reductions are achieved.
In this paper, we use the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (Maskin and Tirole, 1988) dynamic
oligopoly framework developed in Ryan (2010) as the foundation for an analysis of market-based
regulations limiting industrial emissions. Our approach allows us to assess the welfare implications
of various permit allocation schemes, in particular accounting for market power, leakage, and the
efficiency and equity implications of different rebating mechanisms. Our analysis focuses on the
US Portland cement industry. For a number of reasons, this industry has been at the center of
the debate about climate change policy and domestic competitiveness. First, cement is one of the
largest manufacturing sources of domestic carbon dioxide emissions (Kapur et al, 2009). Second, the
anticipated effects of proposed federal and state-level climate change policies on cement production
costs are striking. Given projected carbon prices and current emissions intensities, average variable
production costs would increase by more than 50 percent.4 Finally, import penetration in the
domestic cement market has exceeded 20 percent in recent years, giving rise to concerns about the
potential for emissions leakage (Van Oss, 2003 ENV; USGS Mineral Commodity Summary 2010).
While both the academic literature and policy analysis carried out by government agencies tends
to emphasize the more direct and immediate effects of emissions regulations, the dynamic industry
responses to market-based environmental policy interventions have received relatively less attention.
Yet, these responses are expected to play a dominant role in the context of proposed climate change
regulations. In a recent survey, Millimet et al. (2009) suggest that "the most striking gap in the
literature on environmental regulation is its inability to connect to the rich literature on dynamic
legality and the practical near impossibility of properly assessing carbon emissions for all input processes in the
production of foreign goods.
4 On average, domestic cement producers emit approximately one ton of carbon for each ton of cement produced.
Marginal costs of cement production are estimated to be in the range of $30-$40/ton (Ryan, 2010). Analyses of
proposed federal greenhouse gas emissions trading programs project a permit price of $15-$20 per ton of C02 by
2015. Absent cost mitigation measures, variable operating costs would increase by approximately 50 percent.
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industry models in order to understand the long-term impacts of environmental regulation on
industries and firms." A static, short-run analysis is ill-suited for a study of how proposed emissions
regulations might impact the domestic cement industry. Capital stock turnover is expected to play
an essential role in improving the environmental performance of this industry (Worrell et al., 2001;
Sterner, 1990). This is partly due to the limited opportunities to reduce carbon intensity through
process changes and disembodied capital change, and partly due to fact that some very old and
inefficient kilns are still in operation. Replacing these with newer and more efficient technologies
would yield emissions reduction benefits.
Our analysis begins with the specification of a theoretical model of dynamic oligopoly in which
strategic domestic cement producers compete in spatially segregated regional markets. Some of
these markets are trade exposed, whereas other landlocked markets are sheltered from foreign com-
petition. Firms make optimal entry, exit, and investment decisions in order to maximize their
expected stream of profits conditional on the strategies of their rivals. Conditional on capital
investments, producers compete each period in homogeneous quantities. Regional market struc-
tures evolve as firms enter, exit, and adjust production capacities in response to changing market
conditions.
Building on the parameter estimates from Ryan (2010), we then turn to our investigation of the
static and dynamic implications of the permit allocation design decision. In the benchmark model
that we estimate, industry emissions are unconstrained. To the extent that market-based emissions
regulations affect firms' production and investment choices exclusively through operating costs,
this model can be used to simulate industry response to proposed emissions regulations. The basic
intuition underlying our counterfactual simulations is quite simple. In the benchmark scenario in
which emissions are unconstrained, firms invest at the level where marginal costs equal expected
marginal benefits subject to covering their fixed costs. The expected benefits are a function of the
period payoffs, as firms with larger capacities are able to compete over a larger segment of this
trade exposed market. With the introduction of an emissions cap-and-trade program, firms face a
different payoff structure. Firms' operating costs and marginal revenues vary systematically across
the permit allocation design alternatives we consider. This variation has significant implications
for industry dynamics in equilibrium.
Our primary finding is that the imposition of a carbon trading program in the US Portland
cement industry would result in net negative welfare gains, even after accounting for the benefits
of the abatement. Two primary market forces lead to this conclusion. The first intuition follows
Buchanan's insights on balancing distortions from market power against those induced by pollution
externalities. The US Portland cement industry is already sufficiently concentrated that equilibrium
levels of quantity are far below what the social planner would produce, even accounting for carbon
dioxide externalities. The second market force arises from incomplete regulation: accounting for the
carbon emissions of production which has substituted to unregulated jurisdictions further reduces
the attractiveness of the carbon regulation. We estimate that the social welfare costs of the cap-
and-trade regulation would run between a billion dollars to over five billion dollars, depending on
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the mechanism, for a range of policy-relevant carbon prices.
This paper makes substantive contributions to three areas of the literature. First, this paper is
germane to the literature that considers the dynamic efficiency properties of market-based emissions
regulations. By their very nature, long-run policy impacts are very difficult to identify empirically.
During the time it takes for these impacts to manifest, a host of other potentially confounding
factors and processes change and evolve. The conventional approach to analyzing these long run
relationships has been to use either highly stylized theoretical analysis of the effects of environmental
policies on market structure (Conrad and Wang, 2003; Requate, 1997) or large, deterministic,
optimization-based simulation models (Jensen and Rasmussen, 2000; Fischer and Fox, 2007). Our
paper is unique in its detailed representation of industry dynamics and its use of state-of-the-art
econometric modeling tools to estimate key structural parameters that cannot be observed directly.
To highlight the importance of properly accounting for industry dynamics, we compare the
predictions of the dynamic model against a model that limits firms responses to price and quantity
changes; technology operating characteristics and industry structure are held fixed. The differences
are striking. In one of the regional markets we consider, estimates of the benefits associated
with dynamic permit allocation updating (vis a vis more standard auctioning or grandfathering)
generated using the static model are more than twice as large as the estimates generated using the
dynamic model. Intuitively, the industry structure evolves differently under different policy design
scenarios, and this has significant implications for welfare.
Second, we are not aware of any other study of the impacts of market-based emissions reg-
ulations (and permit allocation design decisions in particular) in the domestic cement industry.
This industry has an important role to play in efforts to reduce industrial CO 2 emissions. Domes-
tic cement producers are at the center of debates about potentially adverse impacts of emissions
regulations on domestic industrial competitiveness. We discuss how our results can inform this
important policy discussion.
Finally, the paper makes an important methodological contribution in its application of para-
metric value function methods to a dynamic game. We make use of interpolation techniques to
compute the equilibrium of the counterfactual simulations. This allows us to treat the capacity of
the firms as a continuous state. Even though parametric methods have been used in single agent
problems, its application to dynamic industry models with discrete entry, exit and investment
decisions have not been very successful to date (Doraszelski and Pakes, 2007).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of the related literature.
Section 3.3 provides some essential background on the US Portland cement industry. We introduce
the model in Section 3.4. We present the estimation and computational methodology in Section
3.5. Detailed descriptions of the different pollution permit mechanisms are presented in Section
3.4.3. Counterfactual simulation results with and without permit markets are reported in Section
3.6. We conclude with a discussion of the results and directions for future research in Section 3.7.
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3.2 Background and Related Literature
Regulatory agencies have been allocating tradable emissions permits under the auspices of local,
regional, and nationwide emissions cap-and-trade programs for over a decade. Historically, policy
makers have chosen between two types of permit allocation approaches: auctioning and grandfa-
thering. Under an auction regime, emissions permits are sold to the highest bidder. In contrast,
"grandfathered" permits are freely distributed in lump-sum to regulated sources based on pre-
determined, firm-specific characteristics.
Economists have generally argued in favor of auctioning permits when auction revenues
can be used to offset factor taxes or other pre-existing distortions. 5 However, policy makers have
routinely chosen to forego auction revenues in favor of handing permits out for free to regulated en-
tities. 6 The ability to make concessions to adversely impacted and politically powerful stakeholders
via grandfathering has played an essential role in securing widespread support for the adoption of
emissions trading programs. A pure grandfathering approach is unlikely to be a politically feasible
option in the context of a Federal GHG trading program. This is primarily due to the unprece-
dented value of the permits to be allocated; grandfathering all permits to industry would amount
to significant overcompensation for compliance costs incurred. 7
More recently, a third approach has emerged. Under "contingent allocation" regimes, rules
established ex ante determine how a firm's permit allocations will be periodically updated over
the course of the trading program based on lagged production decisions. By making future permit
allocations a function of current production, allocation updating confers an implicit production
subsidy. Contingent allocation is similar to grandfathering insofar as it can be used to transfer
value to firms via free permit allocations, but different in that the implicit production subsidy
reduces the marginal costs of production whereas grandfathering reduces fixed costs.
Previous work addressing permit allocation design can generally be divided into two cat-
egories. The first consists of theoretical analyses that derive more general results and insights.
Among the most relevant to this paper are Fischer (2003) and Neuhoff et al. (2005). Both demon-
strate how allocation updating can be used to reduce inefficiencies resulting from the exercise of
market power in imperfectly competitive product markets.
The second category includes detailed policy simulations using large-scale linear programming
models or other deterministic, optimization-based approaches. Several of these papers consider how
European cement producers might be impacted under alternative permit allocation regimes (see, for
example, Demailly and Quirion (2006); Ponssard and Walker (2008); Jensen, 2001; Szaboe et al,
2006; US EPA, 1996).8 One limitation of these numerical simulation models is that they must rely
5A summary of the literature that considers the permit allocation design choice in the presence distorted factor
markets is provided by Goulder and Parry(2008).
6A majority of permits are distributed freely to regulated entities in Southern California's RECLAIM program,
the European Union's Emissions Trading Program (EU ETS), the National Acid Rain Program (ARP), and the
regional NOx Budget Trading Program.
7The Congressional Budget Office estimates that emissions permits allocated annually under the federal cap-and-
trade system proposed by the Senate in 2009 could be worth up to $300 billion a year by 2020 (CBO, 2009).
8 All of these papers assume assume Cournot competition. All but one analyze the European cement sector.
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on the extant econometric literature to provide "off-the-shelf" estimates of important structural
parameters (such as the fixed costs of entry or the elasticity of import supply). It is often the case
that the econometric literature is not up to the task; models are often parameterized using outdated
values or educated guesses. We believe our paper is unique in that we use econometrically-derived
values of these primitives to assess the industry response to alternative permit allocation designs.
3.3 Regulating CO 2 emissions in the domestic cement industry
3.3.1 The Portland cement industry
Portland cement is an inorganic, non-metallic substance with important hydraulic binding prop-
erties. It is the primary ingredient in concrete, an essential construction material used widely
in building and highway construction. Demand for cement comes primarily from the ready-mix
concrete industry, which accounts of over 70 percent of cement sales. Other major consumers in-
clude concrete product manufacturers and government contractors. Because of its critical role in
construction, demand for cement tends to reflect population, urbanization, and economic trends.
Cement competes in the construction sector with substitutes such as asphalt, clay brick, rammed
earth, fiberglass, steel, stone, and aluminum. Wood is a particularly important substitute in
housing construction (Van Oss ENV 2003). Another important class of substitutes are the so
called supplementary cementitious materials (SCMs) such as ferrous slag, fly ash, silica fume and
pozzolana (a reactive volcanic ash). Concrete manufacturers can use these materials as partial
substitutes for clinker. The substitition of SCM for clinker can actually improve the quality and
strength of concrete. Substitution rates range from 5 percent in standard portland cement to as high
as 70 percent in slag cement. These blending decisions are typically made by concrete producers
and are typically based on the availability of SCM and associated procurement costs (Van Oss,
2005, facts; Kapur et al, 2009).
Cement producers are among the largest industrial emitters of airborne pollutants, second only
to power plants in terms of the criteria pollutants currently regulated under existing cap-and-trade
programs (i.e. NOx and SO 2 ). The cement industry is also one of the largest manufacturing
sources of domestic carbon dioxide emissions (Kapur et al, 2009). Worldwide, the cement industry
is responsible for approximately 7 percent of anthropogenic C02 emissions (Van Oss, 2003, ENV).
The cement production process involves two main steps: the manufacture of clinker (i.e. pyro-
processing) and the grinding of clinker to produce cement. In the pyroprocessing stage, a fuel mix
comprised of limestone and supplementary materials is fed into a large kiln lined with refractory
brick. Under intense heat (kiln temperatures reach temperatures of 1450 C), limestone undergoes
a chemical transformation to the precursor of cement, known as clinker. Once cooled, clinker is
mixed with gypsum and ground into a fine powder to produce cement. 9
9The US cement industry is comprised of clinker plants (kiln only operations), grinding-only facilities, and inte-
grated (kiln and grinding) facilities.Almost all of the raw materials and energy used in the manufacture of cement
are consumed during pyroprocessing. We exempt grinding only facilities from our analysis.
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The US cement industry is fragmented into regional markets. This fragmentation is primarily
due to transportation economies. The primary ingredient in cement production, limestone, is
ubiquitous and costly to transport. To minimize input transporation costs, cement plants are
generally located close to limestone quarries. Land transport of cement over long distances is also
not economical because the commodity is difficult to store (cement pulls water out of the air over
time) and has a very low value to weight ratio. It is estimated that 75 percent of domestically
produced cement is shipped less than 110 miles (Miller and Osborne, 2010).1o
3.3.2 Carbon dioxide emissions from cement production
Carbon dioxide emissions intensities, typically measured in terms of metric tons of emissions per
metric ton of clinker, vary considerably across cement producers. Because plants with different
emissions intensities will respond differently to the policy interventions we analyze, it is important
to capture this variation as accurately as possible.
In the cement production process, carbon dioxide is emitted, in approximately equal propor-
tions, from the combustion of fuel in the kiln and the chemical reaction that transforms limestone
into cement. Trace amounts of carbon dioxide can also escape in cement kiln dust.
Carbon intensity of cement production varies significantly across producers. Much of this varia-
tion is driven by variation in fuel efficiency. The oldest and least fuel efficient kilns are "wet-process"
kilns. As of 2006, there were 47 of these wet kilns in operation (all built before 1975) (PCA PIS,
2006). "Dry process" kilns are significantly more fuel efficient, primarily because the feed material
used has a lower moisture content and thus requires less energy to dry and heat. The most modern
kilns, dry kilns equipped with pre-heaters and pre-calciners, are more than twice as fuel efficient as
the older wet-process kilns.
Although data limitations prevent us from estimating emissions intensities specific to each kiln
in the data set, we can estimate technology-specific emissions rates. Both the IPCC and the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development's Cement Sustainability Initiative (WBC, 2005) have
developed protocols for estimating emissions from clinker production. We use these protocols to
generate technology-specific estimates of carbon dioxide emissions rates. Appendix 3.8.1 explains
these emissions rate calculations in more detail.
3.3.3 Trade Exposure
Whereas overland transport of cement is very costly, sea-based transport of clinker is relatively
inexpensive. The United States absorbs approximately one quarter of the total global cement trade
(Van Oss, 2003 ENV). Imports are used to satisfy cyclical increases in domestic demand when
domestic capacity constraints bind and to arbitrage production cost disparities across countries.
In the recent past, import penetration rates have averaged around 20 percent (USGS Mineral
Commodity Summary 2010). China is currently the largest supplier of imported cement (accounting
10Most cement is shipped by truck to ready-mix concrete operations or construction sites in accordance with
negotiated contracts. A much smaller percent is transported by train or barge to terminals and then distributed.
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for 22 percent of imports), followed by Canada, Korea, and Thailand (USGS, 2010 fact sheet).
Notably, the degree of import penetration varies significantly across regional markets. Whereas
imports accounted for approximately 40 percent of California's total cement consumption in 2006,
several inland markets are supplied exclusively by domestic production.
3.4 Model
The basic building block of the model is a regional cement market." Each market is fully described
by the N x 2 state vector, st, where sit describes the productive capacity of the i-th firm at time t
and its associated emissions rate. We set N to be the maximal number of firms. Firms with zero
capacity are considered to be potential entrants. Time is discrete and unbounded. Firms discount
the future at rate 3 = 0.9.
Each decision period is one year. In each period, the sequence of events unfolds as follows:
first, potential entrants receive a private draw from the distribution of both investment and entry
costs, while incumbents receive private draws on the fixed cost of investment/divestment and their
scrap value for exiting. Second, all firms simultaneously make entry, exit, and investment decisions.
Third, incumbent firms compete over quantities in the product market. Finally, firms enter and
exit, and investments mature. We assume that firms who decide to exit produce in this period
before leaving the market, and that adjustments in capacity take one period to realize. We also
assume that each firm operates independently across markets.' 2
Firms in trade-exposed regional markets face an import supply curve:
In Mm = po + pi n Pm, (3.4.1)
where Mm measures annual import supply in market m and pi is the elasticity of import supply.
Here we assume that the elasticity of import supply is an exogenously determined parameter.13
In future work, we hope to explore the potential implications of the strategic use of imports by
dominant market players.
Firms obtain revenues from the product market and incur costs from production, entry, exit,
and investment. Firms compete in quantities in a homogeneous goods product market. After
netting out imports, firms face a constant elasticity residual demand curve:
In Qm,(a) = aom + a, In Pm, (3.4.2)
nThis section borrows heavily from Ryan (2010).1 2This assumption explicitly rules out more general behavior, such as multimarket contact as considered in Bern-
heim and Whinston (1990) and Jans and Rosenbaum (1997).1 31n fact, firms that own a majority of the domestic production capacity in the United States are also among the
largest importers. These dominant producers presumably use imports to supplement their domestic production as
needed, and to compete in markets where they do not own production facilities. Domestic cement producers have
noted that increased domestic ownership of import facilities has contributed to a "more orderly flow of imports into
the U.S."
Grancher, Roy A. "U.S. Cement: Record Performance and Reinvestment", Cement Americas, Jul 1, 1999
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where Qm is the aggregate market quantity, Pm is price, aom is a market-specific intercept, and ai
is the elasticity of demand. For clarity, we omit the m subscript in what follows.
There are essentially five variable inputs used in cement production: labor, fuel (primarily
coal), electricity, feedstocks, and maintenance. These factor inputs are not substitutable (Das,
1994). The majority of variable operating costs are energy related. Because frequent heating and
cooling damages the firebrick lining, kilns typically operate continuously at full capacity for 24
hours a day. Annual output is adjusted by varying the length of time the kiln is shut down for
annual maintenance. In the model, each firm chooses the level of annual output that maximizes
their static profits given the outputs of the competitors, subject to capacity constraints that are
determined by dynamic capacity investment decisions:
max P qi + gyj;ca qi - Ci(qi;J) - W(qiei,7r), (3.4.3)
where P(Q; a) is the inverse of Equation 3.4.2. In the presence of fixed operation costs the product
market may have multiple equilibria, as some firms may prefer to not operate given the outputs of
their competitors. However, if all firms produce positive quantities then the equilibrium vector of
production is unique, as the best-response curves are downward-sloping.
We will use this model to evaluate the impacts of alternative approaches to allocating emissions
permits in an emissions trading program. Firm-specific compliance costs will be determined by
kiln-specific emissions rates, ei, production quantity, and the number of permits the firm receives
free of charge. While postponing the discussion of the policy designs we consider until Section
3.4.3, we note here that the introduction of a cap-and-trade program modifies the profit function in
Equation 3.4.3 through the term W(qi, ei, r), where r is the price of a permit for one metric ton of
carbon dioxide. The precise nature of the modification will vary across permit allocation designs.
The cost of output, qi, is given by the following function:
Ci(qi; 6) = 61qi + 62 1(qi > vsi)(qi - Vsi) 2 . (3.4.4)
Variable production costs consist of two parts: a constant marginal cost, 61, and an increasing
function that binds as quantity approaches the capacity constraint. I assume that costs increase
as the square of the percentage of capacity utilization, and parameterize both the penalty, 62,
and the threshold at which the costs bind, v. This second term, which gives the cost function
a "hockey stick" shape common in the electricity generation industry, accounts for the increasing
costs associated with operating near maximum capacity, as firms have to cut into maintenance time
in order to expand production beyond utilization level v. We denote the profits accruing from the
product market by ri (s; a, 6).
Firms can change their capacity through costly adjustments, denoted by xi. The cost function
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associated with these activities is given by:
T(Xi;-Y) = 1(Xi > 0)(7 1 +7( 2Xi + 73 x) + 1(Xi < O)(74 +Y5Xi +Y 6Xz). (3.4.5)
Firms face both fixed and variable adjustment costs that vary separately for positive and negative
changes. Fixed costs capture the idea that firms may have to face significant setup costs, such as
obtaining permits or constructing support facilities, that accrue regardless of the size of the kiln.
Fixed positive investment costs are drawn each period from the common distribution F,, which is
distributed normally with mean pg and standard deviation o4+, and are private information to the
firm. Divestment sunk costs may be positive as the firm may encounter costs in order to shut down
the kiln and dispose of related materials and components. On the other hand, firms may receive
revenues from selling off their infrastructure, either directly to other firms or as scrap metal. These
costs are also private information, and are drawn each period from the common distribution G-,
which is distributed normally with mean pL- and standard deviation og-.
Firms face fixed costs unrelated to production, given by <bi(a), which vary depending on their
current status and chosen action, ai:
<bif(ai; si, 4) = ri if the firm is a new entrant, (3.4.6)
4i if the firm exits the market.
Firms that enter the market pay a fixed cost of entry, si, which is private information and drawn
from the common distribution of entry costs, F. Firms exiting the market receive a payment of 4i,
which represents net proceeds from shuttering a plant, such as selling off the land and paying for
an environmental cleanup. This value may be positive or negative, depending on the magnitude of
these opposing payments. The scrap value is private information, drawn anew each period from the
common distribution, F0. Denote the activation status of the firm in the next period as Xi, where
Xi = 1 if the firm will be active next period, whether as a new entrant or a continuing incumbent,
and Xi = 0 otherwise. All of the shocks that firms receive each period are mutually independent.
Collecting the costs and revenues from a firm's various activities, the per-period payoff function
is:
g(s, a; o, p, 61,7, I i, 4i) = ri (s; ae, p, j) - r (xi;7-y) + <bi (ai; si, 4i). (3.4.7)
For the sake of brevity, we henceforth denote the vector of parameters in Equation 3.4.7 by 6.
3.4.1 Transitions Between States
To close the model it is necessary to specify how transitions occur between states as firms engage
in investment, entry, and exit. We assume that changes to the state vector through entry, exit, and
investment take one period to occur and are deterministic. The first part is a standard assumption
in discrete time models, and is intended to capture the idea that it takes time to make changes
to physical infrastructure of a cement plant. The second part abstracts away from depreciation,
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which does not appear to be a significant concern in the cement industry, and uncertainty in the
time to build new capacity.14
We also assume that the emissions rate of the firm is fixed. We assume that there are three
discrete levels of emissions rates, corresponding to the three major types of production technology
in the cement industry. Existing incumbents are modeled as having one of the three technologies,
while new entrants are always endowed with the frontier technology. As a result, the emissions
profile of an industry changes over time in response to firm turnover.
3.4.2 Equilibrium
In each time period, firm i makes entry, exit, production, and investment decisions, collectively
denoted by ai. Since the full set of dynamic Nash equilibria is unbounded and complex, I restrict
the firms' strategies to be anonymous, symmetric, and Markovian, meaning firms only condition on
the current state vector and their private shocks when making decisions, as in Maskin and Tirole
(1988) and Ericson and Pakes (1995).
Each firm's strategy, ui(s, ei), is a mapping from states and shocks to actions:
Ui : (s, ei) -+ ai, (3.4.8)
where ci represents the firm's private information about the cost of entry, exit, investment, and
divestment. In the context of the present model, ai(s) is a set of policy functions which describes
a firm's production, investment, entry, and exit behavior as a function of the present state vector.
In a Markovian setting, with an infinite horizon, bounded payoffs, and a discount factor less than
unity, the value function for an incumbent is:
Vi(s; o(s), 6, ei) = -ri(s; 6)
+ max max -Yi1 - 72XI - 73X32 + 3J EiVi(s'; u(s'), 6, Ei) dP(si + x*, s'_; s, a(s)) ]
max -Yi4 - 5 762 + 3 EiVi(s'; a(s'), 6, e) dP(si + x*, s'_;; s, U(s))]
#3 EeiVi(s'; o,(s'), 0, ei) dP(s'; s, a(s)), #i ,(3.4.9)
where 6 is the vector of payoff-relevant parameters, Ei1 is the expectation with respect to the
distributions of shocks in future periods, and P(s'; u(s), s) is the conditional probability distribution
over future state s', given the current state, s, and the vector of strategies, a(s).
Potential entrants must weigh the benefits of entering at an optimally-chosen level of capacity
against their draws of investment and entry costs. Firms only enter when the sum of these draws is
sufficiently low. I assume that potential entrants are short-lived; if they do not enter in this period
14it is conceptually straightforward to add uncertainty over time-to-build in the model, but assuming deterministic
transitions greatly reduces the computational complexity of solving for the model's equilibrium.
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they disappear and take a payoff of zero forever, never entering in the future.15 Potential entrants
are also restricted to make positive investments; firms cannot "enter" the market at zero capacity
and wait for a sufficiently low draw of investment costs before building a plant. The value function
for potential entrants is:
V(s; o(s), 0, Ei) = max {0,
max [-yli - 72x' - y3x!2 +# Ej Vi(s'; o(s'), 9,,Ei)dP(si + x*, si;s, (s)) - i (3.4.10)
Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) requires each firm's strategy profile to be optimal
given the strategy profiles of its competitors:
Vi(s; o*(s), oi(s), 9, ei) Vi(S; &i(S), oui(S), 6, ei), (3.4.11)
for all s, ei, and all possible alternative strategies, di(s). As I work with the expected value func-
tions below, I note that the MPNE requirement also holds after integrating out firms' private in-
formation: E Vi (s; o2(s), oi(s), 9, ci) E Vi (s; &j(s), ori(s), 9, ej). Doraszelski and Satterthwaite
(2010) discuss the existence of pure strategy equilibria in settings similar to the one considered
here. The introduction of private information over the discrete actions guarantees that at least one
pure strategy equilibrium exists, as the best-response curves are continuous. However, there are no
guarantees that the equilibrium is unique, a concern I discuss next in the context of my empirical
approach.
3.4.3 Cap-and-trade Mechanisms
In the counterfactual policy simulations, domestic cement producers are required to participate in
the greenhouse gas emissions trading program. To comply with the program, all domestic firms
must hold sufficient permits to offset their emissions. We impose no spatial or sectoral restrictions
on permit trading; permits can be traded freely among all program participants. To keep the
analysis more tractable, we do not allow banking or borrowing of permits across time.
The equilibrium permit price, r, is an exogenous parameter in our simulations. This is equivalent
to assuming that the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve is flat in the neighborhood of the
constraint imposed by the emissions cap. This will be an appropriate assumption if the domestic
cement industry is a relatively small player in the emissions market, such that changes in industry
net supply/demand for permits cannot affect the equilibrium market price. 16
15This assumption is for computational convenience, as otherwise one would have to solve an optimal waiting
problem for the potential entrants. See Ryan and Tucker (2010) for an example of such an optimal waiting problem.
16This assumption is likely to be approximately true in the context of a federal GHG trading program that permits
offsets. Keohane (2009) estimates the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve in the United States (expressed in
present-value terms and in 2005 dollars) to be 8.0 x 107 $/GT CO 2 for the period 2010-2050. Suppose this curve
can be used to crudely approximate the permit supply function. If all of the industries deemed to be "presumptively
eligible" for allowance rebates reduced their emissions by ten percent for this entire forty year period, the permit
price would fall by approximately $0.25/ ton.
We consider the following three general classes of permit allocation mechanisms:
3.4.3.1 Grandfathering
Under a grandfathering regime, permits are allocated for free to incumbent firms pre-existed the
carbon trading program. Firm-specific permit allocation schedules (i.e. the number of permits the
firm will receive each period) are determined at the beginning of the program and are based on
pre-determined operating characteristics. Firms receive the same amount of permits every period
until they exit the market, in which case they lose their allocation. New entrants do not receive
any permits for free in this regime.
Several studies have demonstrated that a pure grandfathering regime would grossly overcompen-
sate industry for the compliance costs incurred under proposed Federal climate change legislation.
For example, a recent paper finds that grandfathering fewer than 15 percent of the emissions al-
lowances generally suffices to prevent profit losses among industries that would suffer the largest
percentage losses of profit absent compensation (Goulder, Hafstead, and Dworsky, 2010). Under
the grandfathering regime we consider, we assume that a number of permits equal to 20 percent
of annual baseline emissions are grandfathered each year to incumbent cement producers. The per
period profit function becomes:
-xit = P qiqit - Ci(qit; 6) - r(eiqit - Ai), (3.4.12)
isi
with Ai=~.
where r is the permit price, ei is the firm's emissions rate and E represents aggregate industry
emissions. The number of permits the firm receives for free from the regulator is Aj; A represents
the total amount of emissions allocated for free to domestic cement producers. We assume that the
share of emissions allowances allocated to firm i (i.e. A/A ) is equal to its share of the installed
kiln capacity at the outset of the program.
When permits are grandfathered in a cap and trade program, policy makers must decide ex
ante how to deal with new entrants and firms who exit. In our simulations, we assume that a
firm forfeits its future permit allocation entitlements when it exits the market. We assume that
new entrants are not entitled to free permits.17 In some existing program designs (including the
EU ETS), some fraction of the permits to be allocated are set aside for new production capacity
entering the market. Future work will explore these alternative policy designs that offer free permit
allocations as incentive for new entrants.
17 In practice, policies regarding free permit allocations to free entrants and former incumbents vary. In the EU
ETS, policies governing the free allocation of permits to entrants vary across member states. Most states require
forfeiture of free permit allocations upon closure.
122
3.4.3.2 Auctioning
In the context of an economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions trading program, an auctioning regime
has its proponents. In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office Director warned that a failure to
auction permits in a federal greenhouse gas emissions trading system "would represent the largest
corporate welfare program that has even been enacted in the history of the United States".18
However, important industry stakeholders have united in their opposition to a policy regime that
would auction all permits (at least in the near term). 19 We include a pure auctioning design in our
analysis nonetheles; it serves as a useful benchmark for other more politically palatable options.
Under the auctioning regime we consider, all emissions permits are sold in a uniform price
auction. In each period, firms must purchase a number of permits equal to their emissions. The
per-period production profit function becomes:
1rit=P it+ gt ; aC qit-Ci(qit; 6) - reiqit. (3.4.13)
joi
Note that the first order conditions associated with static profit maximization under auctioning are
identical to those under grandfathering. This highlights the aforementioned independence property,
which holds that firms' short run production and abatement decisions will be unaffected by the
choice between auctioning permits or allocating them freely to firms in lump sum.
3.4.3.3 Contingent allocation updating
Under proposed state and federal climate change legislation, output-based updating provisions are
used to address concerns about near-term competitiveness impacts, job loss, and emissions leakage.
Emissions permits are allocated for free to eligible firms using a continuously updated, output-based
formula.20
Following Bushnell and Chen (2009), we adopt a closed-loop approach to modeling of an alloca-
tion updating regime. Permits are allocated based on product market shares in the current period.
" Approaches to Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: Hearing before the Committee on the Budget U.S. House
of Representatives", November 1, 2007. (testimony of Peter R. Orszag)
19The US Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) is a non-partisan coalition comprised of 25 major corporations
and 5 leading environmental groups. In January 2009, the group issued its "Blueprint for Legislative Action" in which
it urged Congress to use some portion of allowances to buffer the impacts of increased costs to energy consumers,
and to provide transitional assistance to trade-exposed and emissions intensive industry.
2 0 Climate change legislation recently passed in the House and reported by committee in the Senate includes a
provision that allocates permits to eligible industries using an output-based formula. These free allocations are
intended to compensate both direct compliance costs (i.e. the cost of purchasing permits to offset emissions) and
indirect compliances costs (i.e. compliance costs reflected in higher electricity prices). Under California's AB32,
implementing agencies have recommended that free allocation to industry will, "to the extent feasible, be based on
output-based GHG efficiency "benchmarks" and "update" to reflect changes in production each year for industry
with leakage risk" (Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Regulation Status Update May 17, 2010 California Air Resources
Board).
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The per period profit function becomes:
,rit = P (it +E qjt; a qit -Ci(qit ;)-r(eiqit - 9i(qit)~A), (3.4.14)
where <Oi(qit) denotes the share of the free emissions allocated to firm i.
Implicit in Equation 3.4.14 are two simplifying assumptions. First, the quantity of permits a
firm receives in the current period depends on its production level in that same period. Second, the
size of the implicit subsidy per unit of output is taken to be exogenous to firms' production decisions.
Together, these assumptions simplify the dynamic problem considerably, while still allowing us to
capture the dynamic implications of the grandfathering mechanism to a significant extent. Note
that the independence property does not apply here. Firms production decisions will be directly
affected by how the allocation updating rule is specified.
We consider two different means of updating emissions allocations. In the first "output-based"
updating regime, emissions allowances are allocated according to market share:
Bi(qi)= qj*
Ej qi
In the second, "emissions-based" regime, more polluting firms receive a larger permit allocation.
This might occur if firms owning older, less efficient kilns insist that they should be entitled to a
larger allowance allocation so as to compensate them for their higher compliance costs. In this
case:
Oi(qi) = eqj
JEj eiqi'
In both cases, firms receive permits as long as they are producing in the market. Therefore,
new entrants also receive an allocation proportional to either their output or their emissions.
3.5 Estimation and computation
The econometric estimation is based on the benchmark model, in which the price of emissions is
set to zero (r = 0), i.e. there is no compliance cost due to emissions regulation. Once estimated,
this model can be used to simulate the dynamic industry response to market-based emissions
regulations that affect firms' production and investment choices primarily through operating costs
provided certain assumptions are met. In particular, we will assume that firms' response to a given
operating cost change is independent of whether the cost change is caused by emissions regulation
or other exogenous factors (such as changes in energy prices or other inputs).
3.5.1 Estimation
Although our data sources and identification strategy are similar to Ryan (2010), there are some
important differences in how the model is specified and estimated. In this section, significant
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Regional Markets
Market
Atlanta
Baltimore/Philadelphia
Birmingham
Chicago
Cincinnati
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
Florida
Kansas City
Los Angeles
Minneapolis
New York/Boston
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Salt Lake City
San Antonio
San Francisco
Seattle
St Louis
Number of Firms
6
6
5
5
3
5
4
3
5
4
6
1
4
4
3
2
6
4
2
4
2006 Capacity
1285
1497
1288
972
875
1766
998
1749
1297
1661
1733
1862
1033
1138
614
1336
1318
931
607
1358
Emissions Rate
0.97
0.99
0.94
0.98
0.93
1.05
0.95
1.02
0.93
0.95
0.93
0.93
1.16
0.93
1.08
1.01
0.95
0.93
1.05
1.05
Import Market Share
0.12
0.12
0.35
0.04
0.21
0
0
0.19
0.35
0
0.18
0.2
0.45
0.13
0
0
0.3
0.18
0.65
0
deviations are discussed. The interested reader is referred to Ryan (2010) for additional details
regarding the data and estimation.
3.5.1.1 Regional market definition
The USGS collects establishment-level data from all domestic Portland cement producers and
publishes these data in an annual Minerals Yearbook. Cement price and sales data are aggregated to
the regional market level to protect the confidentiality of the respondents. In recent years, increased
consolidation of asset ownership has required higher levels of data aggregation. Conversations with
the experts at USGS indicate that the current regional market definitions group plants that are
unlikely to compete with each other (Van Oss, personal communication).
Rather than adopt the USGS protocols, we base our regional market definitions on the industry
accepted limitations of economic transport as well as company-specific SEC 10k filings which include
information regarding markets served by specific plants. To merge the USGS cement prices with
our data set, USGS prices are weighted by kiln capacity in each region. For example, if kiln capacity
in the region we define as region A is equally divided between USGS defined markets B and C, we
define the price in region A to be the average price reported in USGS markets B and C. We report
some descriptive statistics for our regional markets in Table 3.1.
3.5.1.2 Import supply and residual demand elasticities
In this paper, the import supply response to changes in domestic operating costs is modeled sepa-
rately from domestic market demand response. This separation is important given our interest in
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understanding how policy-induced operating cost increases could affect import penetration rates.
Regional cement prices, Pnt, domestic production levels, Qmt, and imports, Mint, are endoge-
nous variables in our estimation framework. We jointly estimate the following system of equations
using two stage least squares (2SLS):
InQmt = ao+ailn Pmt+Ca2m +Ca3lnXmt +li (3.5.1)
InMmt = 00+(41fnPmt+ 4 2m+4 3 1n Zmt+E 2mt. (3.5.2)
Equation 3.5.1 specifies the residual demand function, as defined by total market demand less
imports. The matrix Xmt contains the exogenous variables that affect marginal operating costs:
state-level electricity prices, coal prices, and labor costs. The matrix Zmt contains the exogenous
import supply shifters: international freight rates and exchange rates. Each market has a demand
shifter in the intercept, a 2m, using Atlanta as the baseline market.
Equation 3.5.2 represents the import supply schedule. This model is estimated using data from
those markets accessible by water. For inland markets who are supplied entirely by domestic pro-
duction, all 4 coefficients are set to zero. The excluded instruments for cement price are exogenous
factors affecting domestic demand, such as measures of building and highway construction activity,
population, and prices of substitutes such as asphalt.
Here we assume that imports are supplied by a competitive fringe. In fact, a majority of imports
are controlled by the same firms who own a majority of domestic production assets. If imports are
actually strategic, this will affect how imports respond to to relative changes in domestic operating
costs. In future work, we hope to modify the model so as to make imports controlled by firms with
a large domestic presence endogenous.
3.5.2 Estimation results
Table 3.2 enumerates the parameter estimates used in our simulations. Overall, these estimates
appear reasonable.
" The marginal cost estimate of $30/ton of clinker falls well within the range that is typically
reported for domestic production: $27-$44 per ton (Van Oss, 2003 ENV).
" The import supply elasticity point estimate is 2.7. When analyzing the impacts of environ-
mental regulations, the US EPA assumes an import supply elasticity of 2 for the cement
sector based on Broda et al (2008).
" The elasticity of aggregate demand is 2.96. This is higher in absolute value than some other
demand elasticities reported in the literature. For example, Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) es-
timate a domestic demand elasticity of -0.81. On the other hand, using much higher-quality
data, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) estimate several similar high demand elas-
ticities for homogeneous goods industries, such as -5.93 for ready-mixed concrete, cement's
downstream industry. Experimentation with lower elasticities resulted in unreasonably high
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investment costs, on the order of several billion dollars for a median-sized plant, in order to
rationalize low entry rates given the amount of foregone opportunity profits.
" Investment costs are roughly in line with the accounting costs cited in Salvo (2010), which
reports a cost of $200 per ton of installed capacity. Our numbers are slightly higher, which
in line with the idea that these costs represent economic opportunity costs as opposed to
accounting costs. The implied cost of a cement plant is also in line with plant costs reported
in newspapers and trade journals. For example, on October 15, 2010, it was reported that
the most recent expansion of the Texas Industries New Braunfels cement plant, increasing
capacity from 900 thousand tons per year to 2.3 million tons per year, was pegged at a cost
of $350M, which implies a cost of $250 per ton of installed capacity.21
" The magnitudes of the fixed costs are reasonable at face value, and in conjunction with the
estimated variances, are in accord with the observed rates of investment, entry, and exit in
the cement industry.
Some of the parameters from the model described above are not reported. Divestment is
virtually never observed in the data and thus the estimates of divestment costs are estimated
poorly. Fixed costs of production and operation are also not reported, as these are set to zero. The
reason is that we do not observe sufficient periods of operation without production (mothballing)
which are required to separately identify those parameters from the distribution of exit costs.
3.5.3 Computation
Once the parameters have been estimated, the model can be computed to compare the market
performance under different cap-and-trade policies. In order to compute the equilibrium of the
game, we make use of parametric approximation methods. In particular, we interpolate the value
function using cubic splines. The reasons behind using parametric methods are twofold. First,
the game has a continuous state space, given by the vector of capacities of the firms. By using
parametric methods, we can allow firms to deterministically choose their capacity in a continuous
space. Second, parametric approximation methods can be useful to improve computational speed.
Previous work has already suggested the potential benefits of using parametric approximation
methods (Pakes and McGuire, 1994).
Parametric value function methods have been explored in a single agent dynamic programming
context.22 However, they have not been widely used in dynamic games, particularly in games in
which players take discrete actions, such as entry and exit (Doraszelski and Pakes, 2007). In our
application, we find the method to perform well compared to a discrete value function method. In
particular, this parametric method allows us to treat capacity as a continuous state, which improves
the convergence properties of the game.2 3
2 1 Source: KGNB Radio, New Braunfels, Texas.
22 For a general treatment of approximation methods used in the context of dynamic programming, see Judd
(1998). An assessment of these methods in a single agent model can be found in Benitez-Silva et al. (2000).
2 3This is mainly driven by the fact that firms take deterministic actions with respect to the continuous state.
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Table 3.2: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Demand Parameters
Constant 20.38
Elasticity of Demand -2.96
Discount Factor
#3 0.9
Production Parameters
Capacity Cost 1.157E10
Capacity Cost Binding Level 1.896
Marginal Cost 30
Investment Parameters
Fixed Cost Mean 1,798
Fixed Cost Standard Deviation 420
Marginal Cost 233
Exit Cost
Scrap Distribution Mean -67,490
Scrap Distribution Standard Deviation 55,167
Entry Distribution
Entry Cost Mean 172,680
Entry Cost Standard Variance 41,559
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The procedure we use is similar in spirit to the discrete value function iteration approach. In
both methods, the value function is evaluated at a finite number of points. At each iteration and
for a given guess of the value function, firms' strategies are computed optimally (policy step). Then,
the value function is updated accordingly (value function step). This process is repeated until the
value function and the policy functions do not change significantly.
The difference between the discrete value function iteration and our iterative approach is that
we approximate the value function with a flexible parametric form. In particular, given a guess
for the value function Vk at pre-specified grid points, we interpolate the value function with a multi-
dimensional uniform cubic spline, which can be computed very efficiently (Habermann and Kindermann,
2007).24 This interpolation defines an approximation of the value function in a continuous space
of dimension equal to the number of active firms. For a given number of firms active NA in the
market, the value function at any capacity vector s is approximated as,
where J is the number of grid points, #NA,ij are the coefficients computed by interpolating the
values Vk when there are A active firms, and BNA,j(s) is the spline weight given to coefficient 4NA,j
when the capacity state equals s. This coefficient is the product of capacity weights for each of the
incumbent firms, so that BNA,j(S) = HiEA Bj(Si)-
In the policy step, optimal strategies are computed over this continuous function. For a given
firm, we compute the conditional single-dimensional value function, given the capacity values of the
other firms, Vk(sjs-i). This formulation allows us to represent the single-dimensional investment
problem of the firm. The following expression defines the expected value function of the firm
conditional on staying in the market and investing to a new capacity s'. Firms maximize,
max 7ri(s,s';si)+ E Prk(sli;ok(s))Vrk(s;s'_i). (3.5.3)
We compute the optimal strategy by making use of the differentiability properties of the cubic
splines, which allows us to compute the first-order conditions with respect to investment. Given that
the cubic spline does not restrict the value function to be concave, we check all local optima in order
to determine the optimal strategy of the firm. 25 Conditional on optimal investment strategies, we
then compute the new policy function with respect to the entry, investment and exit probabilities,
which gives us an updated optimal policy ak+1 . This allows us to compute a new guess for the
value function Vk+1 in the value function step.
The process is iterated until the strategies for each of the firms and the value function in each
of the possible states do not change more than an established convergence criterion, such that
|| Uk+1 - ,7k |< e and || Vk+1 _ Vk 11< EV-
24 For a detailed treatment of splines methods, see de Boor (2001).
25Given that the cubic spline is defined by a cubic polynomial at each of the grid intervals, this implies that at
most there will be 2(J - 1) + 2 candidate local optima, where J is the number of grid points.
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3.6 Counterfactuals
We investigate both the static and dynamic effects of alternative cap-and-trade policy designs on
the US Portland cement industry. The static analysis helps to build intuition about the relation-
ships between policy design features and short-run equilibrium outcomes. The dynamic modeling
emphasizes more complex, long-run industry responses.
In this preliminary draft, we report results from simulating outcomes of a subset of our regional
markets: Cincinnati, Denver, Detroit, Kansas City, Minneapolis, New York, Pittsburgh, Salt Lake
City, San Francisco, Seattle, Phoenix, and St. Louis. These markets represent ahnost all of the
markets with five firms or less in the United States. There is a range of variation in market size,
plant technology, and import presence: for example, the Salt Lake City market is not accessible by
water and demand is met entirely by domestic suppliers, who have heterogeneity in their emissions
rates. In contrast, a market like San Francisco is trade-exposed and incumbent producers are
homogenous with respect to emissions rates.
In the near-term future, the scope of the analysis will be expanded to include all domestic
cement markets. This will allow us to provide a more comprehensive assessment of the industry-
wide impacts of the policies we consider, and to assess the extent to which a "one-size-fits-all"
policy regime can have differential impacts across heterogeneous regional markets.
In this section, we evaluate the relative welfare impacts of the alternative permit market designs
we consider. A simple example helps to lay the foundation for this analysis. Figure 3-1 illustrates
the static welfare consequences of introducing an emissions trading program into an inland (and
thus autarkic) regional cement market that is monopolized by a single domestic producer. The curve
labeled MPC measures the marginal private costs of production (i.e. fuel costs, labor costs, etc.)
net of any environmental compliance costs. The curve labeled MSC captures both private marginal
costs and the monetized value of the damages from the firm's emissions: MSC = MPC + re. This
assumes a constant emissions rate per unit of output (e). The social welfare maximizing level of
output is Q*. The corresponding price is P*.
Under a grandfathering (GF) or auctioning (AU) regime, compliance obligations increase vari-
able operating costs by re. The monopolist will choose to produce QGF/AUC. The equilibrium price
is PGF/AUC. Alternatively, if free permit allocations are contingent upon output, the monopolist
will account for this implicit production subsidy. For the sake of expositional clarity, the implicit
subsidy depicted in Figure 3-1 exactly offsets the policy-induced increase in marginal operating
costs. The monopolist's profit maximizing choice of output under updating is therefore Qup.
This stylized example can be used to motivate the three welfare measures we use in the analysis
that follows:
1. Wi: Our first welfare measure captures producer and consumer surplus generated in this
industry plus any auction revenues earned through the government sale of emissions permits.
In Figure 3-1, allocation updating increases this welfare measure (vis a vis grandfathering or
auctioning) by an amount equal to area A + B + C + D + E. This welfare gain derives from the
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Figure 3-1: Welfare in a Regulated Monopoly
mand
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reduction in the distortion associated with the exercise of market power under grandfathering
or auctioning.
2. W2: Our second welfare measure accounts for the fact that any allocation updating-induced
increase in emissions must be offset by other sources subject to the cap. In Figure 3-1,
industry emissions increase by e(Qup - QGF/AUC) under the updating regime as compared
to grandfathering or auctioning. This shifts more of the compliance burden to other industries
and sources. The additional abatement cost incurred outside this industry in order to offset
the emissions increase is area D + E. This assumes a constant permit price, equivalent to
assuming that the abatement supply curve facing the monopolist is locally flat. A more
comprehensive welfare measure subtracts this cost from W1. In Figure 3-1, the net welfare
impact of moving from a grandfathering or auctioning regime to the updating regime is
A+ B+C.
3. W3: The third welfare measure accounts for any emissions leakage. The stylized example
in Figure 3-1 fails to capture the benefits associated with reduced emissions leakage under
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allocation updating. Many regional cement markets in the United States are accessible by
water and are thus exposed to competition from foreign imports. As the above results helped
to illustrate, a potentially important advantage of output-based updating is that the implicit
production subsidy serves to mitigate the leakage of output and emissions to less stringently
regulated jurisdictions. All else equal, the welfare properties of allocation updating regimes
vis a vis auctioning or grandfathering will be more favorable in trade exposed markets.
The counterfactual policy simulations we conduct are considerably more complex than the
stylized case depicted in Figure 3-1. First, the regional markets we consider are served by more
than one firm. In a more competitive product market, the welfare gains from allocation updating
(vis a vis grandfathering or updating) in an autarkic market may disappear. Intuitively, if the
emissions externality is the dominant (or the only) market failure in play, there is little (or nothing)
to be gained from setting the marginal disincentive to pollute below the marginal damage. Second,
in several of the regional markets we analyze, there is intra-market variation in emissions rates. If
relatively clean producers are not capacity constrained, this makes it possible to achieve short run
reductions in emissions intensity through a reallocation of production activity. Finally, and perhaps
more importantly, our analysis considers both static and dynamic efficiency. When we allow firms
to make entry, exit, and investment decisions over several periods, the welfare implications of these
permit allocation alternatives can look quite different.
More formally, in the static analysis, per period welfare is defined as follows:
Q qi
w(s, a; o, 6j, ^/, r, e) = P(x; a)dx - I C(x; 6i)dx - P(Q; a)M(P; -) -r ejqi - reMM(P; -y),
0 20
(3.6.1)
where eM denotes the emissions intensity of imports. This is an exogenous parameter constructed
using an import volume weighted average of estimated foreign cement producers' emissions intensi-
ties (Worrell et al., 2001). The vector e includes the emissions intensity measures of both domestic
producers and foreign imports.
In specifying this welfare function, we assume that marginal damages from carbon dioxide
emissions are approximately constant and equal to the assumed equilibrium permit price r. Because
damages from greenhouse gases are independent of where in the world the emissions occur, we
penalize both domestic and foreign emissions at a rate of r per unit. Equation 3.6.1 implicitly
assumes that the cement sector is small relative to the larger emissions trading program, such
changes in cement industry emissions do not affect the equilibrium permit price. Under a binding
cap, - E eiqi can be interpreted as the cost of offsetting emissions from the cement industry
through emissions reductions at other sources under the cap.26 Finally, we do not account for
producer surplus captured by the producers of domestic imports in our welfare measures; domestic
policy makers presumably ignore the economic impacts on producers and consumers outside their
2 6 If net permit demand from the cement sector can affect the equilibrium permit price, our estimates of the costs
of allocation updating, vis a vis auctioning or grandfathering, will be too low.
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jurisdiction.
Our welfare analysis will emphasize welfare comparisons across permit allocation designs, hold-
ing the permit price r, and thus total emissions, constant. A change in the permit market design
will induce a change in Equation 3.6.1. We characterize these changes using the three welfare
measures introduced in the previous section. W1 captures changes in the private economic surplus
accruing from domestic cement consumption (i.e. the first three terms in Equation 3.6.1. W2
accounts for impacts on abatement costs outside the industry. We assume that the cement sector
is small relative to the larger emissions trading program such that changes in cement industry
emissions do not affect the equilibrium permit price. Any change in r E ejqi will have implications
for the abatement activities and costs in at other sources under the cap. Finally, W3 accounts for
changes in emissions leakage across policy designs. Changes in emissions leakage are measured as
changes in reMM(P;Y).
Welfare analysis in the dynamic simulations sums Equation 3.6.1 and subtracts any entry, exit
and investment costs accruing over the time horizon we consider. This measure of dynamic effi-
ciency is somewhat unconventional insofar as it rules out innovation and technological change. For
our purposes, a dynamically efficient outcome maximizes social welfare subject to the constraints
imposed by existing and proven production technologies.
The common practice in ex ante policy analysis involves simulating regulatory effects in a static
setting, using a representative year as the basis for estimating annual regulatory impacts, and then
using that test year to extrapolate outcomes over a longer time horizon (OAQPS, 1999). We adopt
this approach in our static analysis. More precisely, we simulate a single period market outcome
in the unregulated baseline case and under the range of counterfactual policy designs we consider.
To facilitate comparisons with our dynamic simulations, results are expressed as net present values
using a social discount rate of three percent. We assume the simulated annual outcomes would be
observed each year of the 30 year time horizon we consider.
3.6.1 Cement Prices
Figure 3-2 plots both the static and dynamic equilibrium present discounted price under auctioning,
grandfathering, quantity updating, and emissions updating. Auctioning and grandfathering exhibit
the so-called "independence property" (Hahn and Stavins, 2010): equilibrium cement prices and
quantities are equal, holding permit prices constant. In the short run, marginal effects of permit
market compliance obligations are identical across these two regimes. In contrast, outcomes differ
across the output-based and emissions-based updating regimes in the short-run. Because firms in
this industry differ with respect to emissions intensity, capacity, and cost structure, the size of
the marginal production subsidy conferred under allocation updating will vary across firms under
emissions-based updating, but will be the same for all firms under output-based updating. However,
the differences between the two contingent updating schemes are relatively minor. The reason is
two-fold: first, new firms enter at a fixed frontier emissions rate, so as the industry turns over we
asymptote towards having identical outcomes under both policies. Second, in the static case, the
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Figure 3-2: Counterfactual: Cement Prices
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only margin for differences between the two is differential reorganization of production across units
with different emissions intensity. In this setting, that margin is relatively small compared to the
overall contraction in market quantity; as such, differences between the two policies are masked by
the overall market changes.
An interesting aspect of the static result is that when the carbon permit price is relatively
low, up to about $22 per ton, equivalent to assuming that the emissions cap is relatively lax, the
introduction of the emissions regulation has no effect on equilibrium prices and quantities. In the
benchmark (unregulated) case, firms in this market are capacity constrained and earning scarcity
rents. When firms are required to internalize a relatively small emissions cost, scarcity rents are
reduced, but output decisions are essentially unaffected in the short run. This results in the flat
line in Figure 3-2.
Cement prices rise more quickly and steeply under auctioning or grandfathering as compared
to contingent allocation updating regimes. The implicit subsidy conferred by allocation updat-
ing, some of which is passed through to consumers, partially mitigates the effect of the emissions
regulation on cement prices and quantities. This is seen most clearly at the point where permit
prices start to reduce production under grandfathering; for a small range of higher permit prices,
production remains constant under updating.
When we allow the structure of the industry to respond to the introduction of market-based
emissions regulation, the independence property ceases to hold; equilibrium outcomes differ across
auctioning and grandfathering regimes. This is due to the wedge driven between new entrants
and existing incumbents in the dynamic model; the grandfathered permits create a permanent
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Figure 3-3: Counterfactual: Domestic Emissions
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advantage to incumbent firms as long as they stay in the market. This distorts the evolution of the
market structure, as grandfathered firms have a higher exit threshold in order to induce their exit.
Compared to the static case, prices are far higher for any given permit price when dynamics
are properly accounted for. This is due to the large reduction in capacity that permit prices
induce, which is missing from the static case. As expected, the reduction in equilibrium levels of
capacity is most accelerated under auctioning; firms are more likely to exit when they do not have a
steady stream of freely allocated permits to look forward to. In general, auctioning has the highest
equilibrium prices, lowest levels of production, and lowest emissions.
As in the static case, dynamic allocation updating mitigates the effect of the emissions regula-
tions on cement prices. In contrast to the static case, even low permit prices have non-negligible
equilibrium impacts when firms are able to adjust their entry, exit, and investment decisions.
3.6.2 Emissions
Figure 3-3 shows the levels of emissions for different carbon permit prices under the various rebating
regimes. All of the regimes are successful at dramatically lowering emissions. At a posited price of
$30 per ton of carbon, for example, emissions cut in half under auctioning and by roughly a third
in grandfathering and dynamic updating.
The most notable difference between the static and dynamic cases is that emissions are sub-
stantially lower in the dynamic case. This is intuitive, since in the dynamic case firms exit the
market, constricting output and correspondingly reducing emissions. The large difference between
the static and dynamic outcomes for a given rebate mechanism highlights the importance of ac-
135
Figure 3-4: Counterfactual: Emissions Leakage
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counting for dynamic effects; of the roughly 50 percent decrease in emissions under auctioning, the
dynamic component accounts for approximately two-thirds of the decrease.
In line with our discussion of emissions-based updating versus output-based updating, the dy-
namic calculations show no sizeable difference between the two. This contrasts with the static case,
which demonstrates the increasing differential incentives of dirty firms to pollute in the short run
under emissions-based updating. Note that the difference only becomes noticeable at relatively
high levels of the carbon price, and as before, the difference in the emissions levels is swamped by
the overall change in industry emissions.
3.6.3 Leakage
A central question facing regulators of trade-exposed emissions-intense industries is the degree to
which production will be substituted to unregulated jurisdictions. Figure 3-4 plots the amount
of leakage under each scenario; the results suggest that leakage is a very relevant concern in the
US cement industry. In general, auctioning leads to the highest amount of leakage, followed by
grandfathering (in the dynamic case), and dynamic updating. Auctioning places the highest burden
on domestic producers, who are quickest to exit under this scheme. Therefore, coastal markets
import a relatively high proportion of their cement from abroad. Grandfathered firms exit at a
slower rate, and therefore the domestic cement sector is larger in coastal markets under this regime,
reducing imports and emissions leakage. The figure also illustrates one comparative advantage of
the dynamic updating schemes (and their political raison d'etre): emissions leakage is minimized
under these schemes as firms are effectively subsidized to have differentially large incentives to
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Figure 3-5: Counterfactual: W1
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produce in the domestic market.
3.6.4 Decomposing Changes in Welfare
Our fundamental goal is to estimate the changes in social welfare for different carbon prices under
the various rebating mechanisms. We present three metrics of the change in social welfare, decom-
posing along conceptually distinct lines. The first metric, W1, calculates the difference in producer
and consumer surplus between the unregulated baseline case and the four rebating regimes, ac-
counting for revenues raised by the government through permit sales. This is a measure of how
the local market changes in response to the regulation, and is a major component of understanding
welfare changes in concentrated industries.
Figure 3-5 shows the results under metric W1. By construction, the welfare changes are all
negative. The changes in product market surplus are largest under auctioning, where firms face
the largest cost burden. Grandfathering becomes increasingly attractive compared to auctioning
for moderate carbon prices, and then asymptotes to the same welfare losses at higher prices. This
is driven by the fact that at very high carbon prices the domestic production market has largely
shut down across the US; in coastal markets the entire demand is met by imports while interior
markets evolve towards marginal monopoly operations.
The results for grandfathering mask two countervailing forces. On one hand, high carbon prices
incentivize firms to reduce their production, which harms both consumer and producer surplus. On
the other hand, grandfathered firms hold an increasingly valuable resource as carbon prices go up.
When we broke out the profits of firms under different regimes, it turns out that incumbent firms
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Figure 3-6: Counterfactual: W2
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under grandfathering actually become more profitable as the permit price climbs above $60 per
ton. They simply stop producing and start selling all of their permits to the market. Our results
suggest that the loss in product market surplus is greater than the windfall profits of being given
valuable permits for free.
Of course, metric WI misses the entire reason for having a carbon abatement regulation: carbon
emissions are damaging. As seen above, emissions decline under the regulation, so welfare should
be increased by the foregone damages from these emissions. Metric W2, as shown in Figure 3-6
adds in the social benefits of mitigated carbon emissions.
The most important observation is that for a wide range of permit prices, the social welfare
under metric W2 is negative. Up to carbon prices of $45 per ton, all of the permit allocation
schemes have net negative social welfare. This result is driven by Buchanan's observation that the
social planner must properly account for the two competing distortions in concentrated markets
with externalities. We find that the social losses from further restrictions of output in the product
market more than outweigh the benefits in carbon emissions reductions.
The figure has several other interesting aspects. The first is that for large carbon prices (im-
plying very high social damages from carbon emissions), all of the rebating mechanisms, even
auctioning, have positive social welfare under metric W2. Second, the relative difference between
the mechanisms in the dynamic case converge to roughly the same level of welfare. The intuition is
that at these high prices, the domestic market has largely stopped producing. As carbon dioxide's
social damages increase towards high extremes, all regimes have domestic production approaching
zero, which is optimal under metric W2. Third, the relative ranking of the regimes swaps for
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Figure 3-7: Counterfactual: W3
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high carbon prices. The same reasons that made auctioning and grandfathering unattractive under
metric W1 make them attractive once we account for the benefit of foregone carbon emissions.
For moderate carbon prices, the dynamic updating allocation schemes are best, particularly in the
policy-relevant range of $15 to $40 per ton.
The final welfare metric, W3, augments W2 by adding in the social damages incurred through
the production of cement through leakage. Since carbon dioxide has uniform damages, it does
not matter where it is released.2 Therefore, the correct social metric should include damages
from carbon emissions in other jurisdictions. Figure 3-7 shows this most comprehensive measure
of welfare.
Since ignoring the emissions from overseas production biases the measure of social welfare
upward, our primary finding of net negative social effects of the carbon regulation is present at
even higher carbon damages. Grandfathering and auctioning now do not have net positive welfare
effects until the carbon price hits $60 per ton. The net welfare costs of grandfathering exceed five
billion dollars for a carbon prices in the range of $30 to $40 per ton. In contrast, the dynamic
updating regimes look even more relatively attractive, while still leading to losses of over a billion
dollars in NPV for a wide range of carbon prices, including very low levels. While the breakeven
price is slightly higher than in metric W2, the advantages that these dynamic schemes hold remain
large for even the highest carbon prices. This is entirely driven by the fact that dynamic updating
incentivizes firms to produce in the domestic market, reducing each market's reliance on imports,
which in turn mitigates leakage.
2 7This contrasts to other emissions that have spatially-varying damages. See, for example, Fowlie and Muller
(2010).
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In conclusion, our results strongly suggest that Buchanan's observation about needing to account
for market power when regulating the emissions of a concentrated industry is of primary importance
here. Net social welfare under all dynamic regimes is highly negative, frequently exceeding a billion
dollars for plausible levels of the carbon price, save for the highest possible carbon prices.
This result is robust to a wide range of demand elasticity estimates, which are a key determinant
of the consumer gross surplus in the model and therefore an important element in our welfare
measures. Appendix 3.8.3 presents a table with W3 welfare differences for different carbon prices
and elasticities. As one would expect, we find that the negative effects are even more persistent
when demand is more inelastic, but still present for more elastic demand curves.
3.7 Conclusion
We present a dynamic model to evaluate the counterfactual effects that different environmental
policies would have to the US cement industry. We asses the implications of several mechanisms
that have been discussed in policy circles. We examine the effects of a emissions permit market
where firms do not have any market power, and contrast the different dynamic implications that
auctioning, grandfathering, and two dynamic updating schemes have in this context.
Our primary finding is that for moderate levels of carbon prices, included a wide range around
those similar to those in extant European Trading System (ETS), a cap-and-trade scheme would
lead to significant social welfare losses. The intuition for this result is found in Buchanan (1969),
who emphasized the need to balance two countervailing forces in regulated oligopolies: one on hand,
the regulator wants to reduce harmful emissions, but on the other hand she must balance the losses
in product market surplus resulting from any further restrictions in quantity when market power is
present. We find that the latter effect dominates the former in the US Portland cement industry.
We estimate that the losses from subjecting the cement industry to carbon regulation would lead
to losses between one billion and five billion dollars, depending on the mechanism, for a range of
plausible carbon prices.
Our results reflect a complex interplay of equilibrium forces. The dynamic welfare consequences
of various allocation mechanisms are complicated by the equilibrium reactions of firms along their
entry, exit, and investment dimensions, which can result in a complex set of outcomes. Our results
highlight the competing tensions facing policymakers in these markets: one on hand, there are
concerns of serving the product market, and some allocation schemes result in more capitalized
markets with more firms and lower prices, which helps obtain this goal. On the other hand, these
allocation schemes may result in substantially more emissions than in more strict regimes that
result in lower producer and consumer surplus. In some extreme cases, grandfathering acts as a
net transfer of permits to the firms, which can be viewed as a government subsidy to pollute. This
analysis is further complicated by the need to account for emissions leakage through an increased
reliance on imports in coastal markets. Our analysis shows the complex interplay between these
schemes and equilibrium market structure, emissions, and welfare. We think that this paper is an
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important first step to understanding the interplay between these forces.
We are currently extending the analysis to cover all markets in the US Portland cement industry.
Using heterogeneous market structures in the different regional markets in the United States, we
would like to emphasize the potential spatially-differentiated impacts across heterogeneous markets
of the implementation of a homogeneous policy such a carbon tax. This undertaking will require
us to find ways to simulate very large markets, on the order of 8 or more strategic actors, which
is currently a computational challenge that we are addressing. The approximation methods used
in this paper may be useful in that regard, as they are capable of reducing the complexity of the
state space to a smaller number of relevant variables. The approximation methods of Benkard et al.
(2008) may also be fruitful in this regard.
3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Construction of Emissions Rates
Over half of the emissions from clinker production come from the chemical reaction that occurs
when the calcium carbonate in limestone is converted into lime and carbon dioxide. To measure
carbon dioxide emissions from calcination accurately, emissions factors can be determined based
on the volume of the clinker produced and the measured CaO and MgO contents of the clinker. In
the absence of this detailed plant-level information, we assume a default rate of 0.525 metric tons
of carbon dioxide/metric ton of clinker (WBC, 2005).
The other major source of carbon dioxide emissions from clinker production is fossil fuel com-
bustion. The preferred approach to estimating CO 2 emissions from fuel combustion requires data
on fuel consumption, heating values, and fuel specific carbon dioxide emission factors. Although
the Portland Cement Association (PCA) does collect plant level data regarding fuel inputs and
fuel efficiency (i.e. BTUs per ton of cement), these data are disaggregated data are not publicly
available. We do have data aggregated by kiln type and vintage. We use these data (reported in
2006), together with average carbon dioxide emissions factors, provided by the U.S. Department of
Energy, to estimate kiln technology specific emissions intensities.
We consider three classes of kilns in particular: wet process kilns (i.e. older, less efficient technol-
ogy), dry process kilns with preheater/precalciner, and a best practice energy intensity benchmark
(Coito et al., 2005)28 Because of the dominant role played by coal/pet coke, our benchmark emis-
sions calculations are based on coal/petcoke emissions factors. We assume an emissions factor of
210 lbs carbon dioxide/mmbtu. 29
28The industry has slowly been shifting away from wet process kilns towards more fuel-efficient dry process kilns.
On average, wet process operations use 34 percent more energy per ton of production than dry process operations.
No new wet kilns have been built in the United States since 1975, and approximately 85 percent of U.S. cement
production capacity now relies on the dry process technology.
2 9Fuel-specific emissions factors are listed in the Power Technologies Energy Data Book, published by the US
Department of Energy (2006). The emissions factors (in terms of lbs C02 per MMBTU) for petroleum coke and
bituminous coal axe 225 and 205, respectively. Here we use a factor of 210 lbs C02/MMBTU. This is likely an
overestimate for those units using waste fuels and/or natural gas.
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Our technology-specific emissions rate calculations are explained below. To put these numbers
in perspective, the national weighted average emissions rate was estimated to be 0.97 tons carbon
dioxide/ton cement in 2001 (Hanle et al, 2005).
Wet process In 2006, there were 47 wet process kilns in operation. On average, wet kilns
produced 300,000 tons of clinker (per kiln) per year. The PCA 2006 Survey reports an average
fuel efficiency of 6.5 mmbtu/metric ton of clinker equivalent among wet process kilns. The relevant
conversion is then 0.095 metric tons carbon dioxide/mmbtu * 6.5 mmbtu/metric ton of clinker
equivalent = 0.62 tons carbon dioxide/ton clinker. When added to process emissions, we obtain
our estimate of 1.16 tons carbon dioxide/ton clinker.
Dry process In 2006, there were 54 dry kilns equipped with precalciners with an average annual
output of 1,000,000 tons of clinker per year. The PCA 2006 Survey reports an average fuel efficiency
of 4.1 mmbtu/metric ton of clinker equivalent among dry process kilns with precalciners. Thus,
0.095 metric tons carbon dioxide/mmbtu * 4.1 mmbtu/metric ton of clinker equivalent = 0.39 tons
carbon dioxide/ton clinker. Adding this to process emissions results in the estimate for dry-process
kilns: 0.93 tons carbon dioxide/ton clinker.
Frontier technology To establish estimates for new entrants, a recent study (Coito et al, 2005)
establishes a best practice standard of 2.89 mmbtu/ metric ton of clinker (not clinker equivalent).
The calculation is then: 0.095 metric tons carbon dioxide/mmbtu * 2.89 mmbtu/metric ton of
clinker equivalent= 0.275 tons carbon dioxide/ton clinker. Adding this to process emissions obtains
in 0.81 tons carbon dioxide/ton clinker for new kilns.30
3.8.2 Abatement response
In the simulation exercise, the state space is modified such that emissions rates vary systematically
across plants of different vintages and technology types. Incumbent firms are classified as either
wet-process, dry-process, or dry-process with precalciner/preheaters. New kilns are assumed to
be state-of-the-art. This modification allows us to crudely capture changes in embodied emissions
intensity as the industry evolves.
There are four main strategies for reducing the carbon intensity of domestic cement industry.
First, it is anticipated that capital stock turnover will be a major driver of emissions intensity
reductions (Worrell, 1999). Replacing old wet-process kilns with state-of-the-art dry kilns could
deliver significant reductions in combustion-related emissions.
Second, the carbon intensity of clinker production can also be reduced via fuel switching. Cur-
rently, coal and petroleum coke are overwhelmingly the dominant fuel used in pyroprocessing and
3oThis is very similar to the C02 emissions rate assumed in analyses carried out by California's Air Resources Board
in 2008 under a best practice scenario that does not involve fuel switching. If fuel switching is assumed, best practice
emissions rates drop as low as 0.69 MT C02/ MT cement. See NRDC Cement GHG Reduction Final Calculations.
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electricity is used to grind raw materials into kiln feed. Most domestic kilns are capable of burning
a variety of fuels in principle, although fuel switching can adversely affect plant performance.
Third, concrete manufacturers have the capacity to partially substitute SCMs for clinker inputs.
The advantage of this emissions reduction strategy is that, by reducing the use of clinker, carbon
emissions from both fuel combustion and calcination are eliminated. Finally, cement manufacturers
have some capacity to substitute less carbon intensive raw materials for limestone.
Data limitations will prevent us frol being able to model input and fuel substitution capabilities
accurately at the plant level. In our model, these two abatement options are ignored. In the policy
simulations, carbon dioxide emissions from the domestic cement industry can be reduced via four
channels: accelerated capital turnover (i.e. retirement of older kilns and investment in newer, more
efficient operations), a reallocation of production from more to less emissions intensive incumbents,
an increased reliance on imports, and a decrease in domestic clinker consumption. To the extent
that fuel and input substitution are economically viable and cost effective compliance alternatives,
our results will over estimate compliance costs and thus should be interpreted as upper bounds.
3.8.3 Sensitivity to elasticity of demand
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Table 3.3: Differences in welfare with respect to baseline (W3) for different demand elasticities
7.5 15 22.5 30 37.5 45 52.5 60 67.5 75
7 = 1.50
Auction -128.441 -299.945 -525.263 -714.717 -847.863 -915.220 -922.032 -901.835 -851.665 -777.361
Grandfather -142.674 -308.523 -477.578 -714.188 -836.786 -903.831 -910.066 -911.950 -889.972 -871.328
Emissions -90.461 -174.186 -272.596 -356.210 -397.958 -395.531 -374.862 -336.382 -262.0103 -189.074
Output -91.223 -173.232 -277.816 -359.551 -394.708 -388.960 -360.215 -306.725 -240.034 -173.458
7= 2.00
Auction -128.953 -253.071 -469.191 -639.213 -741.893 -787.662 -740.251 -674.668 -589.020 -469.628
Grandfather -143.177 -273.084 -421.168 -647.386 -741.054 -784.645 -756.894 -721.253 -672.628 -594.157
Emissions -93.486 -173.380 -219.465 -310.038 -339.423 -338.456 -292.108 -202.626 -117.108 -15.110
Output -92.748 -172.555 -221.441 -309.049 -342.227 -324.668 -276.628 -175.581 -100.761 -4.341
77 = 2.50
Auction -150.999 -271.267 -431.413 -606.362 -669.576 -667.880 -599.592 -500.816 -379.081 -199.175
Grandfather -166.273 -287.968 -395.513 -574.375 -666.361 -676.948 -634.033 -567.557 -483.336 -331.987
Emissions -122.754 -182.938 -219.382 -276.212 -300.628 -283.050 -206.387 -108.264 11.796 141.488
Output -112.945 -184.9716 -220.061 -276.808 -303.663 -264.579 -190.577 -90.720 21.638 153.039
7= 3.00
Auction -169.386 -287.133 -417.544 -557.135 -615.450 -577.343 -489.587 -366.278 -195.088 26.625
Grandfather -186.695 -309.195 -398.123 -528.205 -613.723 -594.224 -531.408 -437.924 -305.914 -100.063
Emissions -124.654 -199.743 -225.488 -252.536 -271.031 -242.318 -144.859 -20.900 a 122.926 273.051
Output -125.397 -200.999 -225.342 -253.461 -270.535 -239.011 -130.876 -6.727 130.552 282.548
77 = 3.50
Auction -192.281 -309.853 -412.307 -515.935 -553.772 -490.665 -379.100 -219.507 -5.481 248.741
Grandfather -210.955 -332.166 -401.017 -476.994 -549.177 -507.037 -424.262 -296.374 -112.651 130.821
Emissions -141.729 -217.109 -232.320 -235.808 -229.891 -183.774 -67.421 76.268 247.528 420.392
Output -141.653 -215.751 -231.999 -235.488 -231.560 -180.627 -59.538 82.158 249.379 433.288
7 = 4.00
Auction -278.287 -380.091 -446.477 -501.648 -496.442 -397.194 -247.951 -31.951 233.663 534.298
Grandfather -287.609 -401.531 -440.164 -460.772 -502.502 -414.753 -290.297 -109.802 130.837 425.685
Emissions -234.489 -287.317 -276.759 -239.081 -196.342 -111.968 46.307 226.459 433.527 644.581
Output -233.866 -284.818 -275.133 -237.255 -196.772 -100.963 50.923 224.914 430.609 652.808
Notes: Table reports average differences in welfare for a subset of regional markets with three or less firms (Cincinnati, Detroit, Minneapolis,
Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, Seattle).
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